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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the centraijustifications for the 2003 war in Iraq was the need
for regime change.1 The United States claimed that an Iraq freed of
Ba'ath Party rule, and following democratic and free market principles,
would reap benefits for its people, the region, and the rest of the
world.2 Almost immediately after major hostilities ended, U.S. civil
administrators began to implement this vision. A vast program of
reform was undertaken. Iraqi political, legal, economic, and regulatory
institutions were remade to accord with models generally found in
Western, developed states. Inconsistent Iraqi law was repealed. Virtu-
ally all components of a political system dominated by one-party rule
and an economy characterized by central planning and ownership
were swept aside.3 As the U.S.-led occupation authority declared in a
mid-term review, "[t] he ultimate goal for Iraq is a durable peace for a
unified and stable, democratic Iraq that is underpinned by new and
protected freedoms and a growing market economy.,4
Given the centrality of these reforms to U.S. war aims, the legal issue
they raise assumed a critical importance: can a foreign power in
custody of a defeated state effectively remake its laws and public
1. See, e.g., President's Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the
Union, 40 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 94 (Jan. 20, 2004), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2004/01/200401 20-7.html.
2. Threats and Responses; In the President's Words: 'Free People Will Keep the Peace of the World', N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 27, 2003, at A10.
3. See discussion of the reform initiatives infra Part II.B.
4. Coalition Provisional Authority, An Historic Review of CPA Accomplishments 4, available at
http://www.cpa-iraq.org (last visitedJan. 19, 2005). This website is no longer being updated and
will be available only until June 30, 2005.
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institutions? Is occupation an opportunity for social engineering dur-
ing which legislative prerogatives are temporarily transferred to the
occupier? Or does international law reserve fundamental decisions
about legal and economic policy to a post-occupation, indigenous
government? Public discussion of this question was minimal, if not
non-existent. At first blush this seems surprising: virtually all of the
important political controversies emerging from the war turned largely
on points of law, and discussion in the media often focused on the
international legal questions.5 Several factors may explain the lack of
public attention to legal aspects of the occupation reforms. First, few
were inclined to question efforts at improving human rights and
economic conditions in a country whose recent history had witnessed
profound suffering. Second, U.S. authorities deliberately sought to
reframe the issue, seeking to avoid the negative implications that
seemed to follow from the term "occupying power." Shortly after U.S.
military forces entered Baghdad on April 9, 2003, General Tommy
Franks, commander of the coalition forces, announced that the Ameri-
cans had "come as liberators, not occupiers." 6 Other U.S. officials
5. These included the proper role of the United Nations Security Council in authorizing the
war, prosecution of deposed Ba'ath Party leaders, alleged torture of Iraqi detainees, misconduct
by private contractors, the status of United States and other foreign forces after the return of an
Iraqi government, the awarding of reconstruction contracts, and the protection (or lack thereof)
of Iraqi cultural heritage. SeeJohn F. Burns, Thom Shanker & Steven R. Weisman, U.S. Officials
Fashion Legal Basis to Keep Force in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2004, at A10 (discussing the status of
post-occupation forces); Severin Carrell & Robert Verkaik, War on Iraq Was Illegal, Say Top Lawyers,
INDEP., May 25, 2003, at 6 (discussing war's legality); Ariana Eunjung Cha & Renae Merle, Line
Increasingly Blurred Between Soldiers and Civilian Contractors, WASH. POST, May 13, 2004, at Al
(discussing the role of contractors); Christopher Greenwood, Trying Saddam, THE GuARDiAN
(U.K.), Dec. 17, 2003, Guardian Leader Pages at 21 (trial of Ba'athist leaders); Guy Gugliotta,
Pentagon Was Told of Risk to Museums; U.S. Urged to Save Iraq's Historic Artifacts, WASH. POST, Apr. 14,
2003, at A19 (discussing protection of cultural heritage); Luke Harding, Torture Commonplace, Say
Inmates' Families, THE GuARDIAN (U.K.), May 3, 2004, Guardian Home Pages at 5; Seymour M.
Hersh, Torture at Abu Ghraib, NEW YORKER, May 10, 2004, at 42 (discussing detainee torture);
Ignacio Ramonet, Lawless War, LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, Apr. 2003, available at http://
mondediplo.com/2003/04/01 lawlesswar (discussing war's legality); Jackie Spinner, Only Allies to
Help with Rebuilding U.S. to Deny Contracts to Firms from Nonsupporting Nations, WASH. POST, Dec. 10,
2003, at Al (discussing preference in reconstruction contracts); Raymond Whitaker & Robert
Verkaik, Revealed: Attorney General Changed His Advice on Legality of Iraq War, INDEP., Feb. 29, 2004, at
I (discussing war's legality). Concise discussions of these and other legal questions raised by the
Iraqi war and occupation can be found in the Insight publications of the American Society of
International Law. See http://www.asil.org/insights.htm.
6. See Nir Rosen, When a Liberator Is an Occupier, ASIA TIMES, Dec. 4, 2003 (quoting General
Tommy Franks), at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle East/EL04Ak04.html.
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repeated this statement.7 The distinction seemed to fit well with the
U.S. promise to bring democracy and human rights to Iraq. But what
were the U.S. forces in law if not occupiers? As a U.S. officer later
admitted to a reporter, "[t]here is no liberation law, only occupation
law."8 A report of the U.S. Third Mechanized Infantry went further:
"For political reasons, leaders declared that U.S. forces were 'liberating
forces' rather than occupying forces .... As a matter of law and fact, the
United States is an occupying power in Iraq, even if we characterize
ourselves as liberators."'9
Finally, the reform program in Iraq appeared to resemble the many
nation-building operations undertaken by the United Nations in the
1990s. After Cambodia, Liberia, Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, and
others, it was no longer politically remarkable for the international
community to assist (or even direct) the rebuilding of governing
institutions in post-conflict states. And so it was a reasonable assump-
tion that the legal basis for these reformist missions was also uncontro-
versial. Why should Iraq be any different?
But profound legal questions do exist about the Iraqi reforms. These
arise out of the international law of occupation, which is codified in two
treaties-the 1907 Hague Regulations Respecting the Laws and Cus-
7. For example, on April 25, 2003, Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs Marc
Grossman told an interviewer, "Obviously we consider ourselves to be liberators of Iraq, not the
occupiers of Iraq ... ." U.S. Dep't of State, International Information Programs, Grossman Says
U.S. Liberator, Not Occupier of Iraq (Apr. 30, 2003), at http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.
html?p=washfile-english&y=2003&m =April&x= 20030430151708tiwomods0.3930475&t=
xarchives/xarchitem.html. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Peter
W. Rodman told a House Committee on March 3, 2004, "[W]e have kept our promise-that we
were there [in Afghanistan and Iraq] as liberators, not occupiers." U.S. Central Command Fiscal Year
2005 Posture Hearing Before the House Comm. on Armed Services, 108th Cong. (Mar. 3, 2003)
(statement by Peter W. Rodman, U.S. Assistant Sec'y of Defense for Int'l Security Affairs), at
http://ww.house.gov/hasc/openingstatementsandpressreleases/18thcongress/04-O3-O3rodma-
n.html. Secretary Powell took a more nuanced approach: "We are not occupiers ... . We have
come under a legal term having to do with occupation under international law, but we came as
liberators." CNN.com, Powell: WeAre Not Occupiers'in Iraq (Sept. 14,2003), at http://www.cnn.com/
2003/WORLD/meast/09/14/spj.irq.main/. See also Editorial, The U.N. 's Better Idea on Iraq, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 10, 2003, at A30 ("President Bush has repeatedly said that American forces came to
Iraq as liberators, not occupiers.").
8. Rosen, supra note 6 (internal quotations omitted).
9. THiRD INFANTRY DIVISION (MECHANIZED) AFTER ACTION REPORT: OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM
289 (2003), available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2003/3id-aar-
ju03.pdf.
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toms of War on Land (Hague Regulations)10 and the 1949 Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War (the Fourth Geneva Convention or GC IV). i" In the traditional
understanding, an occupying power is a temporary custodian of the
status quo in the territory it controls.' 2 Occupiers are assumed to
remain only for the limited period between the cessation of hostilities
and the conclusion of a final peace treaty. That treaty determines the
fate of the occupied territory, most likely returning it to the ousted de
jure sovereign. Thus, an occupier exercises mere de facto power. For
that reason it enjoys no general legislative authority to make perma-
nent changes to legal and political structures in the territory. These are
instead choices reserved to an indigenous government upon its return
to power at the end of the occupation.1 3 This limitation on the
law-making capacity of the occupier may be referred to as the "conser-
vationist principle."
The principle has obvious and troubling implications for the sweep-
ing reform agenda pursued in Iraq. But adopting this legal paradigm
presents an immediate problem, one that suggests the U.S. distinction
between "liberator" and "occupier" may not have been so fanciful after
all. If occupation law cast the United States as a custodian of Iraq, was it
to be a mere disinterested observer of pre-existing conditions in the
country? Did the conservationist principle truly require it to respect the
laws and political institutions of the Iraqi Ba'ath Party, widely con-
demned for horrific human rights abuses? Surely, as the only func-
tional authority in Iraq, the American administrators were obligated to
oversee the welfare of individual Iraqis. And surely this would entail
altering, reinterpreting, or even discarding some Iraqi laws. If this is
true, does the Iraq war make the case that the international law of
occupation (or a least this part of it) should be treated as an anachro-
nism?
Much of the discussion that follows will explore the legal interplay
between these contending imperatives of conservation and reform as
they played out in Iraq. The two sides in this debate break down largely
between an emphasis on the importance of substantive goals sought by
10. Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, Regulations
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631 [hereinafter
Hague Regulations].
11. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention].
12. GERHARD VON GLAHN, THE OCCUPATION OF ENEMY TERRITORY 27-37 (1957).
13. See infra Part III.C.
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the occupation on the one hand and a proper allocation of decision-
making competence on the other. Support for the reforms is based on
their consistency with international legal standards such as those set
out in human rights treaties, as well as prevailing "best practices"
followed by the most highly developed Western democracies. Iraq, it is
argued, lagged far behind these high standards and could not success-
fully emerge from years of repressive, centralized rule without adopting
the modes of governing Western democracies embody. Opposition to
the reforms' legitimacy is based not on a wholesale rejection of reform,
though many may question, for example, the virtual elimination of any
barriers to foreign investment in a country scarcely able to compete in a
globalized marketplace for goods and services. The critique, in other
words, does not involve a debate as to whether the reforms were good
or bad for Iraq. Rather, it rests on the view that an occupier acquires
only limited rights in the territory it has secured by military force. To
permit an occupier all of the prerogatives of the ousted de jure
sovereign would effectively collapse the distinction between occupa-
tion and annexation. The conservationist principle, on this view, is a
norm primarily concerned with process that cabins the legislative
discretion of an occupier regardless of the substantive merits of the
reforms it is prepared to enact.
As this Article will make clear, however, the two sides' seemingly clear
distinction between substance and process is not always easy to main-
tain. There are arguments in support of the reforms that rely on the
occupier in fact acquiring valid legislative authority, most importantly
through actions of the United Nations Security Council. And some
arguments against the occupiers' actions challenge the substantive bona
fides of certain reforms under international law, most notably in the
economic sphere. Finally, there is the question of the lingering effect of
the United States' failure to secure Security Council backing for the
war itself. Did the Council's reluctance to approve a use of force
designed to remove Iraq's Ba'athist leaders have implications for
post-war reforms also designed to implement that goal? As will be seen,
the answer operates on the level of both doctrine and politics. The
former concerns the relation between occupation law, which addresses
conduct in warfare, and law regulating the resort to force in the first
place. The latter concerns the Council's willingness to grant the
occupiers a clear reformist mandate knowing that doing so would in
some sense be seen as validating a war that many members opposed
from the outset and continued to oppose during the occupation. In
short, criticism of the reforms does not automatically reflect a callous
disregard for efforts to improve life in Iraq. And support for them does
[Vol. 36
THE OCCUPATION OF IRA Q
not necessarily give a blank check to any and all occupiers to govern as
if they were the legitimate sovereign.
The discussion will proceed as follows. Part II describes the nature of
the occupation regime established by the United States. The Coalition
Provisional Authority (CPA) undertook reforms in six major areas and
significantly altered pre-existing Iraqi law and governing institutions.
Part III explores the nature and scope of the conservationist principle,
the primary legal impediment to a reformist occupation. Part IV
evaluates how the U.S. reforms fare under that principle. Because a
literal reading of the conservationist principle would find many of the
reforms unacceptably over-broad, Part V considers five separate theo-
ries that might justify the U.S. actions. These are consent by Iraqi
authorities, legislative action by the Security Council, desuetude of the
conservationist principle, a reformist reading of occupation law and
recourse to the Allied occupation of Germany after World War II as
legal precedent. Part VI offers some tentative conclusions.
II. THE NATURE OF THE OCCUPATION
The occupation of Iraq followed a long political confrontation and a
short war. At the end of the first Gulf War in April 1991, the U.N.
Security Council imposed a laundry list of obligations on Iraq in
Resolution 687.14 Many have analogized this resolution to a peace
treaty, designed to eliminate a defeated nation's capacity to wage war
on its neighbors.1 5 Its most far-reaching provisions obligated Iraq to
permit intrusive inspections by international personnel who would
verify the destruction of its chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons
capabilities. 16 The remainder of the 1990s witnessed a series of confron-
tations between Iraq and the inspectors over these disarmament obliga-
tions. 17 In 2002, after a four-year absence, the inspectors returned to
Iraq following the Security Council's decision in Resolution 1441 that it
was in "material breach" of its obligations under Resolution 687 and
subsequent resolutions and that it had "a final opportunity" to make
full disclosure of its weapons stockpiles and capabilities.
18
Consensus at the United Nations then collapsed. The United States
14. S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2981st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (1991).
15. See Bardo Fassbender, Uncertain Steps into a Post-Cold War World: The Role and Functioning of
the UN Security Council Afier a Decade of Measures Against Iraq, 13 EUR. J. IN'TL L. 273, 279 (2002).
16. S.C. Res. 687, supra note 14, 1 7-14.
17. See generally Fassbender, supra note 15.
18. S.C. Res. 1441, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4644th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1441 (2002).
2005]
GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
claimed that Iraq had failed to meet the demands of Resolution 1441
and sought the Council's authorization to initiate armed interven-
tion. 9 When the necessary votes failed to materialize, the United States
and Britain, undeterred, commenced hostilities on March 20, 2003.20
Iraqi resistance proved minimal. U.S. forces entered Baghdad on April
9, and the Pentagon declared an end to major hostilities on April 14.21
Most leaders of the Iraqi Government were either dead or captured or
had gone into hiding, bringing the regime's control over the country to
an abrupt end.22
A. The Structure of the Occupying Authority
The ensuing occupation lasted just over fourteen months, ending on
June 28, 2004. The institutions of occupied rule took shape in the
month immediately following the end of hostilities. Two actors were
primarily responsible: the U.N. Security Council, where broad ques-
tions of the occupiers' authority were addressed in a series of resolu-
tions, and the American-led CPA, the body that exercised day-to-day
governing power.
The United States and the United Kingdom announced the creation
of the CPA in a letter to the Security Council on May 8, 2003.23 The new
authority would "exercise powers of government temporarily" in Iraq.24
Two weeks later the Security Council passed Resolution 1483, its first to
address issues of governance under occupation. The Council acknowl-
edged the U.S./U.K. letter and described the two states as "occupying
powers under unified command. 25 It referred to this command as "the
Authority," but said little about the specific powers assumed by the CPA
other than to refer several times to the importance of international
occupation law and the responsibilities it created for the two states.26
19. See Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law: Use of Military Force
to Disarm Iraq, 97 AM.J. INT'L L. 419, 421-25 (Sean D. Murphy ed., 2003).
20. Id. at 425.
21. Id. at 426-27.
22. Id. at 430-31.
23. Letter Dated 8 May 2003 from the Permanent Representatives of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to the United Nations Addressed to the
President of the Security Council U.N. Doc. S/2003/538 (2003).
24. Id.
25. S.C. Res. 1483, U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4761st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (2003).
26. See id. pmbl. (noting U.S./U.K letter and "recognizing the specific authorities, responsi-
bilities, and obligations under applicable international law of these states as occupying powers
under unified command"); id. 5 (calling on "all concerned to comply fully with their obligations
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While the precise origins of the CPA remain unclear-it was not
created by any specific act of U.S. or U.K. law, and a thorough study of
its creation concluded that "[d] etailed information that explicitly and
clearly identifies how the authority was established, and by whom, is not
readily available"27-the Security Council never questioned the CPA's
leading role in making policy for occupied Iraq.
Shortly thereafter, the CPA issued its first decree, Regulation No. 1,
which defined the scope of its powers:
The CPA shall exercise powers of government temporarily in
order to provide for the effective administration of Iraq during
the period of transitional administration, to restore conditions
of security and stability, to create conditions in which the Iraqi
people can freely determine their own political future, includ-
ing by advancing efforts to restore and establish national and
local institutions for representative governance and facilitating
economic recovery and sustainable reconstruction and develop-
ment.
28
In order to exercise these "powers of government," the CPA was to be
"vested with all executive, legislative and judicial authority necessary to
achieve its objectives, to be exercised under relevant U.N. Security
Council resolutions, including Resolution 1483 (2003), and the laws
and usages of war."' 29 The CPA would exercise these powers by issuing
Regulations, Orders, and interpretive Memoranda. 30 Regulations and
Orders would "take precedence over all other laws and publications to
the extent such other laws and publications are inconsistent. '31 Exist-
ing Iraqi law that did not impede CPA objectives, however, would
under international law including in particular the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Hague
Regulations of 1907").
27. L. ELAINE HALCHIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTOrrITY (CPA):
ORIGIN, CHARACTERISTICS, AND INSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITIES 4 (Apr. 29, 2004), available at http://
fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/32338.pdf.
28. Coalition Provisional Authority Regulation No. 1, CPA/REG/16 May 2003/01 (May 16,
2003), available at www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20030516_CPAREG1 _TheCoalition_
Provisional Authoity_.pdf. The chronology at this point is rather unclear. CPA Regulation No. 1
bears a date of May 16, 2003, but it makes reference to Security Council Resolution 1483, which
was passed almost one week later on May 22, 2003. I will assume that Regulation No. I was
back-dated for reasons not explained in official CPA documents.
29. Id. § 1 (2).
30. Id. §§ 3(l), 4(1).
31. Id. § 3(1).
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remain in force:
Unless suspended or replaced by the CPA or suspended by
legislation issued by democratic institutions of Iraq, laws in
force in Iraq as of April 16, 2003 shall continue to apply in Iraq
insofar as the laws do not prevent the CPA from exercising its
rights and fulfilling its obligations, or conflict with the present
or any other Regulation or Order issued by the CPA.
The CPA thus asserted a plenary authority to govern Iraq. The Security
Council, however, called for an indigenous Iraqi body to play a role in
the occupation administration. Resolution 1483 supported "the forma-
tion, by the people of Iraq ... of an Iraqi interim administration as a
transitional administration run by Iraqis, until an internationally recog-
nized, representative government is established by the people of Iraq
and assumes the responsibilities of the Authority."3 3 On July 13, the
CPA announced the formation of the Governing Council of Iraq,
acknowledging its origins in Resolution 1483. 4 The CPA also selected
the twenty-five members of the Governing Council. 35 The CPA de-
scribed the Governing Council as "the principal body of the Iraqi
interim administration, pending the establishment of an internation-
ally recognized, representative government by the people of Iraq. 3 6 It
seemed to grant the Governing Council something of a partnership in
governing Iraq: "the Governing Council and the CPA shall consult and
coordinate on all matters involving the temporary governance of Iraq,
including the authorities of the Governing Council."3 7
Two months later, the Security Council welcomed the creation of the
Governing Council, which it described as "an important step towards
the formation by the people of Iraq of an internationally recognized,
32. Id.§2.
33. S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 25, 9.
34. Governing Council oflraq, Coalition Provisional Authority Regulation No. 6, CPA/REG/13
July 2003/06 (July 13, 2003), available atwww.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20030713_CPAREG_
6_GoverningCouncil-of Iraq_.pdf. The second preambular paragraph "[r]ecogniz[ed] that, as
stated in paragraph 9 of Resolution 1483, the Security Council supports the formation of an Iraqi
interim administration as a transitional administration run by Iraqis, until the people of Iraq
establish an internationally recognized, representative government that assumes the responsibili-
ties of the CPA." Id. pmbl. (italicization omitted).
35. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 24 of Security Council Resolution 1483,
U.N. Doc. S/2003/715, 24 (2003) [hereinafter SGJuly Report].
36. Coalition Provisional Authority Regulation No. 6, supra note 34, § 1.
37. Id. § 2(1).
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representative government that will exercise the sovereignty of Iraq.,
38
In October, the Security Council went further and described the
Governing Council and its ministers as "the principal bodies of the
Iraqi interim administration, which.., embodies the sovereignty of the
State of Iraq during the transitional period."
3 9
Neither the CPA nor the Security Council described with any preci-
sion how the Governing Council would fit into the governing structure
of the occupation. No public document states whether the CPA or the
Governing Council (or both) would initiate changes in Iraqi law,
whether the approval of both bodies was necessary, or how conflicts
between the two bodies would be resolved. 40 The CPA did delegate a
variety of tasks to the Governing Council and the Iraqi-run ministries.
41
In addition, Resolution 1483 required that the disbursement of funds
by the new Development Fund for Iraq, as well as the review of
contracts under the U.N. "Oil-for-Food" program, be made in "coordi-
nation" or "consultation" with the Governing Council.42 But no general
autonomy in decision-making emerged from these discrete cessions of
authority.
Indeed, the contrary seems to have been the case. CPA Regulation
No. 6, creating the Council, did not alter the CPA's earlier description
of itself as vested with all executive, legislative and judicial authority
necessary to achieve its objectives. 43 Such authority necessarily in-
cluded the ability to ignore Governing Council objections to its deci-
sions or to bypass consultation in the first place. Regulation No. 6 did
provide that the CPA would "consult and coordinate" with the Govern-
38. S.C. Res. 1500, U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4808th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1500 (2003)
(describing Governing Council as "broadly representative").
39. S.C. Res. 1511, U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4844th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1511 (2003).
40. The President of the Governing Council himself admitted to the Security Council that
Resolution 1483 "did not set out in a clear and precise manner the functions of the interim
administration." U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4791st mtg. at 9, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4791 (2003).
41. See, e.g., International Donor Assistance, Coalition Provisional Authority Regulation No. 7,
CPA/REG/5 Dec. 2003/07, § 6 (Dec. 5, 2003) (CPA delegates to Governing Council all its
authority to deal with international reconstruction assistance to Iraq.), available at http://
www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/ 20031205_CPAREG_7_InternationalDonorAssistance.pdf;
Licensing Telecommunications Services and Equipment, Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 11,
CPA/ORD/8 June 2003/11, § 2(1) (June 8, 2003) (Iraqi Ministry of Transportation and
Communications "shall assume responsibility for licensing all commercial telecommunications
services in Iraq."), available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20030609_CPAORD-
I lLicensingTelecommunications Svc andEquipment.pdf.
42. S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 25, 1 13, 16.
43. Compare Coalition Provisional Authority Regulation No. 1, supra note 28, with Coalition
Provisional Authority Regulation No. 6, supra note 34.
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ing Council "[i]n accordance with Resolution 1483. ' '4 In Resolution
1483, as noted, the Security Council placed responsibility for governing
Iraq with the occupying powers.45 While the Council did call for the
creation of "an Iraqi interim administration" in Resolution 1483, not
only did it fail to specify the duties of such a body but, in context, this
call seems directed to a future period between the time the occupying
powers relinquished authority and when a permanent, elected Iraqi
government took office. The reference to Resolution 1483 in Regula-
tion No. 6, therefore, did not appear to enhance the Governing
Council's powers.
Unofficial sources confirm the Council's subordinate role, with
many describing a CPA "veto" power over all Governing Council
actions. 46 In several cases, the CPA Administrator threatened to with-
hold his approval of the Council's decisions, a threat reported as fatal
to the proposed initiatives.47 In sum, the Governing Council appears to
have played a purely advisory role.
44. See Coalition Provisional Authority Regulation No. 6, supra note 34, § 2(1).
45. The resolution
4. Calls upon the Authority, consistent with the Charter of the United Nations and other
relevant international law, to promote the welfare of the Iraqi people through the
effective administration of the territory, including in particular working towards the
restoration of conditions of security and stability and the creation of conditions in
which the Iraqi people can freely determine their own political future; 5. Calls upon all
concerned to comply fully with their obligations under international law including in
particular the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Hague Regulations of 1907.
S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 25, 4-5.
46. See Council on Foreign Relations, Iraq's Governing Council (Council "can appoint interim
diplomats and ministers, approve budgets, and propose policies, but the coalition authorities can
veto any of its decisions"), at http://www.cfr.org/background_iraqcouncil.php (May 17, 2004);
Christian Ule, Coudert Bros. LLP, Legal Framework for Foreign Investment in Iraq ("[T] he CPA has
reserved itself a veto-right and, thus, may abrogate the Governing Council's resolutions."), at
http://%rw.coudert.com.au/publications/articles/031015-70iraqlnvestcb.pdf (Oct. 15, 2003).
47. See, e.g., Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Iraq Occupation Faces New Challenge; Shiite Demand to Elect
Constitution's Drafters Could Delay Transfer of Power, WAsH. POST, Oct. 21, 2003, at A20 (In crafting a
process to draft new Iraqi constitution, "[t]he occupation authority is allowing the Governing
Council to choose how the drafters will be selected, but Bremer reserves the right to veto the
decision."); Richard A. Oppel, Jr. & Robert F. Worth, After the War: Politics, N.Y. TIMES, July 19,
2003, at A7; Vivienne Walt, Iraq Schools Trying to Close Book on Ba'athist Reome, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct.
1, 2003, at A15 ("The US administrator in Iraq, L. Paul Bremer III, who has veto power over the
Governing Council, has not approved the council's decision" to fire teachers who were Ba'ath
Party members.); Edward Wong, The Struggle for Iraq: The Government, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2004, at
All.
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Finally, two United Nations actors created by the Security Council
were active in the occupation. Neither, however, asserted an indepen-
dent check on the CPA's supreme governing powers. The first was the
Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG). In Resolution
1483 the Council asked the Secretary-General to appoint an SRSG so
that he could address a wide range of substantive tasks "in coordination
with the Authority." 48 None involved an actual role in governing.
49
Further, in executing his mandate the SRSG "made clear the indepen-
dence of his role and that the Coalition Provisional Authority, not the
United Nations, was responsible for administering Iraq, for providing
for the welfare of the people, and for restoring conditions of security
and stability." 50 In mid-August 2003, the Security Council established
the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), headed by
the SRSG.51 But UNAMI's tasks were similarly of the planning, coordi-
nation, exhortation, and information-seeking variety.52 The role of the
United Nations, in sum, was that of a facilitator, not a ruler: "to assist
the Iraqi people in achieving their goals [] ... to help them participate
in, and take ownership of, the definition of the policies and priorities
that will shape the future of their country."
53
The second entity was a "multinational force under unified com-
mand," which the Security Council authorized in Resolution 1511 to
"take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of
security and stability in Iraq. '54 The United States and Great Britain
often referred to this force as "the coalition," noting that forty-eight
states had either sent troops or made other contributions.55 Descrip-
tively, this claim was largely rhetorical, as the United States and Britain
48. S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 25, 1 8. The United Nations referred to the CPA as "the
Authority."
49. Many of the tasks involved issues of governance, such as "efforts to restore and establish
national and local institutions for representative governance," "facilitating the reconstruction of
key infrastructure," "economic reconstruction and the conditions for sustainable development,"
and protecting human rights and judicial reform. But they were all to be done "in coordination"
with the CPA or other actors, or the SRSG was to "encourage" or "promote" the goals. He was not
asked to assume exclusive control over any task. Id.
50. SJuly Report, supra note 35, at 22.
51. S.C. Res. 1500, supra note 38.
52. SGJuly Report, supra note 35, at 19-20 (describing UNAMI's mandate, later approved by
Security Council in Resolution 1500).
53. Id. at 19.
54. S.C. Res. 1511, supra note 39, 13.
55. The White House, Coalition Members (Mar. 27, 2003), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2003/03/20030327-10.html.
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supplied over 90% of the foreign forces in Iraq. 56 Legally, the multina-
tional force had no mandate to assert U.N. control over governance or
security matters. The Security Council did not create any form of
operational control over the force. U.S. military commanders (like the
CPA Administrator) reported directly to the U.S. Secretary of Defense
and through him to the President of the United States. 57 There seems
little basis, therefore, to regard the multinational force as a separate
legal actor for purposes of assessing compliance with the law of
occupation.
B. Legal and Institutional Reforms
In Regulation No. 1, the CPA granted itself authority to supersede
any law in force in Iraq. It used this legislative authority to enact a set of
reforms so broad that it is no exaggeration to describe the CPA as
having engaged in a social engineering project in Iraq. The following
sections describe the CPA's reform efforts in several key sectors.
1. De-Ba'athification
On the same date it announced its own creation, the CPA issued
Order No. 1 on the "De-Ba'athification of Iraqi Society." 58 "By this
means," the CPA stated, the occupiers would "ensure that representa-
tive government in Iraq is not threatened by Ba'athist elements return-
ing to power and that those in positions of authority in the future are
acceptable to the people of Iraq."59 The Ba'ath Party was formally
"disestablished" by "eliminating the Party's structures and removing its
leadership from positions of authority and responsibility in Iraqi soci-
ety."60 Both junior and senior members of the Party were removed
from governmental positions and barred from future employment in
the public sector. 61 All senior Party members and junior members
56. In July 2004, 133,000 foreign soldiers were stationed in Iraq. U.S. and U.K troops
constituted most of these, with 112,000 being American. BBC News, Coalition Troops in Iraq (July
20, 2004), at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middleeast/3873359.stm.
57. HALCHIN, supra note 27, at 11.
58. De-Ba'athification of Iraqi Society, Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 1, CPA/
ORD/16 May 2003/01 (May 16, 2003), available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/
20030516_CPAORD_1 De-Baathification of IraqiSociety_.pdf.
59. Id. § 1(1).
60. Id. The Party's removal from public life was total. All images of Saddam Hussein and
other "readily identifiable" members of the Ba'ath Party, as well as symbols of the Party itself, were
banned from display in government buildings or public spaces. Id. § 1 (4).
61. Id. § 1(1)-(3).
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holding positions in the upper tiers of government ministries were to
be evaluated for criminal conduct and detained if deemed a security
risk or a risk of flight. 62 In November 2003, the CPA delegated
authority to conduct de-Ba'athification to the Governing Council.63
Several days later, the CPA extended the scope of these purges by
ordering the dissolution of governmental entities used "to oppress the
Iraqi people and as institutions of torture, repression and corrup-
tion."64 The dissolved entities comprised seven ministries or governmen-
tal divisions, two cadres of Saddam Hussein's bodyguards, eight military
organizations, four paramilitaries, and seven other organizations. 65 All
assets of these entities were to be turned over to the CPA, all their
financial obligations suspended, all their personnel dismissed, and all
tides or ranks conferred by the entities cancelled.66
Many observers criticized the de-Ba'athification program as depriv-
ing the Iraqi government and military of needed expertise and claimed
that it unfairly excluded those who had joined the Ba'ath Party due to
necessity rather than for ideological reasons.67 The CPA appeared to
respond to this criticism. On June 28, the last day of its existence, the
CPA rescinded the Governing Council's authority to conduct de-
Ba'athification.68
62. Id.
63. Delegation of Authority Under De-Ba'athification Order No. 1, Coalition Provisional Authority
Memorandum No. 7, CPA/MEM/4 November 2003/7 (Nov. 4, 2003), available at http://
www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20031104_CPAMEMO7_Delegation-ofAuthority.pdf. The
CPA had initially created an Iraqi De-Ba'athification Council to operate under the authority of the
Administrator. Establishment of the Iraqi De-Ba'athification Council, Coalition Provisional Authority
Order No. 5, CPA/ORD/25 May 2003/05 (May 25, 2003), available at http://www.iraqcoalition.
org/regulations/CPAORD5.pdf. Memorandum No. 7, issued six months later, rescinded this
order and delegated its tasks to the Governing Council. Coalition Provisional Authority Memoran-
dum No. 7, supra, § 3.
64. Dissolution of Entities, Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 2, CPA/ORD/23 May
2003/02 (May 23, 2002), available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20030823_
CPAORD_2_Dissolution of Entities withjAnnexA.pdf.
65. Id. annex. The ministries were those of Defense, of Information, and of State for Military
Affairs. The military organizations were the Iraqi Army, Air Force, Navy and Air Defense Force, the
Republican Guard, and the Special Republican Guard. Other organizations included the Presiden-
tial Secretariat, the Revolutionary Command Council, the National Assembly, and the Revolution-
ary, Special, and National Security Courts. Id.
66. Id. §§ 2, 3.
67. See FALEH A. JABAR, U.S. INST. FOR PEACE, POSTCONFLICr IRAQ: A RACE FOR STABILITY,
RECONSTRUCTION, AND LEGITMACY (May 2004), available at http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialre-
ports/sr120.html#top.
68. Transition of Laws, Regulations, Orders, and Directives Issued by the Coalition Provisional
Authority, Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 100, CPA/ORD/28June 2004/100, § 6(7)
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2. Reform of Security and Military Institutions
Three months after disbanding virtually the entire Iraqi military
establishment, the CPA announced the creation of a "New Iraqi
Army."69 While the CPA acknowledged that the new force might be
altered or disbanded by a successor Iraqi government, it nonetheless
promulgated a detailed order setting out new ranks, command struc-
ture, and relations to civilian authorities. 70 A new Code of Military
Discipline was promulgated, 7' and five existing military codes and laws
were abolished, three of which pre-dated the Ba'ath Party's assumption
of power in Iraq in 1968.72 An agency was created to provide support
services for the new force in the areas of finance, personnel, recruit-
ment, and procurement. 73 Two additional services, the Facilities Protec-
tion Service and the Civil Defense Corps, were also created to perform
security duties not permitted the new Army, which the CPA banned
from domestic law enforcement.7 4 Command of the New Army and the
Civil Defense Corps resided with the CPA Administrator for the dura-
tion of the occupation.
75
(June 28, 2004), availableathttp://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20040628_CPAORD 100
Transition ofLawsRegulations OrdersandDirectives.pdf.
69. Creation of a New Iraqi Army, Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 22, CPA/ORD/
7 August 2003/22 (Aug. 7, 2003), available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/
20030818_CPAORD_22_Creation of-aNewIraqiArmy.pdf.
70. Id.
71. Creation of a Code of Military Discipline for the New Iraqi Army, Coalition Provisional Authority
Order No. 23, CPA/ORD/7 August 2003/23 (Aug. 7, 2003), available at http://www.iraqcoalition.
org/regulations/20030820_CPAORD 23 Creation of a Code withAnnex.pdf.
72. Order No. 22 abolished the Iraqi Military Law Code Number 13 of 1940, the Iraqi Military
Procedures Code Number 44 of 1941, the Code of Legal Notification of Military Personnel
Number 106 of 1960, the Punishment of Military Deserters Law Number 28 of 1972, and the Penal
Code of the Popular Army Number 32 of 1984. Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 22,
supra note 69, § 2.
73. Creation of the Defense Support Agency, Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 42,
CPA/ORD/19 September 2003/42 (Sept. 19, 2003), available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/
regulations/20030923_CPAORD42.pdf.
74. See Establishment of the Facilities Protection Service, Coalition Provisional Authority Order No.
27, CPA/ORD/4 September 2003/27 (Sept. 4, 2003), available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/
regulations/index.htm#Regulations; Establishment of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, Coalition Provi-
sional Authority Order No. 28, CPA/ORD/3 September 2003/28 (Sept. 3, 2003) [hereinafter
Civil Defense Order], available athttp://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20030903_CPAORD_
28-Est of thejIraqiCivilDefenseCorps.pdf; Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 22,
supranote 69, § 3(2) (mission of the New Army).
75. See Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 22, supra note 69, § 3(3) (command of
Army); Civil Defense Order, supra note 74, § 4(1) (Civil Defense Corps subject to CPA command,
which may be delegated to commander of coalition forces in Iraq).
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In order to centralize administration of these new entities, the CPA
created a new Ministry of Defense on March 21, 2004.76 A long list of
"key principles" guiding the new Ministry sought to create as stark a
contrast as possible to the highly politicized role of the military in the
Ba'athist era.7
Other security-related reforms went beyond the uniformed military.
The CPA created a new Iraqi National Intelligence Service, replacing
the old, dissolved service.7v An Iraqi Radioactive Source Regulatory
Agency regulated the use and disposal of radioactive materials in the
country.7 9 A Non-Proliferation Programs Foundation would seek to
find "peaceful civilian" employment for scientists and others formerly
working in weapons of mass destruction programs.8s
As the occupation drew to a close, the security situation in Iraq
deteriorated. A series of confrontations between U.S. troops and local
militias produced heavy casualties.8 ' The militias also threatened to
undermine the authority of the transitional Iraqi government-
created by a constitution-like Transitional Administrative Law (TAL)
promulgated by the Governing Council on March 8, 2004S2-almost
before it had taken office. The TAL therefore prohibited any "armed
forces and militias not under the command structure of the Iraqi
Transitional Government ... except as provided by federal law."8 3
76. Ministry of Defence, Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 67, CPA/ORD/21 March
2004/67 (Mar. 21, 2004), available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20040321_
CPAORD67_Ministry ofDefence.pdf.
77. The principles were service, loyalty, civilian control, professionalism, unity, representative-
ness, integrity, stewardship, transparency, security, and affordability. Id. § 5.
78. Delegation of Authority to Establish the Iraqi National Intelligence Service, Coalition Provisional
Authority Order No. 69, CPA/ORD/1 April 2004/69 (Apr. 1, 2004), available at http://www.
iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20040401_CPAORD69_Delegation of Authority-to-Establish-
theIraqiNationalIntelligenceService with Annex.pdf.
79. Iraqi Radioactive Source Regulatory Authority, Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 72,
CPA/ORD/10June 2004/72 (June 10, 2004), available at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/regulaions/
20040615_CPAORD72_IraqiRadioactiveSourceRegulatoryAuthority.pdf.
80. The Iraqi Nonproliferation Programs Foundation, Coalition Provisional Authority Order No.
79, CPA/ORD/19 June 2004/79 (June 19, 2004), available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/
regulations/20040619_CPAORD_79 IraqiNonProliferationProgramsFoundation_with_
Annex.pdf.
81. See Anthony H. Cordesman, Center for Strategic and Int'l Studies, Fallujah, Sadr, and the
Eroding US Position in Iraq 2 (Apr. 30, 2004), available at http://www.csis.org/features/
iraq.fallujah.pdf.
82. Coalition Provisional Authority, Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional
Period (Mar. 8, 2004) [hereinafter TAL], available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/government/
TAL.html; see discussion infra Part I.C.
83. TAL, supra note 82, art. 27(B).
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Shortly before the CPA disbanded, it issued an order providing for such
exceptions, allowing militias that met the criteria of registration, trans-
parency, non-aggression, and non-criminality, among others, to dis-
band slowly through a plan that provided a variety of social service and
benefit incentives to their members.84 Militias not meeting these
criteria were to be treated as criminal.85 Further, members of illegal
militias could not hold political office, and any political party "associ-
ated" with an illegal militia would be penalized.86 Because this order
implemented a provision of the TAL, it was obviously intended to
regulate conduct after the close of the occupation.
3. Human Rights Reforms
Many of the CPA's reforms in criminal procedure and other areas
can be seen as implementing internationally recognized standards of
human rights. But the CPA also sought to consolidate oversight of
human rights matters in Iraq. To this end, it established a Ministry of
Human Rights. 87 The Ministry was to engage in a variety of tasks-
generating proposals for the creation of new institutions or reform of
existing ones, public education, assisting victims, and functioning as
the national liaison with international human rights bodies.88 The
Ministry was intended both to address the consequences of human
rights abuses under the prior regime and to ensure that post-Ba'athist
Iraq adhered to its obligations under human rights treaties to which it
is party.89 The Minister of Human Rights would also coordinate with
other Iraqi ministries "to ensure that new legislation is adopted taking
into account" human rights treaty obligations.90
A law addressing the problem of child labor straddled human rights
and economic-oriented reforms.9' In addition, the CPA stated that its
84. Regulation of Armed Forces and Militias Within Iraq, Coalition Provisional Authority Order
No. 91, CPA/ORD/02June 2004/91, § 4 (June 19,2004), available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/
regulations/20040607_CPAORD91_Regulation ofArmedForces and MilitiaswithinIraq.
pdf.
85. Id. § 6.
86. Id. §§ 6(4), (6).
87. Ministry of Human Rights, Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 60, CPA/ORD/19
February 2004/60 (Feb. 19, 2004), available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/
20040220_CPAORD60.pdfCPA/ORD/19 Feb. 2004/60.
88. Id. § 2.
89. Id. pmbl.
90. Id. § 3.
91. See generally Amendments to the Labor Code-Law No. 71 of 1987, Coalition Provisional
Authority Order No. 89, CPA/ORD/05 May 2004/89 (May 5, 2004), available at http://
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substantial amendments to the Iraqi Labor Code related to children
were partly intended to implement Iraq's obligations under two Inter-
national Labor Organization conventions. 92 The amendments estab-
lished a minimum age of fifteen for employment and sought to
prohibit the "worst forms of child labor," such as slavery and prostitu-
93tion.
4. Criminal Law and Law Enforcement Reforms
Iraqi criminal law and procedure were the subject of extensive
reforms. The CPA observed that "the former regime used certain
provisions of the penal code as a tool of repression in violation of
internationally recognized human rights standards. ' 94 Early in the
occupation it prohibited torture, suspended the imposition of capital
punishment, and prohibited discrimination on a wide variety of grounds
by all persons holding public office.95 Several provisions of the 1969
Iraqi Penal Code were suspended. Other sections, such as those dealing
with kidnapping, rape and damage to public utilities, were modified.9 6
Procedurally, a host of changes were made to the 1971 Iraqi Law on
Criminal Proceedings, which the CPA regarded as deficient "with
regard to fundamental standards of human rights." 97 For example, all
Iraqi law enforcement officers were required to give Miranda-like
warnings when making an arrest.98
While the structure of the Iraqi judiciary remained largely intact, a
new Central Criminal Court was created both to serve as a model for
www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20040530_CPAORD89_Amendments-to-the Labor Code-
LawNo.pdf.
92. Id. pmbl. The two are the Convention Concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment
(No. 138) (June 26, 1973) and the Convention Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Actionfor the
Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour (No. 182) (June 17, 1999).
93. Amendments to the Labor Code--Law No. 71 of 1987, supra note 91, arts. 90-91.
94. Penal Code, Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 7, CPA/ORD/9 June 2003/07
(June 10, 2003), available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20030610_CPAORD 7
PenalCode.pdf.
95. Id.
96. Modifications of Penal Code and Criminal Proceedings Law, Coalition Provisional Authority
Order No. 31, CPA/ORD/10 September 2003/31, §§ 2-3 (June 10, 2003), available at http://
www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/2003092I-CPAORD3I .pdf.
97. Criminal Procedures, Coalition Provisional Authority Memorandum No. 3 (Revised),
CPA/MEM/27 June 2004/03 (Dec. 31, 2003), available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/
regulations/20040627_CPAMEMO_3_CriminalProcedures.._Rev_.pdf.
98. Id. § 4. ("At the time an Iraqi law enforcement officer arrests any person, the officer shall
inform that person of his or her right to remain silent and to consult an attorney.").
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further judicial reform and to try "those serious crimes that most
directly threaten public order and safety."9 9 Cases heard by the Central
Court were to be chosen by the CPA Administrator, who also appointed
the judges.'0° Other Iraqi courts were required to cooperate with the
Central Court on a variety of procedural matters. 10 1
Because the CPA viewed the Iraqi judiciary as having been widely
politicized and corrupted under the Ba'athist regime, new supervisory
structures were created. 10 2 In June 2003 the CPA created a Judicial
Review Committee charged with determining the suitability of current
judges and prosecutors for office and removing them if they were
found unsuitable. 0 3 In September it reconstituted the Council of
Judges, which had been abolished by the prior regime, to serve as a
permanent supervisory and disciplinary body. The Council was to
operate independently of the Justice Ministry.
10 4
In Resolution 1483, the Security Council spoke of the need for
"accountability for the crimes and atrocities committed by the previous
Iraqi regime."' 0 5 Invoking this provision, the CPA authorized the
Governing Council to establish an Iraqi Special Tribunal "to try Iraqi
nationals or residents of Iraq accused of genocide, crimes against
humanity, war crimes or violations of certain Iraqi laws." 0 6 While the
99. The Central Criminal Court of Iraq, Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 13, CPA/ORD/
X 2004/13, §18 (Apr. 22, 2004), available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20040422_
CPAORD 13_RevisedAmended.pdf; Memorandum from Judge Donald F. Campbell, CPA Senior
Advisor to the Ministry ofJustice, to All Coalition Provisional Authority Officials with Responsibility for
Matters Relating to the Ministry of Justice 5 (June 26, 2003) (new Central Criminal Court "is being
established as a model of procedural fairness and judicial integrity and to hear especially serious
cases"), available at https://www.jagcnet.army.mil/JAGCNETInternet/Homepages/AC/CLAMO-
Public.nsf/0/2ed78fI 71710693885256d5e004c0159/Body/M2/Ministry%20of%20Justice%
20National%2OPolicy%20Guidance.doc?OpenElement.
100. Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 13, supra note 99.
101. Id.§9.
102. Establishment of the Judicial Review Committee, Coalition Provisional Authority Order No.
15, CPA/ORD/-June 2003/-(June 23, 2003) ("[T]he Iraqijustice system has been subjected to
political interference and corruption over the years of Iraqi Ba'ath Party rule."), available at http:
//www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20030623_CPAORD 15_Establishment of the judicial_
ReveiwCommittee.pdf.
103. Id. § 4.
104. Re-Establishment of the Council of Judges, Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 35,
CPA/ORD/13 Sep 2003/35 §6 (Sept. 13, 2003), availableathttp://www.cpa-iraq.org/regulations/
20030921_CPAORD35.pdf.
105. S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 25, pmbl.
106. See Delegation of Authority Regarding an Iraqi Special Tribunal, Coalition Provisional
Authority Order No. 48, CPA/ORD/3June2003/48, § 1 (1) (June 23, 2003), available at http://
www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20031210_CPAORD48 IST-and-AppendixA.pdf.
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CPA and the Governing Council collaborated on drafting the Tribu-
nal's statute and the elements of crimes to be prosecuted, the Adminis-
trator retained "the authority to alter the statute... or any elements of
crimes or rules of procedure developed for the Tribunal, if required in
the interests of security." 0 7 The CPA's preeminence was to continue
even after the Tribunal began functioning; in the event of a conflict
"between any promulgation by the Governing Council or any ruling or
judgment by the Tribunal and any promulgation of the CPA, the
promulgation of the CPA shall prevail."' ' No cases were initiated,
however, before the end of the occupation.
The final change in law enforcement concerned the Iraqi prison
system. The CPA consolidated authority over all detention facilities in
the Ministry of Justice.' 0 9 More significantly, in light of the Ba'athist
regime's history of human rights abuses, the CPA issued a minutely
detailed set of standards for the management of detention and prison
facilities. ° Standards roughly congruent with those in international
human rights instruments addressed the segregation of juvenile and
adult prisoners; conditions of accommodation; standards of personal
hygiene, food, medical services, discipline, and punishment; and pris-
oners' right of complaint, among others. All existing Iraqi prison
regulations were suspended."1 '
5. Economic Reforms
The most far-reaching reforms were economic. Shortly after the CPA
began operation, Administrator Paul Bremer announced that eco-
nomic reform was the coalition's "most immediate priority."" 2 He
described the Ba'athist-era economy as a "closed, dead-end system."' 1 3
The CPA would work to foster a "transition from a state-dominated to a
107. Id. § 1(6).
108. Id. § 2(3).
109. See Management of Detention and Prison Facilities, Coalition Provisional Authority Order
No. 10, CPA/ORD/8 June 2003/10 (June 5, 2003), available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/
regulations/20030605_CPAORD1OManagement of Detention and PrisonFacilities.pdf.
110. See Management ofDetention and Pris on Facilities, Coalition Provisional Authority Memoran-
dum No. 2, CPA/MEM/8June 2003/02 (June 8, 2003), available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/
regulations/20030608_CPAMEMOQ2_Management of Detention and PrisonFacilities.pdf.
111. Id. § 1 (2).
112. Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III, Chief Administrator in Iraq, Address at the World
Economic Forum (June 23, 2003) [hereinafter Bremer Address], available at http://www.weforum.
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private sector economy" by enacting reforms that would bring about a
"demanding, but exciting economic transformation" in the country.
1 1 4
The CPA spoke of the need for a "transition from a non-transparent
centrally planned economy to a market economy characterized by
sustainable economic growth through the establishment of a dynamic
private sector," as well as "the need to enact institutional and legal
reforms to give it effect."
'1 15
The economic reforms covered seven broad areas: banking, taxation,
foreign trade and investment, private economic transactions, securities
regulation, regulatory reforms, and state-owned enterprises.
a. Banking
Iraqi commercial banking was wholly transformed by a new Bank
Law.' 1 6 A comprehensive system of regulations prescribed standards in
areas such as capitalization, lending limits, on-site examination of
banks and their affiliates, mechanisms for conservatorship, receiver-
ship, and liquidation of banks and receipt of deposits. 117 As in the
114. Id. Bremer summarized the CPA's economic goals as follows:
" start a thoroughgoing reform of Iraq's financial sector in order to provide liquidity
and credit for the Iraqi economy;
" simplify the regulatory regime so as to lower barriers to entry for new firms, domestic
* and foreign;
* review Iraq's body of commercial law to determine which changes are needed to
encourage private investment;
* lift unreasonable restrictions on property rights;
* develop anti-trust and competition laws;
" develop an open market trade policy providing for a level playing field with regional
trade partners;
* encourage the adoption of laws and regulations to assure that Iraq has high standards
of corporate governance;
" develop accelerated training programs for business managers in best practices and
business ethics.
Id.
115. Foreign Investment, Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 39, CPA/ORD/19 Septem-
ber 2003/39 (Sept. 19, 2003), available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20031220_
CPAORD39ForeignInvestment_.pdf.
116. An initial law, issued in September 2003, was later revised in June 2004. See Bank Law,
Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 40, CPA/ORD/19 September 2003/40 (Sept. 19,
2003), available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20030919_CPAORD40-BankLaw_
withAnnex.pdf; BankingLaw of 2004, Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 94, CPA/ORD/6
June 2004/94 (June 7, 2004), available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20040607_
CPAORD94_BankingLaw of 2004_withAnnexA.pdf.
117. See generally Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 94, supra note 116.
[Vol. 36
THE OCCUPATION OF IRA Q
United States, Iraqi banks were prohibited from engaging in activities
such as retail trade or insurance underwriting.l" 8 All banks were to be
licensed by the Central Bank of Iraq (CBI), which would also engage in
ongoing regulatory oversight." 9 All existing laws inconsistent with the
Bank Law were suspended. 
1 20
The law also opened the Iraqi banking sector to foreign ownership.
Previously, only Arab banks were permitted to operate in Iraq.121
Under the CPA law, any foreign bank may apply to the CBI for a permit
to establish a branch in Iraq (provided it is adequately regulated at
home) or a license to establish a new Iraqi subsidiary bank.122 The CPA
initially limited the number of wholly foreign-owned banks to six until
2008, but the limitation was dropped in a revised Banking Law issued
on the eve of the CPA's dissolution.' 23 Once a foreign-owned bank is
properly established, it is treated no differently than an Iraqi bank. 124
The Iraqi Central Bank was also wholly transformed. 25 Detailed
requirements for management, foreign reserves, monetary functions,
regulation of currency, and criminal offenses related to legal tender




A second set of changes occurred in tax law. A tax holiday was
declared on virtually all levies from the inception of the occupation
through the end of 2003.127 This was later extended for certain
118. Id. art. 28.
119. Id. art. 4(1).
120. Id. art. 107(2).
121. Financial Reconstruction in Iraq: Hearing Before the Senate Subcomm. on Int'l Trade and Fin.,
108th Cong. (2004) (statement of John B. Taylor, U.S. Under Sec'y of the Treasury for Int'l
Affairs), available at http://banking.senate.gov/-files/ACF68.pdf.
122. SeeCoalition Provisional Authority Order No. 94, supranote 116, arts. 4(1), 6(1).
123. Compare Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 40, supra note 116, art. 4(6)
(limitation), with Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 94, supra note 116, art. 6 (no
limitation).
124. Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 94, supra note 116, art. 4(5).
125. See Central Bank Law, Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 56, CPA/ORD/1 March
2004/56 (Mar. 6, 2004), available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20040306_
CPAORD 56 CentralBank LawwithAnnex.pdf.
126. Id. art. 63.
127. Tax Strategy for 2003, Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 37, CPA/ORD/19
September 2003/37 (Sept. 19, 2003), available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/
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taxes. 2 ' At the same time, a 5% "reconstruction levy" was imposed on
all goods imported into Iraq, with a variety of humanitarian goods
excepted. 29 Foreign companies operating in Iraq were required to pay
a 15% tax on income earned in the country.1
30
c. Foreign Trade
A third set of changes was made to foreign trade and investment laws.
All tariffs, custom duties, import taxes, and licensing fees for goods
entering or leaving Iraq were suspended until the end of the occupa-
tion. 13 ' A Trade Bank of Iraq was created to facilitate imports and
exports with an initial capitalization of $100,000,000.132 In February
2004, Iraq gained observer status at the World Trade Organization,
which was described as a prelude to full membership. 33 Perhaps most
importantly, the CPA promulgated a foreign investment law for Iraq
"that would make the country one of the most open in the world.' 34
Foreigners could own up to 100% of any Iraqi enterprise except
"natural resources... involving primary extraction and initial process-
20040306_CPAORD_56_CentralBankLaw-with Annex.pdf. The exceptions were for taxes on
certain hotels and restaurants, real property transfers, car sales, and petrol sales. Id. § 3.
128. Amendments to Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 37 and Coalition Provisional Authority
Order No. 49, Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 84, CPA/ORD/30 April 2004/84
(Apr. 30, 2004), available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20040430_CPAORD_84
Amendments ofCPAOrder-37-and_49.pdf.
129. Reconstruction Levy, Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 38, CPA/ORD/ 19 Septem-
ber 2003/38 (Sept. 19, 2003), available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/
20040404_CPAORD_38_ReconstructionLevy.pdf.
130. Tax Strategy of 2004, Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 49, CPA/ORD/19
February 2004/49, § 3(3) (Feb. 19, 2004), available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/
20040220_CPAORD49TaxStrategy_ofl_2004_withAnnex_andExNote.pdf.
131. The initial suspension lasted until the end of 2003. Trade Liberalization Policy, Coalition
Provisional Authority Order No. 12, CPA/ORD/7 June 2003/12 (june 7, 2003), available at
http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/CPAORD12.pdf. It was then extended until the transi-
tion to Iraqi rule. Trade Liberalization Policy 2004, Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 54,
CPA/ORD/24 February 2004/54, § 1 (Feb. 24, 2004), available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/
regulations/20040404_CPAORD54_TradeLiberlizationPolicy_2004_withAnnexA.pdf.
132. Trade Bank of Iraq, Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 20, CPA/ORD/14 July
2003/20 (July 14, 2003), available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20030717-
CPAORD_20_TradeBankofIraq.pdf.
133. Press Release, Coalition Provisional Authority, Iraq Achieves Observer Status at the
WTO (Feb. 12, 2004), available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/pressreleases/20040212_WTO.
html.
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ing" (meaning oil), banking (addressed separately), and insurance. 135
There was no requirement of partnership orjoint venturing with Iraqi
investors, though such arrangements were permitted: a foreign inves-
tor could create an independent business in Iraq or establish a subsid-
iary of its own enterprise.1 36 Additionally, foreign investors were made
subject to "national treatment," meaning that they must be allowed to
conduct business on terms no less favorable than those permitted
Iraqi-owned enterprises. 37 All funds associated with a foreign-owned
business could be transferred abroad without restriction.138 The law
included no requirement that a foreign investor use local products or
services. Prior Iraqi law had prohibited foreigners from owning real
property. 139 While this formal prohibition continues, the new foreign
investment law largely undermined its effect by permitting foreigners
to obtain licenses to use property for up to forty years, which "may be
renewed for further such periods."'
40
d. Private Economic Transactions
A fourth area of reform involved changes to laws affecting private
economic transactions. Iraqi corporate law was extensively reformed,
with many provisions suspended and others added.1 4 ' Notably, foreign
persons and corporations became eligible to serve as Iraqi corporate
founders, shareholders, and partners. 142 The CPA explained that "some
of the rules concerning company formation and investment under the
prior regime no longer serve a relevant social or economic purpose,
and.., such rules hinder economic growth.
" 143
Substantial changes were made to Iraqi bankruptcy law.144 The CPA
observed that while economic actors "require a fair, efficient, and
135. Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 39, supra note 115, §§ 4(2), 6(1).
136. Id. § 7.
137. Id. § 4(1).
138. Id. § 7(2) (d).
139. See Iraqi Interim Constitution of 1990, art. 16 (giving every Iraqi citizen the right to own
property), available at http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/iz00000_.html.
140. Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 39, supra note 115, § 8.
141. Amendment to the Company Law No. 21 of 1997, Coalition Provisional Authority Order No.
64, CPA/ORD/29 February 2004/64 (Feb. 29, 2004), available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/
regulations/20040305_CPAORD64_Amendment to the-CompanyLawNo._21_.of_1997_with_
Annex A.pdf.
142. Id. § 1(14).
143. Id. pmbl.
144. Facilitation of Court-Supervised Debt Resolution Procedures, Coalition Provisional Authority
Order No. 78, CPA/ORD/19 April 2004/78 (Apr. 19,2004), available at http://www.iraqcoalition.
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predictable mechanism for resolving burdensome indebtedness when
incurred by businesses, . .. several provisions within Iraqi legislation
call for unduly harsh punishments for financially distressed entrepre-
neurs." 145 It therefore promulgated eighteen pages of amendments to
four different Iraqi codes designed to ensure that "a trader and his
creditors may resolve the trader's indebtedness in a collective, transpar-
ent, and realistic manner.
14 6
Intellectual property laws were also overhauled. The Iraqi Trade-
marks and Descriptions Law of 1957 was amended in part to facilitate
Iraqi entry into the World Trade Organization.147 The scope of the
existing Patent and Industrial Design Law and Regulations was ex-
panded and renamed the Patent, Industrial Design, Undisclosed Infor-
mation, Integrated Circuits and Plant Variety Law. 148 The Copyright
Law of 1971 was amended "to ensure that Iraqi copyright law meets
current internationally-recognized standards of protection, and to
incorporate the modern standards of the World Trade Organization
into Iraqi law."'
149
e. Securities Regulation and Trading
Fifth, declaring that "Iraqi entrepreneurs and businesses will benefit




146. Id. § 4(2) (amending the Code of Commerce, the Penal Code, the Enforcement Law,
and the Civil Code).
147. Amendment to the Trademarks and Descriptions Law No. 21 of 1957, Coalition Provisional
Authority Order No. 80, CPA/ORD/26 April 2004/80 (Apr. 26, 2004) ("[r]ecognizing the
demonstrated interest of the Iraqi Governing Council for Iraq to become a full member in the
international trading system, known as the World Trade Organization, and the desirability of
adopting modern intellectual property standards"), available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/
regulations/20040426_CPAORD80_Amendment to theTrademarks and-DescriptionsLaw_
No._21_of_1957.pdf. This goal, phrased in verbatim language, is repeated in the preambles to the
patent and copyright reform orders cited infra.
148. Patent, Industrial Design, Undisclosed Information, Integrated Circuits and Plant Variety Law,
Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 81, CPA/ORD/26 April 2004/81 (Apr. 26, 2004),
available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20040426_CPAORD 81_PatentsLaw.pdf.
149. Amendment to the Copyright Law, Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 83, CPA/
ORD/29 April 2004/83, § 1 (Apr. 29, 2004), available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/
20040501_CPAORD83Amendment to theCopyrightLaw.pdf.
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Interim Law on Securities Markets.' As in other areas, the CPA sought
to update existing law to reflect best international practices, observing
that "some of the regulations concerning securities markets under the
prior regime are not well-suited to a modern, efficient, transparent and
independently regulated securities market."
15 1
The securities law did away with the existing Baghdad Stock Ex-
change and created a new Iraqi Stock Exchange. 152 All government
oversight was removed, as the Exchange was to be a "not-for-profit,
member-owned and self-regulatory organization."'1 53 Detailed stan-
dards were promulgated for listing traded companies, regulating trad-
ing, ensuring full disclosure of information about listed companies,
regulating brokers, and other areas. To supervise the Exchange, an
Interim Iraq Securities Commission was created. 1 54 The law made
several references to an expected Permanent Securities Law but did
not discuss its substance.
f. Regulatory Reforms
Sixth, CPA initiatives addressed a variety of social regulatory issues.
One concerned the media. An Iraqi Communications and Media
Commission was created to license and regulate all forms of media,
including print, radio, and telecommunications. 155 The CPA declared
a "modern and efficient" telecommunications system essential, among
other things, to economic prosperity and in particular to attracting
private investment in media. 156 It also sought to "encourage pluralism
and diverse political debate" and to protect freedom of expression as
defined by international standards. 1 5 7 The Commission was given wide
regulatory authority, including the granting of broadcast licenses and
"creating effective and mandatory Codes of Practice" for broadcast-
150. Interim Law on Securities Markets, Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 18, CPA/
ORD/18 April 2004/74, pmbl. (Apr. 18, 2004), available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/
regulations/20040419_CPAORD-74 InterimLaw onSecuritiesMarkets_.pdf.
151. Id.
152. Id. § 2(1).
153. Id. § 2(3).
154. Id. § 12.
155. Iraqi Communications and Media Commission, Coalition Provisional Authority Order No.
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ers. 58 A new Iraqi Media Network was to serve as the public service
broadcaster for the nation.
159
In a wholly different sphere, the CPA promulgated a comprehensive
traffic code. Previous Iraqi traffic laws were revoked. The new code




Early in the occupation, the CPA announced plans to begin privatiz-
ing Iraqi state-owned enterprises (SOEs) .161 But a variety of circum-
stances-the difficulty of the task, the limited time available before the
CPA ceased operations, opposition by Iraqi officials (including mem-
bers of the Governing Council), and a fear of violence-led the CPA to
abandon these efforts toward the end of 2003.162
Instead, control over certain SOEs was transferred to Iraqi ministries,
which, the CPA believed, would exercise more efficient control.'
63
Once the transfer occurs, an SOE "shall no longer have a separate legal
identity and shall cease to exist."
1 6 4
158. Id. § 5(2).
159. Iraqi Public Service Broadcasting, Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 66, CPA/
ORD/20 March 2004/66, § 3 (Mar. 20, 2004), available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/
regulations/20040320_CPAORD66.pdf.
160. Traffic Code, Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 86, CPA/ORD/19 May 2004/86
(May 19, 2004), available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20040520_CPAORD86_
TrafficCode with Annex_-.A.pdf.
161. Bremer Address, supra note 112; see also Charles Clover& Bob Sherwood, Early Push for
Sell-OffofIraqi Companies, FIN. TIMES,June 9, 2003, at 8.
162. See Bruce Stanley, U.S. in No Rush to Privatize Iraq Oil, THE STATE (Jan. 28, 2004), available
at http://www.thestate.com/mld/thestate/news/7813540.htm; Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Attacks Force
Retreat from Wide-Ranging Plansfor Iraq, WASH. POST, Dec. 28, 2003, at Al.
163. Consolidations of State-Owned Enterprises, Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 76,
CPA/ORD/20 May 2004/76 (May 28,2004), available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/ regulations/
20040528_CPAORD_76_Consolidations ofState-Owned-Enterprises-with-Annex-A.pdf. Some
confusion exists here. Order No. 76 provided for the consolidation into various government
ministries of SOEs listed on Annex A to the Order. But the Annex does not list the responsible
ministries. Id. Annex A. A separate Order discusses the consolidation of SOEs engaged in military
industrial production, but oddly does not explicitly order their transfer to ministerial oversight.
Realignment of Military Industrial Companies, Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 75, CPA/
ORD/15 April 2004/75 (Apr. 20, 2004), available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/
20040420_CPAORD_75 Realignment ofMilitary_ IndustrialCompanies with Annex A.pdf. Its
Annex A lists thirty-three military industrial enterprises to be consolidated into three different
ministries. Id. Annex A.
164. Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 76, supra note 163, § 4(1).
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6. Good Government Reforms
In a final area of reform, the CPA sought to promote openness,
honesty, and trust in government. In January 2004, it authorized the
Governing Council to create the Iraqi Commission on Public Integrity,
which was to issue and enforce a wide variety of anti-corruption and
accountability measures. 65 The Commission was empowered to look
into cases of official corruption dating back to July 17, 1968, and to
present these to an investigative judge. 66 The Commission was also to
promulgate revisions to the existing code of conduct for government
employees and propose additional anti-corruption legislation.
16 7
The Commission was only one part of a new anti-corruption infrastruc-
ture. An April 2004 order wholly remade the existing Supreme Board
of Audit as "a separate and independent government institution ...
empowered to enhance the economy, efficiency, effectiveness, and
credibility of the Iraqi government."' 6 8 The CPA also created an Office
of Inspector General within each Iraqi ministry.69 The Inspectors were
given broad auditing, investigatory, and reporting powers.' 70 Another
order granted protection to whistleblowers employed by the govern-
ment or government contractors.1 71 Government contracts were to be
awarded only after a "full, fair and open competitive public bidding
process," with standard provisions modeled on "accepted international
standards and best practices."172 Government ministers were prohib-
ited from having financial interests in the outcome of government
165. Delegation of Authority Regarding the Iraq Commission on Public Integrity, Coalition Provi-
sional Authority Order No. 55, CPA/ORD/27 January 2004/55, § 1 (Jan. 27, 2004), available at
http://wvv.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20040204_CPAORD55.pdf.
166. Id. annex, § 4(1).
167. Id. annex, § 4(7).
168. Board of Supreme Audit, Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 77, CPA/ORD/18
April 2004/77, § 2(2) (Apr. 18, 2004), available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/
20040425_CPAORD 77 Board_of SupremeAudit.pdf.
169. Iraqi Inspectors Genera Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 57, CPA/ORD/5
February 2004/57, § 2(1) (Feb. 5, 2004), available at http://Wvw.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/
20040212_CPAORD57.pdf.
170. Id. §§ 5-6.
171. See Protection and Fair Incentives for Government Whistleblowers, Coalition Provisional
Authority Order No. 59, CPA/ORD/1 June 2004/59 (June 1, 2004), available at http://
www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20040601_CPAORD59_ProtectionandFairIncentives-
forGovernment_Whistleblowers.pdf.
172. Public Contracts, Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 87, CPA/ORD/14 May
2004/87, §§ 1 (1)(a), 6(2) (May 14, 2004), available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/
20040516_CPAORD_87_PublicContracts.pdf.
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tenders.1 73 And a Financial Management and Public Debt Law sought
to standardize the design of federal budgets, increase transparency in
the budgeting process, and adopt a "fiscal and budgetary policy in line
with international best practices."
174
Reaching beyond official misconduct, the CPA issued an Anti-Money
Laundering Act. 175 It targeted funds involved in unlawful activity
generally and terrorist financing in particular. 176 The Iraqi Central
Bank was to supervise compliance with the Act.
177
CPA officials often described the virtues of governmental decentrali-
zation in Iraq. The autonomy granted to Kurdish regions in the
Transitional Administrative Law is the most prominent example of this
policy.1 78 During the occupation, the CPA also worked to diffuse power
downward in the rest of the country. It described its work in Baghdad as
"illustrative":
In each of Baghdad's 88 neighborhoods, citizens have freely
selected representatives for local governing councils. They, in
turn, choose members of 9 District Councils and a 37-member
City Council. All told, over 800 democratically selected Council
Members are now hard at work serving their fellow citizens.
They include Sunnis, Shias, and Christians, Arabs and Kurds-
and more than 75 women.
1 79
The TAL also affirmed that during the transition period (and likely
beyond) Iraq would function as a federal state. 80 In order to give
173. See id. § 8(2).
174. Financial Management Law and Public Debt Law, Coalition Provisional Authority Order
No. 95, CPA/ORD/2June 2004/95, § 1 (1) (June 2, 2004), available at http://www.iraqcoalition.
org/regulations/20040604 CPAORD_95_Financial_ManagementLaw andPublicDebtLaw_
withAnnex A andB.pdf.
175. Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2004, Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 93, CPA/
ORD/2 June 2004/93 (June 3, 2004), available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/
20040603_CPAORD_93 Anti-MoneyLaunderingAct of 2004_withAnnex.pdf.
176. See id. Annex A, art. 4.
177. See id. Annex A, art. 7.
178. TAL, supra note 82, arts. 53-54.
179. Coalition Provisional Authority, Representative Government at the Local Level, at http://
iraqcoalition.org/government/local_level.html (last visitedJan. 19, 2005).
180. Article 4 of the TAL provided:
The system of government in Iraq shall be republican, federal, democratic, and
pluralistic, and powers shall be shared between the federal government and the
regional governments, governorates, municipalities, and local administrations. The
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substance to the federal structures, the CPA issued an order on Local
Governmental Powers, 81 which delineated the structure of local enti-
ties and their relations to each other. All inconsistent Iraqi law was
suspended. 82 However, the order did not describe the extent to which
the new structures reform existing local entities or create wholly new
ones.
C. The Transition to Iraqi Rule
With many (if not most) Security Council members opposed to the
Iraq intervention from the start, the Council began calling for a swift
hand-over of authority to an Iraqi government almost immediately
after the occupation began. 183 In July 2003, the SRSG reported an
"overwhelming demand" by Iraqis for "the early restoration of sover-
eignty." "" Accordingly, on October 16, 2003, the Security Council
requested the Governing Council and the occupying powers to provide
a timetable for drafting a new constitution and holding democratic
elections no later than December 15, 2003.185
On November 15, 2003, the CPA and the Governing Council an-
nounced agreement on a transitional process.18 6 It called for a Transi-
tional National Assembly to be selected by local caucuses by May 31,
2004, and for the Assembly to assume full sovereign power in Iraq by
June 30. At that point both the Governing Council and the CPA would
be dissolved. The Assembly would govern pursuant to a Transitional
Administrative Law to be drafted by the Governing Council by the end
of February 2004. A permanent constitution would be written by a
federal system shall be based upon geographic and historical realities and the separa-
tion of powers, and not upon origin, race, ethnicity, nationality, or confession.
TAL, supra note 82, art. 4.
181. Local Government Powers, Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 71, CPA/ORD/6
April 2004/71 (Apr. 6, 2004), available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/
20040406_CPAORD_71_LocalGovernmentalPowers_.pdf.
182. Seeid. §8(1).
183. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 25, pmbl. ("expressing resolve that the day when Iraqis
govern themselves must come quickly"); id. 8(c) (Secretary-General requested to assist Iraqi
people in "working together to facilitate a process leading to an internationally recognized,
representative government of Iraq").
184. SGJuly Report, supra note 35,1 11.
185. S.C. Res. 1511, supra note 39, 7.
186. Coalition Provisional Authority & Iraqi Governing Council, The November 15 Agreement:
Timeline to a Sovereign, Democratic and Secure Iraq [hereinafter November 15 Agreement], at http://
www.iraqcoalition.org/government/AgreementNovl5.pdf (last visitedJan. 19, 2005).
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constitutional convention to be elected by March 15, 2005, and subse-
quently put to a popular referendum. Elections under the new constitu-
tion would be held by December 31, 2005. The Transitional Administra-
tive Law would then expire. 1
87
The caucus plan for selecting the Transitional Assembly proved
unpopular with certain powerful Iraqis. 88 A proposed alternative was
direct elections for the Assembly. In late February 2004, however, a
U.N. fact-finding team reported that elections before June 30 were not
feasible and that an alternative method of transferring control to Iraqis
by June 30 needed to be found.1 89 The Secretary-General dispatched
Lakhdar Brahimi as his special envoy to consult with Iraqi leaders and
explore the alternatives.19 At the same time, preparations for the June
30 hand-over continued. On March 8, the Governing Council ap-
proved the TAL, which reaffirmed the hand-over date. 9 The TAL
provided that it would remain in force until a permanent constitution
was approved, which was to coincide with the holding of nation-wide
elections no later thanJanuary 31, 2005.192
Brahimi ultimately proposed that elections for the Transitional
Assembly be postponed until the end of 2004.193 Meanwhile, an
interim provisional government would be selected to run the country
until those elections. 194 Events on the ground proceeded along these
lines, with an Iraqi Interim Government being named on June 1,
2004.195 On June 7, in Resolution 1546, the Security Council endorsed
both this government and Brahimi's timetable for going forward,
adding that the Transitional Assembly would be responsible for draft-
187. Id.
188. See Larry Diamond, What Went Wrong in Iraq, FOREIGN AFF., Sept./Oct. 2004, at 34, 48,
available at http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20040901faessay83505/lary-diamond/what-went-wrong-
in-iraq.html; International Crisis Group Middle East Report No. 27, Iraq's Transition: On a Knife
Edge 3 (Apr. 27, 2004), available at http://www.icg.org//Iibrary/documents/middle east north
africa/iraq-iran-gulf/27_iraqtransition on a knife edge.pdf.
189. The Political Transition in Iraq: Report of the Fact-Finding Mission, U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess.,
Annex, at 12, U.N. Doc. S/2004/140 (2004).
190. Id. at 1.
191. Letter Dated 17 March 2004 from the Interim President of the Iraqi Governing Council Addressed
to the Secretary-General, U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., Annex II, at 3, U.N. Doc. S/2004/225 (2004)
(noting TAL approval).
192. TAL, supra note 82, art. 2.
193. The Political Transition in Iraq, supra note 189, at 12.
194. Id. at 13.
195. ADAM ROBERTS, HARVARD PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH,
THE END OF OCCUPATION IN IRAQ 10 (2004), available at http://www.ihlresearch.org/iraq/
feature.php?a= 51.
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ing a permanent constitution and that elections for a constitutionally
elected government would take place by December 31, 2005.196 Al-
though Resolution 1546 endorsed the process by which the Interim
Government was created, it failed to mention (and thus specifically
endorse) the TAL, an integral component of that process. 197 The
Council declared that "by 30 June 2004, the occupation will end and
the Coalition Provisional Authority will cease to exist, and that Iraq will
reassert its full sovereignty."1 98 On June 28, two days earlier than
planned, CPA Administrator Bremer formally transferred political
authority to the Interim Government and left the country.' 99
However, the CPA did not intend that its dissolution would also
cause its many legislative actions to lapse. To the contrary, just before
its demise it took two steps to ensure that those enactments would
remain valid after the occupation had ended.20 0 First, the TAL pro-
vided that all the laws enacted by the CPA would "remain in force until
rescinded or amended by legislation duly enacted and having the force
of law."'20 1 CPA legislation would thus continue in force unless the new
government chose to opt out.
Second, in the run-up to the June 28 hand-over, the CPA issued a
number of orders specifically addressed to the post-occupation period.
Many concerned the transitional political process, including an elec-
toral law, a political parties law, an order disqualifying certain persons
from running for or holding public office, and an order creating an
independent electoral commission.20 2 A CPA regulation also desig-
196. S.C. Res. 1546, U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 4987th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1546 (2004).
197. Some claim that the lack of a Council endorsement meant the TAL never entered into
force. See Peter W. Galbraith, Iraq: The Bungled Transition, N.Y. REV. BooKs, Sept. 23, 2004, at 70, 71.
198. S.C. Res. 1546, supra note 196, at 2.
199. See Rajiv Chandrasekaran, U.S. Hands Authority to Iraq Two Days Early, WASH. POST, June
29, 2004, at Al.
200. For a general discussion of the end of the occupation, see ROBERTS, supra note 195.
201. TAL, supra note 82, art. 26(C).
202. See Disqualification from Public Office, Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 62,
CPA/ORD 26 February 2004/62 (Feb. 26, 2004), available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/
regulations/20040301 CPAORD62.pdf; The Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq, Coalition
Provisional Authority Order No. 92, CPA/ORD/31 May 2004/92 (May 31, 2004), available at
http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20040531_CPAORD_921Independent-Electoral
commission-of Iraq.pdf;
Political Parties and Entities Law, Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 97, CPA/ORD/7
June 2004/97 (June 7, 2004), available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/
20040615_CPAORD 97 PoliticalParties andEntities.Law.pdf; The Electoral Law, Coalition Pro-
visional Authority Order No. 96, CPA/ORD/7June 2004/96 (June 7, 2004), available at http://
www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20040615_CPAORD_96 TheElectoral-Law.pdf.
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nated the thirty-six members of the Iraqi Interim Government.0 3
Another order created a Joint Detainee Committee to coordinate
detention policy between the Interim Government and the U.S.-U.K.
multinational force that would remain in Iraq after the occupation.20 4
And a comprehensive omnibus order amended many of the CPA's
legislative instruments to substitute the names of the interim Iraqi
authorities for the CPA and occupation officials.20 5 The CPA described
this order as "facilitat[ing] the continuity of Iraqi law,"20 6 though the
order was limited to law it had created, amended, and liberally re-
shaped during the course of the occupation.
III. LEGAL IMPEDIMENTS TO A REFORMIST OCCUPATION
A. The Law of Occupation
The CPA's reforms are to be evaluated by the international law of
occupation. Occupation law emerged in the late eighteenth century as
a humanizing trend in the law of war, modifying a state's previously
unencumbered right to subjugate conquered foreign territories.20 7
Whereas states had traditionally claimed an almost absolute entitle-
ment to the spoils of conquest, writers such as Vattel began to suggest
that because sovereignty over territory acquired in war was not final
until the execution of a peace treaty, a conquering power ought not to
exercise full dominion until its territorial rights had been formal-
ized.20 8 Holding full sovereignty in abeyance would withhold the right
to subjugate until the occupier had perfected its rights. Early articula-
tions of occupation rules in the nineteenth century gave detail to the
203. See Members of Designated Iraqi Interim Government, Coalition Provisional Authority Regula-
tion No. 10, CPA/REG/9 June 2004/10, Annex A (June 9, 2004), available at http://
www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20040609_CPAREG 10_Members-ofDesignated-Iraqi-
InterimGovernment withAnnex_A.pdf.
204. SeeJoint Detainee Committee, Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 99, CPA/ORD/27
June 2004/99 (June 27, 2004), available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20040627_
CPAORD_99jointDetaineeCommittee.pdf.
205. See Transition of Laws, Regulations, Orders, and Directives Issued by the Coalition Provisional
Authority, Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 100, CPA/ORD/28June 2004/100, § 1 (june
28, 2004), available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20040628_CPAORD 100
Transition ofLawsRegulationsOrders andDirectives.pdf.
206. Id. pmbl.
207. See generally OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAw 432-33 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 7th ed. 1952).
208. E. DE VATrEL, 3 THE LAW OF NATIONS OR PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE APPLIED TO THE
CONDUCr AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS 386, §§ 197-198 (joseph Chitty ed., T. &J.W.
Johnson 1852) (1758).
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principle that "belligerent occupation is in essence a temporary condi-
tion in which the powers of the belligerent occupant are not without
limit."2 9 AsJohn Marshall wrote in 1828, "the usage of the world is, if a
nation be not entirely subdued to consider the holding of conquered
territory as a mere military occupation, until its fate shall be deter-
mined at the treaty of peace. 21 ° In the early codifications, occupiers
were thus prohibited from engaging in certain government activities
deemed the legitimate prerogatives of the then-still de jure sovereign
211regime.
There was a peculiar quality to these early norms. Because interna-
tional law of the time did not prohibit conquest itself-the use of force
being understood as a legitimate tool of statecraft212 -one would
assume an occupying power could step automatically into the shoes of
the ousted regime and act as if the conquered territory was its own. One
reason why limits nevertheless appeared in all the early codifications
was that the assumption of rights over conquered territory was often
brutal and punitive-"rape and pillage" being the harsh but common
consequence of foreign control over territory.21 3 With the rise of
standing armies and more standardized codes of conduct in the
nineteenth century, efforts were made to restrain these excesses of
conquest. Rigid notions of a sovereign's prerogatives ruled out the
more obvious ways of restraining brutal occupations-endowing the
inhabitants of an occupied territory with human rights against the
occupier or limiting states' ability to go to war (and thereafter occupy)
209. Ardi Imseis, On the Fourth Geneva Convention and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 44
HARv. INT'L L.J. 65, 87 (2003); see also SHARON KORMAN, THE RIGHT OF CONQUEST 109-11 (1996).
210. Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511,542 (1828).
211. See The Lieber Code: Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field by
Order of the Secretary of War, arts. 31-47 (1863), reprinted in I THE LAW OF WAR: A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY 158, 164-67 (Leon Friedman ed., 1972); Declaration of Brussels, arts. 1-8 (1874), reprinted in
THE LAW OF WAR, supra, at 194-96.
212. See generally KORMAN, supra note 209, at 94-131.
213. See THE RiGHT HON. EARL OF BIRKENHEAD, INTERNATIONAL LAW 253 (Ron W. Moelyn-
Hughes ed., 6th ed. 1927). As Oppenheim recounts,
[i]n former times, enemy territory occupied by a belligerent was in every point
considered his State property, so that he could do what he liked with it and its
inhabitants. He could devastate the country with fire and sword, appropriate all public
and private property therein, and kill the inhabitants, or take them away into captivity,
or make them take an oath of allegiance. He could, even before the war was decided,
and his occupation was definitive, dispose of the territory by ceding it to a third State.
L. OPPENHEIM, 2 INTERNATIONAL LAW 294 (Arnold D. McNair ed., 4th ed. 1926).
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in the first place. The former was unthinkable in an era in which only
states enjoyed international personality. And the latter would not enter
international law until after the First World War.
Occupation law thus represented a more limited and indirect way of
preserving the status quo ante bellum in the territory. Despite their
limited reach, restraints on an occupier's powers did involve interna-
tional law stepping in to fill a vacuum of responsibility; the ousted
sovereign had no ability to protect the local population and the
occupier, if it did not intend to remain in the territory, had no interest
in doing so. The maturing international legal system of the nineteenth
century could slowly begin to require formal indicia of authority before
the full rights of sovereignty would vest in an occupier.2 t4
The international law of occupation evolved throughout the nine-
teenth century and, after several early efforts, became codified in the
1907 Hague Regulations on Land Warfare.215 In the aftermath of
World War II and the brutal Nazi and Japanese occupations, "Hague
law" was substantially expanded upon in "Geneva law"-the Fourth
Geneva Convention of 1949.216 Today, Hague and Geneva law are
widely recognized as norms of international custom, binding even on
states not parties to the treaties.21 7
Yet despite occupation law's long pedigree and extensive delineation
in two widely subscribed treaties, Iraq is one of the few cases of the
post-WWII era in which a state has acknowledged its status as an
"occupying power. '2 18 Many states during this period, of course, have
exercised effective control over foreign territories,219 thus bringing
214. KORMAN, supra note 209, at 110-I.
215. Hague Regulations, supra note 10.
216. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 11.
217. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 257, 79 (July 8)
[hereinafter Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion] ("[T]hese fundamental rules [of Hague and
Geneva law] are to be observed by all States whether or not they have ratified the conventions that
contain them, because they constitute intransgressible principles of international customary
law."); Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
1 89 (July 9, 2004) [hereinafter Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall] (holding
Hague law applicable to Israeli conduct in occupied territories even though Israel is not a party to
Hague Convention), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imwp/imwpframe.htm.
218. See EVAL BENVENISTI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION 6 (1993) ("[M] ost contem-
porary occupants ignored their status and their duties under the law of occupation."); cf Adam
Roberts, What Is a Military Occupation, 1984 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 249, 301 (1984) ("Parties
involved--especially those on the side of the intervening forces-are often and understandably
reluctant to use the word 'occupation' at all.").
219. Post-WWII examples include Turkey in Cyprus, Morocco in the Western Sahara,
Vietnam in Cambodia, South Africa in Namibia, and Iraq in Kuwait.
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them within the pragmatic definition of an "occupier" contained in the
Hague Regulations: "Territory ... is considered occupied when it is
actually placed under the authority of the hostile army. "220 The Israeli
occupation of Palestinian territory is one of the few cases acknowl-
edged by the international community, though not by Israel itself.
22 1
The myriad obligations imposed by occupation law have led states to
make a variety of arguments as to why their administrations of foreign
territory fall outside the Hague and Geneva regimes.222 Even the U.N.
Security Council has been unwilling to elaborate on the legal obliga-
tions of occupying powers, with the exceptions of Israel in the Palestin-
ian territories and the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq.223
One consequence of these few acknowledged occupations is a lack of
state practice that might give depth and nuance to often spare treaty
provisions and assess their relation to cognate bodies of international
law. As will be discussed, there seems a natural affinity between occupa-
tion law and the contemporary legal regimes of human rights, self-
determination, and the use of military force. Yet state practice in which
these separate sets of norms might be assessed together is almost wholly
absent. Scholarly commentary is also sparse. While there was no
shortage of analyses following the two world wars, only one book has
comprehensively addressed the state of occupation law in the last
thirty-five years.224 Since the other areas of international law relevant to
an occupier's duties have changed dramatically during this period,
older accounts are of limited utility on some questions.
There is another source of law, however, usefully combining the
active element of practice with the reflective detachment of legal
commentary, that has been notably missing from most considerations
of occupation law. This is the national military manual, issued by states
220. Hague Regulations, supra note 10, art. 42; see generallyJULIUS STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF
INTERNATIONAL CONFLcT 695-97 (1954).
221. See infra text accompanying notes 260-64 (discussing Israeli occupation).
222. SeeRoberts, supra note 218, at 301.
223. See infra note 264 (discussing resolutions on Israel). In two resolutions, the Council
demanded that Iraq comply with the Fourth Geneva Convention in its occupation of Kuwait,
though because Iraq had declared the country annexed the main focus of the Council's concern
was on its removal. See S.C. Res. 674, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2951st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/674
(1990); S.C. Res. 666, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2939th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/666 (1990). The
Council passed a number of resolutions on other aspects of the Moroccan occupation of the
Western Sahara and the Indonesian occupation of East Timor but made no references to duties
under occupation law. Cf BENVENISTI, supra note 218, at 151-54.
224. The book is Benvenisti's, supra note 218. Others have addressed specific occupations or
a narrow subset of occupation law.
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to guide their own armed forces' conduct. Military manuals, often
drafted with the assistance of prominent scholars, have played an
important role in diffusing and explicating international humanitarian
law. 2 5 They have also served as direct sources of law.2 26 A number of
manuals build directly on Hague and Geneva norms in describing the
proper conduct of occupiers. In the analysis that follows, these national
understandings of international obligations will become central to
understanding the law applicable to CPA reforms.
B. The United States and the United Kingdom as Occupying Powers
There is little question that the United States and United Kingdom
qualified as "occupying powers" in Iraq. Their instrument of authority,
the CPA, described itself as exercising the "powers of government" in
227the country. As we have seen, it used these powers energetically.
While pockets of resistance remained throughout the CPA's tenure, no
serious competitors existed to its overall exercise of authority.228 As a
result, the effective control test for the existence of an occupation was
met-a test that turns not on legal formalities (such as declarations of
occupation or their recognition by third states), but on pragmatic
indicia of actual control.229 In political settings the United States strove
mightily to describe itself as a "liberator" rather than an occupier.23 °
But the following survey of formal statements by all relevant actors
makes clear that this distinction carried little weight as a legal claim.
225. See, e.g., Colloquium, National Implementation of International Humanitarian Law: Proceed-
ings of an International Colloquium at Bad Homburg, June 17-19, 1998, at 215 (Michael Bothe ed.,
1990); W. Michael Reisman & William K. Lietzau, Moving International Law from Theory to Practice:
The Role of Military Manuals in Effectuating the Law of Armed Conflict, in 64 UNITED STATES NAVAL WAR
COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES, THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 1, 4-7 (Horace B. Robertson,
Jr. ed., 1991) (describing the role of manuals in the transmission of law).
226. The Yugoslav Tribunal has regularly cited national military manuals as evidence of
customary international law. See Prosecutor v. Galik, Case No. IT-98-29, 31 n.50 (2003), available
at http://www.un.org/icty/galic/trialc/judgement/gal-jO31205e.pdf.
227. SeeCoalition Provisional Authority Regulation No. 1, supra note 28.
228. Cf BRITISH COMMAND OF THE ARMY COUNCIL, MANUAL OF MILITARY LAw, THE LAW OF WAR
ON LAND 142, 509 (1958) [hereinafter THE LAw Or WAR ON LAND] ("Occupation does not
become invalid because some of the inhabitants are in a state of rebellion, or through occasional
successes of guerilla bands or 'resistance' fighters."); L.C. GREEN, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF
ARMED CONFLICT 248 (1993) ("[T]he presence of isolated areas in which that authority [of the
ousted regime] is still functioning does not affect the reality of the occupation if those areas are
effectively cut off from the rest of the occupied territory.").
229. See Hague Regulations, supra note 10, art. 42 ("Territory is considered occupied when it
is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army.").
230. See sources cited supra note 7.
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In the period surrounding the onset of war in March 2003, many
states made clear in Security Council debates that they expected the
United States and the United Kingdom to abide by Geneva law. 23' Even
the Secretary-General supported this view.232 Accordingly, on March
28, in the midst of the war, the Security Council, acting under Chapter
VII of the Charter, passed Resolution 1472, in which it "requested [ed]
all parties concerned to strictly abide by their obligations under interna-
tional law, in particular the Geneva Conventions and the Hague
Regulations. '' 233 On May 8, less than one month after the end of
hostilities, the United States and the Udited Kingdom informed the
Security Council of their intention to "strictly abide by their obligations
under international law."234 On May 22, the Council set out the terms
of Iraq's post-war administration in Resolution 1483, in which it "[called]
upon all concerned to comply fully with their obligations under
international law including in particular the Geneva Conventions of
1949 and the Hague Regulations of 1907. ",235 On May 19, 2004, the
United States acknowledged to the Security Council that "United States
forces in Iraq are required to operate in accordance with the Geneva
Conventions, and this is an obligation we take very seriously."
236
While none of these statements explicitly acknowledged the exis-
tence of an occupation-again, surely the result of political consider-
ations-the references to applicable humanitarian law could mean
little else. Clarity finally emerged at the end of CPA rule. On June 8,
2004, the Council declared that the formation of an interim Iraqi
Government meant "the occupation will end. ' 237 The United States
231. See U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4726th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.4726 (2003); U.N. SCOR, 58th
Sess., 4726th mtg., Resumption 1, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4726 (2003); U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4732d
mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.4732 (2003).
232. U.N. Doc. S/PV.4726, supra note 231, at 3:
I would recall in particular the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention, under
which those in effective control of any territory are responsible for meeting the
humanitarian needs of its population and are required to maintain dialogue and
cooperation with international organizations engaged in humanitarian relief. No one,
on either side, must obstruct that relief.
233. S.C. Res. 1472, U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4732d mtg. 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1472 (2003).
234. Letter from the United Kingdom and the United States to the Security Council, supra note 23.
235. S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 25, 1 5.
236. U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 4971st mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4971 (2004) (statement of U.S.
Ambassador Cunningham).
237. S.C. Res. 1546, supra note 196, 2.
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acceded to this view.2 38 In sum, there was no evident disagreement with
the legal conclusion that for the fourteen months during which the
United States and the United Kingdom were the only effective political
and military authorities in Iraq, they were occupying powers subject to
the requirements of Hague and Geneva Law.
C. The Prohibition Against Altering Legal and Political Institutions in the
Occupied Territory: The Conservationist Principle
Occupation law posed a Oirect challenge to the CPA's reformist
agenda in Iraq. Occupiers, as temporary de facto powers, are prohib-
ited from making wholesale changes to the legal and political institu-
tions of the occupied state. Yet one of the oft-stated purposes of the
Iraqi occupation was to remake those institutions according to liberal,
democratic, and free market principles. Traditional law views occupiers
as trustees, preserving the status quo ante bellum. The Iraqi occupiers, by
contrast, were agents of political and social change. Can the two
co-exist?
When the law of war coalesced in the nineteenth century, there were
few reasons why a temporary occupying power would seek to intervene
in daily life in the territory, apart from reasons of security. Warfare was
mostly a matter for professional armies, and the European monarchical
states of the time played only a minimal role in the economic lives of
their own citizens.239 This essential commonality of interests among the
dominant states provided few incentives to treat occupation as an
opportunity for social engineering. 240 Eyal Benvenisti aptly describes
the consequences of this separation of the public sphere of war from
the private sphere of everyday life under occupation:
The separation of interests provided room for a simple balanc-
ing principle of disengagement: the occupant had no interest
in the laws of the area under its control except for the security
of its troops and the maintenance of order; the ousted sover-
eign was ready to concede this much in order to ensure
maintenance of its bases of power in the territory against
238. U.N. Doc. S/PV.4971, supra note 236, at 2 (U.S. Ambassador Cunningham states, "On
30 June, the Coalition Provisional Authority and the framework of occupation recognized and
established under Resolution 1483 (2003) will come to an end.").
239. BENVENISTI, supra note 218, at 26-27; Davis P. Goodman, Note, The Need for Fundamental
Change in the Law of Belligerent Occupation, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1573, 1591 (1985).
240. See KRYSTYNA MAREK, IDENTITY AND CONTINUITY OF STATES IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
123-24 (1968).
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competing internal forces and in order to guarantee the hu-
mane treatment of its citizens. This solution was not only well
founded in theory; it was supported by the practice of the
nineteenth-century occupations. These occupations were of
relatively short duration, during which occupants, by and large,
retained existing legislation as much as possible.24'
The final codifications of occupation law adhered to this minimalist
conception of the occupier's role. The 1907 Hague Regulations pro-
vide in article 43:
The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into
the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures
in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public
order and [civil life], while respecting, unless absolutely prevented,
the laws in force in the country.242
The Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 built upon article 43 in its
article 64:
The penal laws of the occupied territory shall remain in force,
with the exception that they may be repealed or suspended by
the Occupying Power in cases where they constitute a threat to
its security or an obstacle to the application of the present
Convention. Subject to the latter consideration and to the
necessity for ensuring the effective administration of justice,
the tribunals of the occupied territory shall continue to func-
tion in respect of all offences covered by the said laws.
The Occupying Power may, however, subject the population of
the occupied territory to provisions which are essential to
enable the Occupying Power to fulfil its obligations under the
present Convention, to maintain the orderly government of the
territory, and to ensure the security of the Occupying Power, of
the members and property of the occupying forces or adminis-
241. BENVENISTI, supra note 218, at 28.
242. Hague Regulations, supra note 10, art. 43 (emphasis added). The original French text
called for the protection of "l'ordre et la vie pubique." For reasons that are unclear, the English
translation still in use today reads "vie publique" as "public safety." This is simply incorrect. See
Edmund H. Schwenk, Legislative Power of the Military Occupant Under Article 43, Hague Regulations, 54
YAE L.J. 393 n.1 (1945).
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tration, and likewise of the establishments and lines of commu-
nication used by them.243
These central treaty pillars of occupation law impose two primary
obligations on occupying powers. The first is that they not acquire (or
attempt to acquire) sovereignty over the territory. An assertion of de
jure authority through annexation is fundamentally at odds with the
temporary nature of occupation.244 There has been no challenge to
this principle in Iraq, as the Security Council consistently reaffirmed
the "sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq '245 and, in the Novem-
ber 15 Agreement, the CPA negotiated a timetable for its own dissolu-
246tion.
The second obligation is to leave the legal and political structures of
the occupied territory intact. Article 43 of the Hague Regulations
requires occupiers to respect laws in force "unless absolutely pre-
vented" from doing SO.247 The Fourth Geneva Convention focuses
specifically on the continuity of penal laws.2 48 This is the conservation-
ist principle. The principle flows naturally from the prohibition on
annexation, as "[t]he powers of occupation authorities are limited
precisely by the presumed temporary nature of the occupation regime
and in particular by the need to avert creeping annexation through the
243. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 11, art. 64. According to authoritative commen-
tary by the International Committee of the Red Cross, article 64 merely sets out, "in a more precise
and detailed form, the terms of Article 43 of the Hague Regulations, which lays down that the
Occupying Power is to respect the laws in force in the country 'unless absolutely prevented'."
INTERNATIONAL COMMITrEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE IV GENEVA CONVENTION
RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVLIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 335 (Jean S. Pictet ed., Ronald
Griffin & C.W. Dumbleton trans., 1958) [hereinafter PICTET].
244. PICTET, supra note 243, at 275 ("[T]he occupation of territory in wartime is essentially a
temporary, de facto situation, which deprives the occupied Power of neither its statehood nor its
sovereignty; it merely interferes with its power to exercise its rights."). One might argue that even
in 1949, when the Fourth Geneva Convention was drafted, this requirement was redundant in
light of the U.N. Charter's general prohibition on the annexation of another state's territory. U.N.
CHARTER art. 2, para. 4. The prohibition retains utility, however, since annexations may not be
sudden and forceful but rather may be accomplished through a slow accretion of regulatory
control over life in a territory. The Fourth Geneva Convention makes clear that legislative activity
of this kind also cannot create title to occupied territory. See generally Fourth Geneva Convention,
supra note 11.
245. SeeS.C. Res. 1511, supra note 39, 1; S.C. Res. 1500, supra note 38, pmbl; S.C. Res. 1483,
supra note 25, pmbl.
246. See November 15 Agreement, supra note 186.
247. Hague Regulations, supra note 10, art. 43.
248. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 11, art. 64.
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imposition of the legal regime and administrative structure of the
enemy power." 249 The occupier thus assumes only as much of the
displaced sovereign's authority as is necessary to administer the terri-
tory, but no more.25° General legislative competence remains with the
displaced regime as the continuing de jure authority over the terri-
tory.25' Thus, "[g]enerally speaking, the occupant is not entitled to
alter the existing form of government, to upset the constitution and
domestic laws of the occupied territory, or to set aside the rights of the
inhabitants. 252 The legitimate sphere of an occupier's concern, in
other words, is limited to pragmatic tasks of orderly administration.253
Both Geneva Convention article 64 and Hague Regulations article 43
provide limited exceptions to the conservationist principle when re-
quired by military necessity.254 These generally arise from security
concerns and involve the preservation of public order and implementa-
tion of other obligations under the Convention. Although such mea-
249. HILAIRE McCOUBREY & NIGEL D. WHITE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT 283
(1992).
250. In the words of the U.S. Army Field Manual:
Being an incident of war, military occupation confers upon the invading force the
means of exercising control for the period of occupation. It does not transfer sover-
eignty to the occupant, but simply the authority or power to exercise some of the rights
of sovereignty. The exercise of these rights results from the established power of the
occupant and from the necessity of maintaining law and order.
U.S. ARMY FIELD MANUAL No. 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE 1 358 (1956) [hereinafter THE LAW
OF LAND WARFARE].
251. See NEW ZEAIAND DEFENCE FORCE, INTERIM LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT MANUAL 13-7,
1304(1) (1992) ("The authority of the Occupying Power is of a provisional nature and it should
only take measures which are necessary for the purposes of the war, the maintenance of order and
safety, and the proper administration of the occupied territory.").
252. CANADIAN OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADvocATE GENERAL, LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT AT THE
OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL LEVELs 12-2, 1205 (2001) [hereinafter LAw OF ARMED CONFLICT); see
also THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS 254 (Dieter Fleck ed., 1995)
(Commentary on regulations for German armed forces, developed through collaboration be-
tween scholars and German Government, provides, "The authority to pass laws is unquestionably
an attribute of sovereignty. Thus the lawful authorities alone-even if absent from the country
and in exile-can make laws for the occupied territory.").
253. THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S SCHOOL, LAW OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION 37 (1944)
("The supreme authority of the occupant is not sovereignty and, therefore, he has no right to
make changes in institutions, laws, or administration other than those which are demanded by
military necessity or public order and safety.").
254. See, e.g., VON GLAHN, supra note 12, at 13941 (discussing censorship, control of public
meetings, travel restrictions, limits on private ownership of munitions, and other actions as
justified by needs of orderly administration).
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sures may substantially alter daily life in the occupied territory-for
example, by suspending civil liberties such as freedom of speech and
assembly, or prohibiting the carrying of firearms-these can only be
justified by the limited objectives of military necessity.255 Others may
arise from the simple fact that an occupier cannot centrally administer
the many facets of a complex modern society without asserting some
form of centralized control.
Such legitimate objectives do not encompass subjective views on the
part of the occupier that politics in the territory ought to be different.
The preeminent goal of traditional occupation law is not justice but
peace: "[t] he law of belligerent occupation is an attempt to substitute
for chaos some kind of order, however harsh it may be."256 It is true that
the Fourth Geneva Convention affords many rights to inhabitants of
occupied territories and that these may not be transgressed by an
occupant in the name of imposing order.257 Indeed, if an occupier
complies fully with all the rights-protective provisions of Geneva law,
the newly established order may result in human rights conditions that
substantially improve on those existing under the ousted de jure
regime. 258 But order is to be achieved for its own sake, not for the
purpose of introducing new political institutions. 2
59
The one case where international actors have consistently reviewed
legislative changes by an occupying power is the Israeli occupation of
Palestinian territories.260 One might argue that certain early administra-
255. Cf McCOUBRLY & WHITE, supra note 249, at 342-43.
256. LORD MCNAIR & A.D. WATrs, THE LEGAL EFFECrS OF WAR 371 (1966).
257. Under the Fourth Geneva Convention, the rights include protections from discimina-
tion (art. 27), impositions on honor and dignity (art. 27), physical or moral coercion (art. 31),
physical suffering (art. 32), collective punishments (art. 33), intimidation, retribution, the taking
of hostages or pillage (arts. 33-34), mass or individual forced transfers (art. 49), compulsion to
serve in the occupant's armed forces (art. 51), destruction of personal property (art. 53), altering
the status of judges or other public officials (art. 54), infringements on the free exercise of
religion (art. 58), executing those under eighteen years old (art. 68), ex post facto prosecutions
(art. 70), infringements on due process protections in criminal proceedings (art. 71), and
inhumane conditions for detainees (art. 76). Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 11, arts. 27,
31-34, 49, 51, 53, 54, 58, 68, 70, 71, 76.
258. PICTET, supra note 243, at 274.
259. MCCOUBPEY & WHITE, supra note 249, at 283 ("It was certainly the intention of those who
framed the Hague Convention that the occupier's law-making powers could be exercised only
where it was a matter of military necessity that they should and not merely where the occupier
considered it expedient to do so.") (quoting P. ROWE, DEFENCE: THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS 184
(1987)).
260. Israeli violations of occupation law were largely the focus of the ICJ's security wall
advisory opinion. See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall, supra note 217; see also
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tive changes in the territories were similar to many of the CPA reforms
in that they were made in the best interests of the local population; they
included the alteration of taxation methods, abolition of the death
penalty, and changes in labor laws. 26' The Israeli Supreme Court has
upheld many such acts, in one case interpreting article 43 of the Hague
Regulations to impose only a "duty to act as a proper government that
looks after the local population in all fields of life. 262 One author has
described this as the "benevolent occupation" approach.263 Nonethe-
less, the Security Council has unequivocally condemned Israel's intro-
duction of its own laws into the territories and affirmed the application
of the Fourth Geneva Convention to its actions.264
On this view of Hague and Geneva law, the conservationist principle
Richard A. Falk & Burns H. Weston, Debate, The Relevance of International Law to Palestinian Rights
in the West Bank and Gaza: In Legal Defense of the Intifada, 32 HAv. INT'L L.J. 129 (1991); Ayelet Levy,
Israel Rejects Its Own Offspring: The International Criminal Court, 22 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
207, 223-32 (1999); Uri Shoham, Note, The Principle of Legality and the Israeli Military Government in
the Territories, 153 MIL. L. REv. 245 (1996).
261. See Adam Roberts, Prolonged Military Occupation: The Israeli-Occupied Territories Since 1967,
84 AM. J. INT'L L. 44, 86 (1990) (Since 1967 "extensive economic changes have been brought
about in such key areas as agriculture, land ownership, use of water resources, the road system,
building construction and taxation ... . Not all these changes have been for the worse."); cf
GREEN, supra note 228, at 249; Moshe Drori, The Legal System inJudea and Samaria: A Review of the
Previous Decade with a Glance at the Future, 1978 ISR. Y.B. HuM. RTs. 144,161-68.
262. Ja'amait Ascan v. IDF Commander in Judea and Samaria, (1982) 37(4) PD 785, 800,
quoted in DAVID KRETZMER, THE OCCUPATION OFJUSTICE 68 (2002).
263. KRETZMER, supra note 262, at 69.
264. SeeS.C. Res. 904, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3351st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/904 (1994); S.C.
Res. 607, U.N. SCOR, 43rd Sess., 2780th mtg., U.N. Doc S/RES/607 (1988); S.C. Res. 497, U.N.
SCOR, 36th Sess., 2319th mtg., U.N. Doc S/RES/497 (1981) ("[T]he Israeli decision to impose its
laws, jurisdiction and administration in the occupied Syrian Golan Heights is null and void and
without international legal effect."); S.C. Res. 465, U.N. SCOR, 35th Sess., 2203rd mtg., U.N. Doc
S/RES/465 (1980) (condemning as a "flagrant violation of the Geneva Convention ... all
measures taken by Israel to change the physical character, demographic composition, institu-
tional structure or status of the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967"). Israel
has taken the position that the Fourth Geneva Convention does not apply to its occupation
because the Convention applies only to the "territory of a high contracting party," which the lands
occupied after 1967, in its view, are not. See, e.g.,Yehuda Blum, The Missing Reversioner Reflections on
the Status ofJudea and Samaria, 3 ISR. L. REv. 279 (1968). This claim is based on a selective reading
of the Convention, however: while the second paragraph of article 2 does apply its provisions to
"territory of a High Contracting Party," the first paragraph applies the Convention to "all cases of
declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High
Contracting Parties." See Roberts, supra note 261, at 62-66. Even the United States acknowledges
that "[t] he international community considers Israel's authority in the occupied territories to be
subject to the Hague Regulations of 1907 and the 1949 Geneva Convention relating to the
Protection of Civilians in Time of War." UNITED STATES DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON
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may be seen as an allocation of decision-making competence between
the occupier and the ousted sovereign. The allocation rests on "the
contrast between the fullness and permanence of sovereign power and
the temporary and precarious position of the Occupant. ,265 The
occupying power is competent to legislate both to maintain security
while it exercises governing authority and to fulfill the obligations
under occupation law that secure basic rights for the local population.
But because the occupier possesses no local legitimacy or necessary
stake in the welfare of the territory after it departs, it is not competent
to enact reforms that fundamentally alter governing structures in the
territory and create long-term consequences for the local population.
IV. CPA REFORMS AND THE CONSERVATIONIST PRINCIPLE
Such is the traditional understanding of the conservationist prin-
ciple. Several arguments can be made challenging this strict understand-
ing. Before addressing these, however, we must first ask how the CPA
reforms fare under the traditional view. In all six substantive areas of
reform-de-Ba'athification, security and military institutions, human
rights, criminal law and law enforcement, the economy, and good
governance-significant changes were made to institutions, laws, regu-
lations, and personnel. Some entities, such as the Iraqi military, were
abolished altogether. Other areas, such as foreign investment, banking,
and securities regulation, were reformed in ways that radically altered
the guiding ethos of pre-existing law. Still others, such as the judicial
system and the penal laws, were modified in ways claimed to ameliorate
violations of international legal principles.
A literal interpretation of article 43 of the Hague Regulations,
prohibiting change to the laws in force "unless absolutely prevented"
from doing so, would likely find most of the CPA's reforms invalid.
Apart from the changes in security and law enforcement, which directly
affected the CPA's ability to keep civil order and dealt with the ongoing
insurgency challenging its authority, a literal view would hold that the
CPA appropriated legislative authority unrelated to the orderly admin-
istration of the territory. While scholars have employed a remarkable
range of linguistic constructions to shed light on when an occupier is
"absolutely prevented" from respecting the laws in force, few propose
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Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall, supra note 217, 93-101.
265. STONE, supra note 220, at 694.
THE OCCUPATION OF IRAQ
justifications wholly divorced from military necessity.266 This appeared
to be the reasoning of the British Attorney General, who issued a
cautionary opinion just prior to the onset of the Iraqi occupation:
(a) Article 43 of the Hague Regulations imposes an obligation to
respect the laws in force in the occupied territory 'unless
absolutely prevented.' Thus, while some changes to the legisla-
tive and administrative structures of Iraq may be permissible if
they are necessary for security or public order reasons, or in
order to further humanitarian objectives, more wide-ranging
reforms of governmental and administrative structures would
not be lawful.
(b) Geneva Convention IV prohibits, subject to certain limited
exceptions, any alteration in the status of public officials or
judges (although officials may be removed from post in
certain circumstances).
(c) Geneva Convention IV also requires that the penal laws of the
occupied territory must remain in force except where they
constitute a threat to security or an obstacle to application of
the Convention. In addition, the courts of the occupied
territory must be allowed to continue to function. There are
limited exceptions allowing the Occupying Power to promul-
gate its own laws in order to fulfill its obligations under the
Convention and to maintain security and public order, but in
266. As Schwenk recounts:
Hyde states that the occupant is absolutely prevented from respecting the laws of the
occupied country if they conflict 'with the security of his army or its support, efficacy,
and success.' Garner suggests that military security or interests is a test for permissible
change of the laws. Wilson considers the occupant entitled to abrogate the existing laws
of the occupied country if they are 'detrimental to the occupant.' Oppenheim submits
that a change of the laws of the occupant is permissible if 'necessitated by [the
occupant's] interest,' or 'by military necessity.' Feilchenfeld believes that the laws may
be changed if the change is 'sufficiently justified.' Fenwick thinks that the occupant
need not respect the laws of the occupied country if they are not 'compatible with the
existence of a state of war and the safety of the army of occupation.' Stauffenberg
regards a change of the laws of the occupied country permissible if it is justified by
'necessity of the war, public safety, and welfare of the population.' Meurer takes the
position that the existing laws in the occupied country may be changed in so far as
'unsurpassable military obstacles exist.' He believes, however, that such 'unsurpassable
obstacles' will soon turn out to be in existence.
Schwenk, supra note 242, at 400 (citations omitted) (quotes and alterations in original).
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principle, the existing structures for the administration of
justice must remain in place.
(d) Apart from rules on the collection of taxes (which must as far
as possible be in accordance with existing local law), there are
no specific provisions in Geneva Convention IV or the Hague
Regulations dealing with the economy of the occupied terri-
tory. However, the general principle outlined in (a) above
applies equally to economic reform, so that the imposition of
major structural economic reforms would not be authorised
by international law.2 67
One could argue that the CPA's more ambitious reforms were in fact
required by military necessity and orderly administration of the terri-
tory.2 68 It could be claimed that because the Ba'athist regime func-
tioned, at least in later years, as a virtual cult of personality surrounding
Saddam Hussein, the CPA was "absolutely prevented" from working
through Ba'athist administrative structures and personnel once Saddam
and his close associates were driven from power. But at best this would
be an argument for removing Ba'athist Party loyalists from positions of
authority-as was done-and replacing them with a merit-based civil
service.2 69 Moreover, this claim fails to provide a necessity justification
for reforms based on disapproval of particular political or economic
models, rather than an inability to work through Ba'athist officials.
Many CPA reforms fell into the former category, including abolition of
military laws that pre-dated the Ba'ath Party's assumption of power in
1968, creation of the Central Criminal Court, anti-corruption laws, and
the wide range of economic reforms.
Alternatively, one could argue that because the Fourth Geneva
Convention imposes an array of affirmative obligations on occupying
powers-going well beyond the spare language of Hague article 43-
local laws that impede the occupier from fulfilling those obligations
must be reformed. Many of these obligations require respect for
267. Memorandum from the Right Hon. Lord Goldsmith, QC to the Prime Minister (Mar.
26, 2003), reprinted in John Kampfner, Blair Told It Would Be Illegal to Occupy Iraq, NEW STATESMAN,
May 26, 2003, at 16-17.
268. See HOWARD S. LEVIE, 2 THE CODE OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 715 (1986)
(justifying WWII Allies' rescission of laws supporting Italian Fascist and German Nazi organiza-
tions on grounds of military necessity).
269. Although article 54 of the Fourth Geneva Convention allows the occupier to remove
public officials from their posts, one widely cited commentary limits this right to situations where
"a public official refuses to fulfil his or her tasks under the occupying authorities." HANDBOOK OF
HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 252, at 258.
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human rights. 27 ° Others require provision of basic necessities of life to
the population.2 71 Working within statutory and administrative struc-
tures that failed to guarantee these basic rights and necessities would
"absolutely prevent" the occupier from fulfilling its Convention obliga-
tions. On this view, the rights-based clauses of the Fourth Geneva
Convention establish minimum standards of occupation governance.
An occupier who preserves existing laws that deny rights to the popula-
tion would presumably violate the Convention, notwithstanding a
claim that the laws presented no obstacle to maintaining order or
pursuing military objectives. Further, because the Convention's protec-
tions focus on the condition of a territory's inhabitants, such an occupier
could not rest on the claim that it had not itself enacted the offending
laws. 7 2 The Convention would instead impose an affirmative duty to
substitute new laws that ensure actual respect for rights. This view finds
support in the proviso of article 64 of the Convention that an occupier
may "subject the population of the occupied territory to provisions
which are essential to enable the Occupying Power to fulfil its obliga-
,,273tions under the present Convention. This passage, according to the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), "means that when
the penal legislation of the occupied territory conflicts with the provi-
sions of the Convention, the Convention must prevail."2 74
Many of the CPA's actions did expand the quantity and quality of
rights guaranteed to Iraqis. But a claim that article 64 and the associ-
ated rights provisions of the Convention provided a blank check for the
CPA to enact any reforms it believed to be in the best interests of the
Iraqi population goes too far. First, the rights guaranteed in the Fourth
Geneva Convention are generally limited to instances of egregious
misconduct: discrimination (art. 27), impositions on honor and dignity
(art. 27), physical or moral coercion (art. 31), physical suffering (art.
32), collective punishments (art. 33), intimidation, retribution, the
270. Seelist of rights, supra note 257.
271. "[T] he Occupying Power has the duty of ensuring the food and medical supplies of the
population," Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 11, art. 55, as well as "the duty of ensuring
and maintaining ... the medical and hospital establishments and services, public health and
hygiene in the occupied territory, with particular reference to the adoption and application of the
prophylactic and preventive measures necessary to combat the spread of contagious diseases and
epidemics." Id. art. 56.
272. In typical phraseology, article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention provides that
protected persons "shall at all times be humanely treated, and shall be protected especially against
all acts of violence or threats thereof and against insults and public curiosity." Id. art. 27.
273. Id. art. 64.
274. PICTET, supra note 243, at 336.
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taking of hostages or pillage (arts. 33-34), limitations on internment
(art. 42), mass or individual forced transfers (art. 49), compulsion to
serve in the occupant's armed forces (art. 51), destruction of personal
property (art. 53), infringements on the free exercise of religion (art.
58), non-retroactivity of laws (arts. 67 & 70), executing those under
eighteen years old (art. 68), due process rights in criminal proceedings
(arts. 71-75), and inhumane conditions in detention (art. 76). Even the
CPA's human rights-oriented reforms go well beyond this list. Most of the
others address different subjects altogether. At most, some of the criminal
procedure and prison reforms might be covered by this theory.
Second, the CPA made no showing that pre-existing Iraqi law permit-
ted forms of abuse prohibited by the Convention. If, instead, some of
the enumerated rights were violated through informal practices or the
predilections of particularly brutal officials, sweeping law reform would
not be a necessary response. Given that occupation law creates a
presumption of normative continuity, changes in existing law cannot
be the path of first resort. Yet in order to remain consistent with a
literalist interpretation of article 43, one would need to make the dubious
claim that the CPA was unable to refrain from violating each right pro-
tected by the Convention without broad legal and institutional reform.
The claim is even more unsustainable when applied to economic
reforms. The CPA obviously believed that Iraqi prosperity required
abandoning the old central planning model in favor of liberal market
policies. But this economic paradigm shift was not so essential to
providing basic means of subsistence to Iraqis that the CPA would have
been unable to do so had the old economic structures remained in
place. A number of non-governmental organizations made assessments
of basic services needed in post-war Iraq. While all found conditions
dire and much of the population in need of immediate assistance,
none recommended market reforms as an immediate (or even long-
term) remedy.2 75 Certainly there is nothing in either the Hague
Regulations or Fourth Geneva Convention that suggests a preference
275. SeeJohn Hamre et al., Ctr. for Strategic and Int'l Studies, Iraq's Post-Conflict Reconstruction
(July 17, 2003), available at http://www.csis.org/features/IraqTrip.pdf; International Crisis Group,
Baghdad: A Race Against the Clock (June 11, 2003), available at http://www.icg.org//library/
documents/reportarchive/A401000_11062003.pdf; Open Soc'y Inst. & United Nations Found.,
Reconstructing Iraq: A Guide to the Issues (May 30, 2003), available at http://www.soros.org/initiatives/
washington/articles-pubications/pubications/reconstructingiraq-20030530/reconstructing-
iraq.pdf; United States Inst. of Peace, Establishing the Rule of Law in Iraq (Apr. 2003), available at
http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr104.pdf.
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for one economic model over another.2 76
Perhaps more importantly, the economic reforms were not intended
solely (or even primarily) to prevent the CPA from transgressing rights
of economic subsistence. They were instead long-term and forward
looking, intended primarily to reap positive benefits after the occupa-
tion had ended.2 77 Indeed, given the radical behavioral changes they
required of Iraqi officials and citizens, one might well say they were
incapable of reaping their intended benefits without a long period of
acclimation. The reforms' future orientation was made clear in the
structure of the transition to Iraqi rule. Virtually none of the CPA
legislation was rescinded and the TAL created an opt-out system,
ensuring that CPA laws would continue in force unless affirmatively
repealed. And the omnibus order issued on the very last day of
occupation-substituting the names of new Iraqi institutions and offi-
cials for those of the CPA-had no other purpose than to project the
reforms into the future. To the extent the CPA's economic reforms
protected individual rights, they were therefore rights held against a
post-occupation Iraqi government. But a claim of necessity in these
circumstances-arguing that failure to enact economic reforms would
result in mass privation, thereby placing the occupying powers in
violation of their treaty obligations-can only address conditions that
existed during the occupation.278
276. See STONE, supra note 220, at 729 (Hague Regulations "provide only the vaguest
inferential guidance on the now basic State functions of currency, banking, debt, exchange, and
import and export control.").
277. This future orientation was evident in U.S. officials' own description of the reforms:
U.S. assistance is predicated on and directed toward reforming Iraq's society and
economy. A new, prosperous, peaceful Iraq must be a democratic, free enterprise Iraq,
fully integrated into the community of nations. The Governing Council and the CPA
are working to establish a solid foundation on which future Iraqi governments can
build. To establish a prosperous, dynamic, and competitive Iraqi economy, Iraqi and
CPA officials are hard at work putting into place modern regimes for trade, investment,
banking, tax, and corporate law.
Economic and Financial Reconstruction in Iraq: Hearing Before the Senate Banking Subcomm. on Int l Trade
and Finance, 108th Cong. (Feb. 11, 2004) (statement of E. Anthony Wayne, U.S. Assistant Sec'y for
Econ. and Bus. Affairs), available at http://banking.senate.gov/_files/ACF84.pdf.
278. See MYREs S. McDouGAL & FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF WAR
753-54 (1994) ("Authority to bind the indefinite future bears no necessary relation to the securing
of the purposes of the law of belligerent occupation.").
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V. ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF LEGITIMACY FOR CPA REFORMS
If a literal interpretation of the conservationist principle would
arguably invalidate many of the CPA's reforms, do alternative sources
of legitimacy exist? Several such claims can be made.
Two are straightforward and do not require any change in the
literalist view. First, Iraqi authorities arguably consented to the CPA's
reforms. Second, it may be claimed that the Security Council ratified
the reforms by effectively legislating a set of goals for the occupation
that superseded the limitations of Hague and Geneva law.
Three others are more ambitious. The first argues there is little sense
in preserving the prerogatives of an ousted regime in a war whose
entire purpose was to bring about regime change. Hague and Geneva
law, on this view, embody an anachronistic conception of occupying
powers as having little interest in the governments or laws of states they
defeat in war. Since this assumption is less true for contemporary wars
generally and not at all true for the Iraq war, this claim directly
challenges the ongoing relevance of the conservationist principle.
The second claim looks to developments in international law that
parallel CPA reforms. If states are legally constrained to apply certain
norms to their own citizens, this claim asserts, international law could not
very well sanction a different model when those states become legally
responsible for the welfare of citizens in an occupied territory. Further,
because the Fourth Geneva Convention supplemented the Hague Regula-
tions by adding an extensive catalogue of protections for the occupied
populations, our understanding of those protections ought to evolve with
more general understandings of similar international legal entitlements.
Otherwise, a population deprived of its dejure government by the actions
of a foreign occupier could become, through no fault of its own, subject to
a lesser set of protections than existed before the occupation.2 79
This claim draws strength from the effective ossification of occupa-
tion law since the Hague and Geneva treaties were drafted. As noted,
there is virtually no state practice of acknowledged occupations to
shape a contemporary understanding of the conservationist principle.
By contrast, international law has developed an increasingly marked
concern with matters previously considered the exclusive prerogative
of national governments. The protection of human rights is primary
279. Obviously this was not the case for human fights in Iraq, where it would be difficult to
violate human rights more thoroughly than occurred throughout the history of the Ba'athist
regime. See MIDDLE EAST WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS IN IRAQ 128 (1990) ("Iraq is a well-organized
police state and its government is one of the most brutal and repressive regimes in power today.").
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among these but other areas of governance are also the subject of
international legal regimes.28 ° In short, occupation law has remained
static while other areas of international law have developed a rich,
value-laden jurisprudence. The vacuum of direct legal authority leaves
room for these cognate developments to shape the contemporary
understanding of an occupier's rights and obligations.
The third ambitious claim looks to the specific case of post-WWII
Germany as precedent for actions in Iraq. The Allies stripped the
German state of its Nazi infrastructure in much the same way that the
CPA removed all traces of the Ba'athist legacy. Unless one is prepared
to hold de-Nazification and its correlate reforms as violating Hague law,
this claim contends, they provide direct support for the Iraqi reforms.
A. Consent of Iraqi Authorities
The first argument rests on the consent of Iraqi authorities. That
consent, it may be asserted, operates to waive any claims of infringe-
ment on the rights of the post-occupation de jure regime, whose
interests the CPA, as de facto temporary authority, was bound to
protect. Even if the CPA exceeded its authority under occupation law,
in other words, the right-holder potentially injured by such acts re-
nounced any claim of injury or illegality.
The only entity capable of giving such consent during the occupa-
tion was the Iraqi Governing Council. The Ba'athist regime had been
disbanded and its leaders taken into custody.28 l While governments of
occupied territories have often gone into exile and continued to issue
legal proclamations from abroad-requiring courts and scholars to
assess their legal effect in the territory-that did not occur here. 282 The
Governing Council was created specifically to introduce an Iraqi voice
into policy-making during the occupation.283 Although the CPA did
not seek the Governing Council's formal approval for each of its
reforms, Council members made public statements generally support-
280. See generally DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAw (Gregory H. Fox & Brad
R. Roth eds., 2000).
281. According to the U.S. Central Command, forty-five Iraqi leaders on a "most wanted list"
of fifty-five had been captured or killed. U.S. CENT. COMMAND, IRAQI 55 MOST WANTED LIST, at
http://www.centcom.mil/Operations/IraqiFreedom/55mostwanted.htm. (last visited Jan. 19,
2005).
282. See BENVENISTI, supra note 218, at 21-27 (discussing governments in exile); Eric Stein,
Application of the Law of the Absent Sovereign in Territory Under Belligerent Occupation: The Schio Massacre,
46 MICH. L. REv. 341 (1948).
283. See Coalition Provisional Authority Regulation No. 6, supra note 34.
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ing CPA initiatives designed to enhance human rights and liberalize
the Iraqi economy.28 4 CPA directives occasionally noted their origins in
consultations with the Governing Council.285 And Iraqi ministries,
operating under the Governing Council, were actively involved in
implementing many of the reforms.
A critical question is whether the Governing Council possessed the
authority to speak for post-occupation "Iraq" and give valid consent on
its behalf. Occupation law contains no criteria by which to judge
whether a local entity adequately represents the occupied state. This is
not surprising: because authority to legislate for the territory is reserved
to the de jure sovereign, the conservationist principle can be under-
stood as simply deferring all questions of how the dejure sovereign is
chosen or constituted until after the occupation is over. At that point,
selection of a new government becomes not a matter of international
occupation law but a matter of the national constitutional law of the
post-occupation state.
One might conclude, therefore, that such legitimizing criteria are
absent from the Hague and Geneva instruments because they simply
do not recognize consent by a local body as relieving an occupying
power of conservationist obligations. An innovation of the Fourth
Geneva Convention strongly supports this view. The Convention's
284. On July 22, 2003, Adnan Pachachi, speaking as the head of a delegation from the
Governing Council, described for the Security Council a list of "pressing issues to be addressed by
the interim Governing Council." U.N. Doc. S/PV.4791, supra note 40, at 10. These included "a
re-examination of the legislation enacted by the previous regime-legislation that enabled it to
tighten its control over the country," as well as efforts "to rebuild its economy, modernize its
industrial sector, reform its educational system, improve its sanitation services and provide basic
necessities to all its citizens." Id.
285. Acknowledgment of consultations was mostly limited to the economic reforms and
usually consisted of the same general boilerplate rather than specific delineations of a legislative
path for a given reform. See, e.g., Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 39, supra note 115,
pmbl. (order promulgated "[i]n close consultation with and acting in coordination with the
Governing Council"); Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 40, supranote 116, pmbl. (noting
that the CPA had "worked closely with the Governing Council to ensure that economic change
occurs in a manner acceptable to the people of Iraq"); see also Coalition Provisional Authority
Order No. 56, supra note 125, pmbl.; Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 64, supra note 141,
(same language in preamble to amendments to Company Law); Coalition Provisional Authority
Order No. 18, supra note 150 (same language in preamble to Interim Law on Securities Market);
Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 75, supra note 163 (same language in preamble to
Realignment of Military Industrial Companies); Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 76,
supra note 163 (same language in preamble to Consolidations of State-Owned Enterprises);
Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 78, supra note 144 (virtually same language in preamble
to reform of bankruptcy procedures); Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 80, supra note
147 (same language in preamble to amendments to Trademarks and Descriptions Law).
[Vol. 36
THE OCCUPATION OF IRA Q
drafters were aware that past occupiers had effectively manifactured
local consent for their actions. "The experiences of both world wars
clearly indicated the need of circumventing a variety of ingenious
devices by which occupants avoided the observance of the rules of
international law."2 86 In its commentary, the ICRC criticized World
War II occupying powers for creating pliant local governments to help
implement their political agendas: 28
7
Of course the Occupying Power usually tried to give some
colour of legality and independence to the new organizations,
which were formed in the majority of cases with the co-
operation of certain elements among the population of the
occupied country, but it was obvious that they were in fact
always subservient to the will of the Occupying Power.288
Agreements with local authorities, whether new or pre-existing,
"represent a more subtle means by which the Occupying Power may try
to free itself from the obligations incumbent on it under occupation
law."289 There is, warned the ICRC, "a particularly great danger of the
Occupying Power forcing the Power whose territory is occupied to
conclude agreements prejudicial to protected persons. "290
As a result, article 7 of the Fourth Geneva Convention provides that
protected persons, who include those in occupied territories, "may in
no circumstances renounce in part or in entirety the rights secured to
them by the present Convention. ' 291 Article 47 reiterates and expands
upon this injunction:
Protected persons who are in occupied territory shall not be
deprived, in any case or in any manner whatsoever, of the
benefits of the present Convention by any change introduced,
as the result of the occupation of a territory, into the institu-
tions or government of the said territory, nor by any agreement
concluded between the authorities of the occupied territories and the
286. VON GLAHN, supra note 12, at 74.
287. See PICTET, supra note 243, at 69.
288. Id. at 273.
289. Id. at 274.
290. Id. at 274-75.
291. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 11, art. 7.
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Occupying Power, nor by any annexation by the latter of the
whole or part of the occupied territory.
292
Occupying powers, therefore, cannot accomplish indirectly through
agreements or pliant local administrators what they are prohibited
from accomplishing directly: changing existing laws or institutions so as
to diminish the rights of protected persons. "In other words, no more
Quislings, Lavals or others of their ilk!"293 Whether this was the case for
the CPA's actions in Iraq will be considered below. Here, the point is
only that such changes, if prejudicial, cannot be sanitized by the
"consent" of the Governing Council.
But CPA proponents might well respond that the Governing Council
was in no way comparable to the Nazi and Japanese puppet regimes
that gave rise to these provisions. The puppets were integral parts of
plans to brutalize the occupied territories. The Council, by contrast,
facilitated a program of reform and progress. Where local consent does
not result in obvious violations of Geneva rights provisions, on this view,
a local entity's "representativeness" must be evaluated on its own
merits.
This policy argument appears weak in light of the treaty provisions'
plain language. But let us assume here that local consent could rescue
rights-enhancing reforms from the conservationist principle. The ques-
tion would remain of how to evaluate the Governing Council's capacity
to consent.294 A requirement that it be democratically elected is
unacceptably ahistorical, since notions of democratic governance were
wholly absent from international law when the Hague and Geneva rules
were drafted.295 What of the Council's specific powers? The primary
factor weighing against its "representativeness" was its subordination to
292. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 11, art. 47 (emphasis added).
293. LEvIE, supra note 268, at 716-17.
294. An alternate conclusion would be that local bodies like the Governing Council are
simply irrelevant. If an occupier's legislative changes diminish protected rights, then no degree of
local consent, however genuine, will cure a violation of Geneva law. If the changes do not violate
protected rights, there is no need to resort to local consent in order to secure their legitimacy.
295. Writing just prior to the 1907 Hague Regulations, Lasa Oppenheim stated in the first
edition of his influential treatise, "The Law of Nations prescribes no rules as regards the kind of
head a State may have. Every State is, naturally, independent regarding this point, possessing the
faculty of adopting any Constitution... according to its discretion." L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL
LAW 403 (1st ed. 1905). Even in 1949, when the Fourth Geneva Convention was drafted, global
human rights treaties guaranteeing a right to political participation were more than a decade
away. See generally Gregory H. Fox, The Right to Political Participation in International Law, in
DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 280, at 48, 50-53.
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the CPA. All Council members were chosen by the CPA, Iraqi ministries
were compelled to carry out CPA directives, no formal mechanism
existed for the Council to vet proposed CPA legislation, and, even
when vetting occurred, Council decisions were subject to the Adminis-
trator's veto. 296 The CPA even revamped the salaries and terms of
employment of civil servants working in Iraqi ministries supposedly
operating under the Governing Council's authority. 297 In the words of
a constitutional advisor to the CPA, "[t]he Governing Council gov-
erned no one. Its 'decisions' were more in the nature of recommenda-
tions. While it named technocrat transitional ministers to run Iraq's
various ministries, the Govenring Council had little or no say in the
ministries' day-to-day operations."
29
In its favor, the Council was intended to be representative of the
various ethnic and religious groups in Iraq, though its membership was
somewhat skewed by a large presence of Iraqi exiles.299 In addition,
Council members were seated as representatives of the Iraqi state at
meetings of the Arab League, the Organization of the Islamic Confer-
ence, and the World Trade Organization. °°
The most significant factor weighing in the Governing Council's
favor was its recognition by the Security Council. In May 2003 the
Security Council declared in Resolution 1483 that it supported
296. See supra text accompanying notes 38-47.
297. See Reform of Salaries and Employment Conditions of State Employees, Coalition Provisional
Authority Order No. 30, CPA/ORD/8 September 2003/30 (Sept. 8, 2003), available at http://www.
iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20030908_CPAORD30Reform ofSalaries-and Employment.
Conditions of State_.Employees withAnnexA.pdf
298. NOAH FELDMAN, WHAT WE OWE IRAQ 110 (2004). Another CPA advisor writes similarly,
The IGC was neither fish nor fowl: It was not really a 'governing' council, as Bremer
made it clear that he would continue to exercise supreme power, including the power
to veto any IGC decisions. But it was given some ability to advise the American viceroy
and to nominate Iraqi ministers (who would themselves have limited power), as well as
to propose a timetable and formula for drafting and ratifying the new constitution and
then conducting elections for a new government.
Larry Diamond, Lessons from Iraq, 16J. DEMOC. 9, 10-11 (2005).
299. See Int'l Crisis Group, Governing Iraq 10-12 (Aug. 25, 2003), available at http://www.
icg.org//library/documents/reportarchive/A401098_25082003.pdf.
300. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 24 of Resolution 1483 (2003) and
Paragraph 12 of Resolution 1511 (2003), U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess. 57, U.N. Doc. S/2003/1149 (Dec.
5, 2003); Press Release, Iraq Achieves Observer Status at the WTO, supra note 133.
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the formation, by the people of Iraq with the help of the
Authority and working with the Special Representative, of an
Iraqi interim administration as a transitional administration
run by Iraqis, until an internationally recognized, representa-
tive government is established by the people of Iraq and as-
sumes the responsibilities of the Authority.
30
'
In July the Security Council welcomed the creation of the Governing
Council one month earlier.3 0 2 Two months later, in Resolution 1511,
the Council declared that the Governing Council satisfied its call in
Resolution 1483 for "an Iraqi interim administration as a transitional
administration run by Iraqis." The Council continued:
[T] he Governing Council and its ministers are the principal
bodies of the Iraqi interim administration, which, without
prejudice to its further evolution, embodies the sovereignty of the
State of Iraq during the transitional period until an internationally
recognized, representative government is established and as-
sumes the responsibilities of the Authority.
30 3
Almost by definition, an entity said to "embody the sovereignty" of
Iraq would appear to represent the state. And because it emanates from
the Security Council's powers under Chapter VII of the Charter, that
declaration is authoritative. But the Council's statement begs the
question of "sovereign" for what purpose? Not to govern Iraq on an
equal footing with the CPA, because other Council resolutions had
affirmed the CPA's primary governing role.30 4 Not to run the Iraqi
ministries, which were all but controlled by CPA "advisors" during the
occupation. 0 5 Not to restrain the scope of CPA lawmaking, since the
301. S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 25, 19.
302. S.C. Res. 1500, supra note 38, 1 (Council "[w]elcomes the establishment of the broadly
representative Governing Council of Iraq on 13 July 2003, as an important step towards the
formation by the people of Iraq of an internationally recognized, representative government that
will exercise the sovereignty of Iraq.").
303. S.C. Res. 1511, supra note 39, 4 (emphasis added).
304. S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 25, 1 4. In debate over Resolution 1500, which welcomed the
creation of the Governing Council, the Mexican ambassador explained, "That welcome does not
constitute legal recognition. Nor should it be interpreted as endorsement. It is not, because the
Governing Council is still under the authority of the occupying Powers." U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess.,
4808th mtg. at 5, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4808 (2003) (statement of Mexican Ambassador Zinser).
305. According to the General Accounting Office,
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CPA exercised a de facto veto over Council actions.3 °6 And not to
prevent CPA reforms from carrying over, as they did, into the post-
occupation period. It is true that Resolution 1511 did not explicitly
disclaim the Governing Council's capacity to consent, most likely
because, as many delegations noted in Security Council debate, the
resolution was a compromise document. 30 7 But when in previous
resolutions the Security Council declared that ad hoc bodies in post-
conflict states "embody" the sovereignty of the state, those resolutions
also made clear the relationship between the local bodies and the
international actors.308 Here the Council provided no such clarifica-
[the] CPA assigned U.S. advisors from various agencies, including the Department of
State and the Department of Defense, to work directly with the Iraqi interim minister
appointed by the Governing Council. According to a former senior advisor, the advisors
had broad managerial authority, including the authority to hire and fire ministry
employees, determine ministry budgets, change ministry structures and functions, and
make major policy decisions.
U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REBUILDING IRAQ: RESOURCE, SECURITY, GOVERNANCE, ESSENTIAL
SERVICES, AND OVERSIGHT ISSUES, GAO-04-902R, at 75 (June 2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d04902r.pdf.
306. See sources cited supra note 47.
307. See U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4844th mtg. at 4, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4844 (2003) (statement of
German Ambassador Pleuger); id. (statement of French Ambassador De La Sabli4hre); id. at 6
(statement of Chinese Ambassador Guangya); id. (statement of Pakistani Ambassador Akram); id.
at 8 (statement of Syrian Ambassador Mekdad).
308. In Cambodia, the Paris Accords created a Supreme National Council-a coalition
group headed by Prince Sihanouk-that was said to be "the unique legitimate body and source of
authority in which, throughout the transition period, the sovereignty, independence and unity of
Cambodia are enshrined." Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia
Conflict, Oct. 23, 1991, 1663 U.N.T.S. 28, 59, [hereinafter Paris Accords], reprinted in Letter Dated
30 Octoberl 991 from the Permanent Representatives of France and Indonesia to the United Nations Addressed
to the Secretay-General U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Agenda Item 24, at 8, U.N. Doc. A/46/608 (1991);
see also S.C. Res. 668, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2941st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/668 (1990) (endorsing
the framework for a comprehensive political settlement of the Cambodia conflict). A Special
Representative of the Secretary-General had the authority to override decisions of the Supreme
National Council if they were inconsistent with the Paris Accords. See Paris Accords, supra, Annex
1, art. 2(b) (stating that the Special Representative would follow the National Council's advice
"provided that it is consistent with the objectives of the present Agreement"); see also Steven
Ratner, The Cambodia Settlement Accords, 87 Am.J. INT'L L. 1, 12 (1993). Likewise in Somalia, the
United Nations instigated the creation of a Transitional National Council that would serve as "the
repository of Somali sovereignty" during a transitional period. Addis Ababa Agreement Con-
cluded at the First Session of the Conference on National Reconciliation in Somalia, Mar. 27,
1993, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND SOMALIA, 1992-1996, at 264-65 (1996). The Addis Ababa
Agreement creating the Council provided that it would "be the prime political authority having
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tion. Indeed, its very use of the term "sovereignty"-a highly contested
concept that many consider to be devoid of any clear substantive
content-only muddied the waters further. 9
The most pragmatic reading of these passages suggests that the
Security Council did not intend to alter the authority exercised by the
Governing Council under CPA regulations. From the beginning of the
occupation the Security Council was notably passive in addressing CPA
reforms. It reminded the occupying powers of their humanitarian law
obligations and defined broad goals for UNAMI and the SGRG, but it
stopped short of creating a binding mandate for the occupation. The
Governing Council was the "representative" body created by the occupi-
ers and presented as a fait accompli to the Council, which appeared
loathe to alter its role or functions.
In the end, the Geneva Convention's strong disposition against
rights-negating agreements with local bodies, combined with the Gov-
erning Council's inability to exercise any independent judgment,
suggests that it should not be seen as legitimizing CPA legislation
through consent. If nothing else, the Governing Council cannot be
said to have consented to the CPA's reform agenda when it lacked any
meaningful power to withhold that consent. The Security Council's
endorsement in no way altered this subordinate role.
B. Security Council Preemption
The second potential source of legitimacy for CPA actions is the
Security Council. Under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, the Council
possesses virtually unlimited authority to respond to "threats to the
peace. '3 10 The Council has frequently invoked this power to compel
action it deems essential to restoring international peace and security,
legislative functions" during the transition period. Id. at 265. The United Nations was asked only to
provide implementation assistance. Id. at 266. The Security Council expressed support for the
Addis Ababa Agreement in September 1993. SeeS.C. Res. 865, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3280th mtg.,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/865 (1993).
309. For a thoughtful discussion of how the Council used this term in Resolutions 1483, 1500
and 1511, see Thomas D. Grant, The Security Council and Iraq: An Incremental Practice, 97 AM.J. INT'L
L. 823 (2003).
310. A finding of a "threat to the peace" is one of the triggers for Chapter VII authority found
in article 39 of the Charter. U.N. CHARTER art. 39. Once such a finding is made, the Council has an
escalating series of measures at its disposal. Article 41 allows it to use "measures not involving the
use of armed force" including "complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail,
sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of
diplomatic relations." Id. art. 41. If these have proven or appear to be inadequate, article 42 allows
the Council to "take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or
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including authorizing the use of force when states (and sub-state
actors) refuse to heed its demands. 311 This claim views Council ratifica-
tion of the CPA's reform agenda as an exercise of its plenary power.312
It asserts that even if Hague and Geneva law proscribed the United
States and other coalition partners-as individual states-from signifi-
cantly altering Iraqi law, that limitation could not trump Council-
sanctioned reforms. The Security Council, on this view, invokes a
superior law when it acts under Chapter VII. Its dictates prevail even
against conflicting treaty norms.313
One can find many broadly worded pronouncements that the Secu-
rity Council lacks the legislative authority to alter pre-existing interna-
tional legal obligations.31 4 Recent U.S. efforts to secure a resolution
exempting its citizens from the jurisdiction of the International Crimi-
nal Court (ICC), for example, led many states to argue that the Council
could not modify rights and obligations under the pre-existing ICC
statute. 15 Despite these objections, the resolution eventually passed.
restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and
other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations." Id. art. 42.
311. For a discussion of the exceptionally broad range of punitive actions taken under
Chapter VII, see THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 605 (Bruno Simma ed., 2d
ed. 2002).
312. This was apparently the position of the U.S. Department of State. SeeJoshua L. Dorosin,
Jus in Bello: Occupation Law and the War in Iraq, Remarks at the American Society of International
Law 98th Annual Meeting (Mar. 31-Apr. 3, 2004), in 98 AM. Soc. INT'L L. PROC. 117, 119-20 (2004)
(with standard caveat of remarks in a personal capacity).
313. Article 103 of the Charter provides, "In the event of a conflict between the obligations of
the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any
other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail." U.N.
CHARTER art. 103.
314. See, e.g., Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 I.C.J.
4, 138 (une 21) (separate opinion ofJudge Dillard) (while Court relies on Charter articles 24 and
25 to support binding character of Council resolutions "it does not purport to carry the
implication that, in its view, the United Nations is endowed with broad powers of a legislative or
quasi-legislative character"). Ironically, given its anti-ICC initiative, discussed below in the text, the
United States took this position in regard to the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee for Cyprus. See U.N.
SCOR, 19th Sess., 1096th mtg. at 36, U.N. Doc. S/PV.1096 (1964) ("This Treaty or any
international treaty cannot be abrogated, cannot be nullified, cannot be modified either in fact or
in effect by the Security Council of the United Nations.").
315. In July 2002, the United States proposed a resolution, ultimately adopted as S.C. Res.
1422 (July 12, 2002), by which the Security Council would request the ICC not to initiate
prosecutions against individual U.N. peacekeepers whose states had not ratified the treaty
establishing the Court. The resolution stated that the request was being made pursuant to article
16 of the ICC statute (a treaty), which allows the Security Council to defer prosecutions for twelve
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More generally, since the end of the Cold War the Council has acted to
supersede or in other ways alter a variety of pre-existing treaty norms."'
Responding to the events of September 11, 2001, for example, the
Council required "all States" to end financing for terrorist groups, an
obligation contained in a multilateral treaty which at that point had
been ratified by only four states.317 The resolution ending the 1991
Gulf War contained a host of new obligations for Iraq, compelling it to
accept a border it had previously rejected, adhere to treaties it had not
ratified, and submit to inspection regimes substantially more intrusive
than those contained in treaties it had ratified.318 In 1992, the Council
ordered Libya to extradite two terrorist suspects even though Libya was
party to a multilateral convention that provided the option of national
prosecution, which Libya had offered to undertake. 31 9 And in creating
a war crimes tribunal for Rwanda, the Council authorized the prosecu-
tion of a host of Geneva Convention violations that, under the Convert-
months. S.C. Res. 1422, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4572d mtg., U.N. Doc S/RES/1422 (2002). Many
state parties to the ICC argued that article 16 was not intended to function as a permanent
exemption for any class of defendants and that the resolution would effectively rewrite the ICC
statute. See Press Release, United Nations, Preparatory Commission for International Criminal
Court 'Deeply Concerned' at Security Council Developments Regarding Court and Peacekeeping,
U.N. Press Release L/3008, at 2-3 IJuly 3, 2002), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/
2002/13008.doc.htm (Switzerland: "[I] t was alarming to see the Council attempting to legislate in
contravention of an existing valid treaty .... The Security Council did not have competence to
adopt rules of law which ran counter to a treaty when that treaty was in compliance with the
United Nations Charter.") (New Zealand: "The Council had no right to highjack article 16 of the
Rome Statute. Under treaty law, the meaning of that article was determined by States parties at the
time the Statute was drawn up.") (Mexico: "The Security Council did not have the power to amend
treaties.") ("Venezuela: "If such a decision [the proposed U.S. resolution] were adopted, the
Security Council would be exceeding the competence granted to it, which was limited to the
maintenance of international peace and security.") (C6te d'Ivoire: "The Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties stipulated that treaties could be changed using procedures they themselves
elaborated ... . Therefore, the Statute [of the ICC] could only be amended in the way it had
decided, with the full agreement of States parties.") (Democratic Republic of Congo: "A United
Nations body could not give itself the right to change the Statute.").
316. See generally Paul C. Szasz, The Security Council Starts Legislating, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 901
(2002).
317. S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4385th mtg. 1 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (2001).
The treaty was the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism,
Dec. 9, 1999, 2178 U.N.T.S. 229; see G.A. Res. 54/109 (Annex), U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., 76th mtg.,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/109 (2000); Szasz, supra note 316, at 903.
318. See Lawrence D. Roberts, United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 and Its Aftermath:
The Implications for Domestic Authority and the Need for Legitimacy, 25 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 593
(1993).
319. S.C. Res. 748, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3063d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1422 (1992).
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tions themselves, do not give rise to individual culpability during civil
wars such as Rwanda's.
3 20
The critical question, therefore, is whether the Security Council
exercised its legislative authority to ratify the CPA reforms. The Coun-
cil's repeated insistence that the occupying powers adhere to the
requirements of occupation law suggests that it did not.321 In Resolu-
tion 1483 the Council bluntly referred to "the specific authorities,
responsibilities, and obligations under applicable international law of
these states [the United States and the United Kingdom] as occupying
powers under unified command." 32 2 Limiting discretion of the Ameri-
can-led CPA was particularly important to Security Council members
who had opposed the war in the first place and who, in its aftermath,
consistently sought a primary role for the United Nations in Iraqi
reconstruction. 23 These members were also eager for the CPA to
relinquish power to an elected Iraqi Government at the earliest oppor-
tunity. 3 2 4 Their views prevailed early on; beginning with Resolution
1483, the Council began to call for a swift end to the occupation.32 5
One reason articulated by several member states was to ensure that
Iraqis and not outsiders set the course of reform for a post-Ba'athist
320. See S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994)
(creating Rwanda tribunal).
321. See S.C. Res. 1511, supra note 39, 1 (affirming CPA's "specific responsibilities,
authorities, and obligations under applicable international law recognized and set forth in
resolution 1483"); S.C. Res. 1483, supranote 25,5 (calling on "all concerned to complyfullywith
their obligations under international law including in particular the Geneva Conventions of 1949
and the Hague Regulations of 1907"); see also S.C. Res. 1472, supra note 233, 1. An alternative
understanding of these demands is that they addressed only the CPA's obligation to maintain civil
order in Iraq, a basic obligation under Hague and Geneva law. Especially after the disastrous
bombing of U.N. headquarters in Baghdad in August 2003, security was very much on the mind of
Security Council members. None of the three resolutions explicitly limited application of
occupation law in this manner.
322. S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 25, pmbl. The importance of the United States and the United
Kingdom adhering to occupation law is underlined in the next preambular paragraph, in which
the Council notes that "other States that are not occupying powers are working now or in the
future may work under the Authority." Id. "The two occupying powers were thus designated to
shoulder primary responsibility." Eyal Benvenisti, Beyond Occupation Law, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 842,
844 (2003).
323. See, e.g., U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4761st mtg. at 3-6, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4761 (2003)
(statements of the French, German, and Mexican ambassadors).
324. See id.
325. S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 25, pmbl. ("expressing resolve that the day when Iraqis govern
themselves must come quickly"); S.C. Res. 1511, supra.note 39, 1 6 (calling upon the CPA "to
return governing responsibilities and authorities to the people of Iraq as soon as practicable").
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era.326 This evident desire for the CPA to make an early exit and leave a
light footprint seems incompatible with the Council simultaneously
granting a mandate for unlimited CPA legislative authority.
On the other hand, Resolution 1483 appealed to member states "to
assist the people of Iraq in their efforts to reform their institutions and
rebuild their country.', 3 27 Paragraph 4 elaborated, calling upon the
CPA,
consistent with the Charter of the United Nations and other
relevant international law, to promote the welfare of the Iraqi
people through the effective administration of the territory,
including in particular working towards the restoration of
conditions of security and stability and the creation of condi-
tions in which the Iraqi people can freely determine their own
political future.328
Paragraph 8 of the resolution called for the appointment of a Special
Representative of the Secretary-General, whose responsibilities in-
cluded coordinating among U.N. and other international agencies
"engaged in humanitarian assistance and reconstruction activities in
Iraq.", 2 9 The SRSG was also to coordinate with "the Authority" (the
CPA) in "assisting the people of Iraq.'330 The list of tasks to which that
assistance was directed was extensive:
(a) coordinating humanitarian and reconstruction assistance by
United Nations agencies and between United Nations agen-
cies and non-governmental organizations;
(b) promoting the safe, orderly, and voluntary return of refugees
and displaced persons;
(c) working intensively with the Authority, the people of Iraq, and
others concerned to advance efforts to restore and establish
national and local institutions for representative governance,
including by working together to facilitate a process leading to
326. See, e.g., U.N. Doc. S/PV.4761, supra note 323, at 6 (statement of Spanish Ambassador)
(describing the "fundamental principle" that "the Iraqis alone are the owners of their political
future and their economic resources"); U.N. Doc. S/PV.4844, supra note 307, at 3 (statement of
Russian Ambassador Lavrov) (Resolution 1511 "unambiguously stresses the Iraqi people's right to
determine its own political future and to manage its own natural resources.").
327. S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 25,1 1.
328. Id. 4.
329. Id. 1 8
330. Id.
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an internationally recognized, representative government of
Iraq;
(d) facilitating the reconstruction of key infrastructure, in coop-
eration with other international organizations;
(e) promoting economic reconstruction and the conditions for
sustainable development, including through coordination with
national and regional organizations, as appropriate, civil soci-
ety, donors, and the international financial institutions;
(f) encouraging international efforts to contribute to basic civil-
ian administration functions;
(g) promoting the protection of human rights;
(h) encouraging international efforts to rebuild the capacity of
the Iraqi civilian police force; and
(i) encouraging international efforts to promote legal and judi-
cial reform.331
A number of these goals arguably support CPA reforms: (1) restoring
and establishing national and local institutions for representative gover-
nance; (2) promoting economic reconstruction and the conditions for
sustainable development; (3) promoting the protection of human
rights; and (4) encouraging international efforts to promote legal and
judicial reform. And the goals of promoting "the welfare of the Iraqi
people" and assisting in efforts to "reform their institutions and rebuild
their country" might be read as a kind of prospective blank check by
which the Council authorized any reforms the CPA believed would
advance these broad objectives.
Despite this superficial congruence, Resolution 1483 should not be
read as a clear endorsement of CPA-led reforms. First, Resolution 1483
was a compromise document that accommodated conflicting views
among Council members about whether the United States or the
United Nations should lead in post-war Iraq, not to mention sharp
conflicts about the legality of the war itself.3 32 Seeking a clear CPA
mandate from such an ambiguous document may be a fool's errand-
reading deeper meaning into phrases that carry none. While one may
find implicit support for reconstruction in Council debate, no member
state clearly described the resolution as providing the CPA with a legal
331. Id.
332. See U.N. Doc. S/PV.4761, supra note 323, at 3 (France: "The resolution we have just
adopted is not perfect."); id. at 5 (Germany: "This resolution is a compromise reached after
intensive and sometimes difficult negotiations."); id. at 6 (Mexico: "The text of this resolution is
undoubtedly a compromise text."); id. at 7 (Russia: "Definitely-and many colleagues stressed this
point-there was compromise.").
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basis to act beyond the parameters of occupation law. 3 3 Indeed, many
members coupled their references to CPA authority with exhortations
that it strictly comply with humanitarian law obligations.334 The resolu-
tion itself echoes this schizophrenia, espousing both a commitment to
reform and fidelity to international law within a single paragraph. 35
The Secretary-General did express support for market-oriented eco-
nomic reforms in his report on implementation of Resolution 1483.336
But he also urged the CPA "to ensure Iraqi ownership of the political
process and the tangible delegation of executive authority and real
power to Iraqi representatives in terms of policy-making, including the
allocation and administration of budgetary resources." 337 Even if the
Secretary-General understood Resolution 1483 to authorize economic
reconstruction, therefore, it was not to occur under the CPA's plenary
control. And when discussing political and legal reforms, the Secretary-
333. At most, members made vague allusions to a reconstruction mandate. See id. at 3
(United States: "[T]he Security Council has provided a flexible framework ... for the coalition
provisional Authority [and others] ... to participate in the administration and reconstruction of
Iraq and to assist the Iraqi people in determining their political future, establishing new
institutions and restoring economic prosperity to the country."); id. at 4 (France: "[T]he
resolution ... attributes to the occupying Powers broad authorities in the area of international
humanitarian law and the necessary means to exercise those authorities."); id. at 5 (Germany: "A
process of political and economic reconstruction will be started."); id. at 7 (Spain: discussing "the
process of Iraq's reconstruction, which starts with this resolution"); id. at 11 (Pakistan: "[Pakistan]
has agreed, due to the exigencies of the circumstances, to the delegation of certain powers by the
Security Council to the occupying Powers, represented by the Authority.").
334. Id. at 5 (United Kingdom: "[Resolution 1483] gives a sound basis for the international
community to come together, in the interests of the Iraqi people, consistent with international
law."); id. at 7 (Russia: noting that one basis for Iraq settlement in resolution is "the observance by
the occupying Powers of international humanitarian law"); id. at 11-12 (Pakistan: "[T]he powers
delegated by the Security Council under this resolution are not open-ended or unqualified. They
should be exercised in ways that conform ... especially ... with the Geneva Conventions and the
Hague Regulations.").
335. Resolution 1483, supra note 25, 4 (calling upon "the Authority, consistent with the
Charter of the United Nations and other relevant international law, to promote the welfare of the
Iraqi people through the effective administration of the territory") The next paragraph calls upon
"all concerned to comply fully with their obligations under international law including in
particular the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Hague Regulations of 1907." Id. 1 5.
336. SGJuly Report, supra note 35, 1 84 (reviewing Iraq's dire economic circumstances and
recommending that "the development of Iraq and the transition from a centrally planned
economy to a market economy needs to be undertaken"); id. 1 88 (declaring that U.N. expertise
"will prove particularly valuable in laying the foundations for economic recovery and the
comprehensive reforms associated with the transition to a market economy"); id. 90 (noting the
need for "institutional and legal reforms" to "establish a market-oriented environment").
337. Id. 21.
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General was quite explicit in emphasizing the need for Iraqi control. 8
None of the circumstances surrounding Resolution 1483, in other
words, suggests a clear reform mandate for the CPA.
Second, and more specifically, the resolution's list of reformist tasks
was directed not to the CPA but to the Special Representative of the
Secretary-General. The distinction is not merely semantic. Many Coun-
cil members opposed to the war were prepared to authorize the United
Nations to perform tasks they would not explicitly delegate to the
CPA.3 39 In his first comprehensive report on progress in implementing
Resolution 1483, the Secretary-General made no mention of a Council
mandate for the CPA, but instead described a largely identical set of
tasks as "the focus of United Nations action in Iraq.
340
Third, the studied ambiguity of Resolution 1483 stands in stark
contrast to language in resolutions in which the Security Council has
directly authorized international actors to undertake wide-ranging
reforms in post-conflict states. Those resolutions were clear and de-
tailed in setting out reformist mandates. In Bosnia, for example, the
Council welcomed the Dayton Agreement and its creation of an
international High Representative, who would oversee implementation
of an entirely new constitutional structure for the country.341The
Council declared that "the High Representative is the final authority in
theatre regarding interpretation of Annex 10 on the civilian implemen-
tation of the Peace Agreement."342 That Annex covered such reforms
as "rehabilitation of infrastructure and economic reconstruction; the
establishment of political and constitutional institutions in Bosnia and
Herzegovina; promotion of respect for human rights and the return of
338. Id. 23 (In discussing constitutional process, the SRSG "has strongly advocated that the
Authority devolve real executive authority to a broadly representative and self-selecting Iraqi
leadership, including in policy- and decision-making."); id. 44 ("[0]nly an elected Iraqi
government should decide" how to address accountability for past crimes.); id. 1 53 ("Before
encouraging efforts to promote legal and judicial reform, there is a pressing need for the justice
system in Iraq to resume functioning within the framework of the provisions of the Geneva
Conventions.").
339. Even the U.S. representative did not describe the CPA as alone setting a reform agenda,
but instead told the Council that it had "provided a flexible framework under Chapter VII for the
coalition provisional Authority, Member States, the United Nations and others in the interna-
tional community to participate in the administration and reconstruction of Iraq." U.N. Doc.
S/PV.4761, supra note 323, at 3.
340. SG July Report, supra note 35, 1 98 (emphasis added). The Secretary-General added
several items to the list in Resolution 1483.
341. S.C. Res. 1031, U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., 3607th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1031 (1995).
342. Id. 27.
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displaced persons and refugees; and the holding of free and fair
elections.,3 43 In Kosovo, the Council created a civil administration for
the territory that would be responsible for "[o] rganizing and oversee-
ing the development of provisional institutions for democratic and
autonomous self-government pending a political settlement, including
the holding of elections."344 And in East Timor, the mission was
endowed with "all legislative and executive authority" in the territory
and was empowered to "establish an effective administration," "assist in
the development of civil and social services," "support capacity-building
for self-government," and perform other tasks.345
While equivalent language for Iraq would have authorized reforms
undertaken by an occupier rather than a U.N.-created mission, that is
not a significant difference. Each is an external actor confronting
domestic laws and institutions in need of change. In either instance,
when the Council seeks to remake national politics along liberal
democratic lines it has a decade's worth of precedent from which to
draw. None of that experience seems to have informed the wording of
the three major Iraqi resolutions, all of which lack the clarity and
forthrightness of the prior documents. Given the Council's simulta-
neous insistence on fidelity to Hague and Geneva law, a much clearer
mandate, directed explicitly to the CPA, would have been required. A
legislative override of occupation law cannot be read into the Council's
tepid language.
C. The Conservationist Principle: An Anachronism?
The third source of legitimacy for CPA reforms, unlike the first two,
does not seek to render the conservationist principle inapplicable to
the Iraqi occupation. It is instead a direct challenge to the principle
itself. When occupation law was first codified in the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, wars among the major Western states were
primarily undertaken for geopolitical advantage, not to affect the
quality of governance in other states. "Misrule" by a defeated regime
was only rarely of concern to a victorious occupying power.346 Misrule
by occupiers, on the other hand, occurred with regularity. Thus, while
343. General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dec. 14, 1995, Annex 10,
art. 1 (Agreement on Civilian Implementation), 35 I.L.M. 75, 147 (1996).
344. S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4011th mtg. 11(c), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244
(1999).
345. S.C. Res. 1272, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4057th mtg. 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1272 (1999).
346. See SIMON CHESTERMAN, JUST WAR OR JUST PEACE?: HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND
INTERNATIONAL LAw 42-43 (2001).
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the conservationist principle prevents an occupier from violating rights
of the local population through punitive or discriminatory laws, nei-
ther Hague nor Geneva law directly addresses an occupier who seeks to
enhance their rights through protective legislation. 47
In the U.N. era, by contrast, and particularly since the end of the
Cold War, military interveners have increasingly proclaimed changes in
domestic governance as a central war aim. Humanitarian intervention,
both unilateral and as authorized by the Security Council, has gained a
significant currency, though a unilateral right is still highly controver-
sial among both states and scholars. But virtually all the post-1945 cases
usually cited in support of a right of unilateral humanitarian interven-
tion resulted in regime change.3 48 The Council-authorized actions
embody the ultimate expression of collective concern with the quality
of national governance. The Security Council has twice approved the
use of armed force to oust regimes deemed democratically illegiti-
mate. 34 9 The elimination of regimes viewed by traditional occupation
law as legitimate dejure governments, in other words, has itself become
a war aim, albeit in a limited number of conflicts. Of course this is not
an entirely new phenomenon, as some justified German de-Nazifica-
tion on the grounds that "removal of the law associated with that
regime had been proclaimed to be one of the major purposes of the
war waged by the allies."35 °
347. As Kalshoven and Zegveld note, by the time the Geneva instruments were drafted, "the
degree to which state organs influence, and even participate directly in, economic and social
affairs [was] immeasurably greater than in the days the Regulations were written." FRrrs KALSHOVEN
& LIESBETH ZEGVELD, CONSTRAINTS ON THE WAGING OF WAR 65 (2001). But acknowledgement of
these trends took the form of enhancing the quality and quantity of rights against occupiers.
348. Excluding pre-1945 cases is necessary because only then did the U.N. Charter prohibit
most instances of unilateral intervention, creating the legal question of whether an exception
exists for humanitarian actions. The oft-cited cases of this period are India's 1971 intervention in
East Pakistan, resulting in the new state (and government) of Bangladesh; Vietnam's 1978
Intervention in Cambodia, ousting the Khmer Rouge; Tanzania's 1979 intervention in Uganda,
ousting Idi Amin; France's 1979 intervention in the Central African Republic, oustingJean-Bedel
Bokassa; the United States' 1983 intervention in Grenada, ousting leaders of a coup; and the
United States' 1989 intervention in Panama, ousting and arresting Manuel Noriega. See THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO
PROTECT (SuPP.) 47-77 (2001).
349. S.C. Res. 1162, U.N. SCOR, 53d Sess., 3872d mtg. 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1162 (1998)
(commending forceful ouster of thejunta in Sierra Leone); S.C. Res. 940, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess.,
3413th mtg. 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/940 (1994) (authorizing the use of force to restore elected
government of Haiti); see BRAD R. ROTH, GOVERNMENTAL ILLEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL LAWA
366-87, 394-98 (1999).
350. THE LAW OF WAR ON LAND, supra note 228, at 143 n.1.
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The claim, then, is that maintaining a distinction between the
legitimate prerogatives of a dejure government and the limited legisla-
tive capacities of an occupier makes little sense when a war is under-
taken precisely to remake the political and legal institutions of the
target state. If the war aim is itself legally sanctioned, then implement-
ing that aim during occupation should logically follow. In these circum-
stances, where international actors seek to enhance human rights in
the territory, the obstructing conservationist principle is simply an
anachronism.
While this claim is superficially appealing, the conservationist prin-
ciple has substantially deeper roots than an appeal to pro-democratic
war aims might suggest. The principle is integral to how occupation law
is understood by military lawyers in the major powers. While national
military manuals allow limited exceptions in the case of laws sanction-
ing extreme violations of human rights, the principle itself is uniformly
reaffirmed. 351 As noted, the manuals are among the most probative
evidence of opiniojuris on this question.352
More broadly, abandoning the principle would have profound conse-
quences elsewhere in international law, suggesting a variety of reasons
why the claim should be rejected. First, abandoning the conservationist
principle under any circumstances would irredeemably blur the line
between occupation and annexation. Occupiers enjoy limited legisla-
tive authority precisely because they do not assume the sovereign rights
351. THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, supra note 250, 370 (American manual provides that with
limited exceptions for "restoring public order and safety, the occupant will continue in force the
ordinary civil and penal (criminal) laws of the occupied territory."); HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN
LAw IN ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 252, at 254 (German manual notes that while exceptions
exist, "[t] he authority to pass laws is unquestionably an attribute of sovereignty .... The occupying
power must administer the occupied territory within the context of its existing legislation.");
INTERIM LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT MANUAL, supra note 251, at 13-7, 1 1304 (New Zealand manual
provides, "Generally speaking, the occupant is not entitled to alter the existing form of govern-
ment, to upset the constitution and domestic laws of the occupied territory, or to set aside the
rights of the inhabitants."); LAw OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 252, at 12-2, 1 1205 (Canadian
manual provides, "Generally speaking, the occupant is not entitled to alter the existing form of
government, to upset the constitution and domestic laws of the occupied territory, or to set aside
the rights of the inhabitants."); THE LAw OF WAR ON LAND, supra note 228, at 143, 1 511 (British
manual provides, "The Occupant is not entitled, as a rule, to alter the existing form of
government, to upset the constitution and domestic laws of the territory occupied, or to set aside
the rights of the inhabitants."); MINISTERE DE LA DEFENSE, SECRETARIAT GENERAL POUR
L'ADMINISTRTION, MANUEL DE DROIr DES CoNFLITs ARMES (conduct of French occupying forces
controlled by the Fourth Geneva Convention), available at http://www.defense.gouv.fr/
portal-repository/752609292 
_0001/fichier/getData (last visited Feb. 1, 2005).
352. See Colloquium, supra note 225; Reisman & Lietzau, supra note 225.
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of the ousted regime. Restrictions on their governing powers are
indicia of their temporary, custodial status. But that status exists only as
a legal construct: "an occupier does not acquire the rights of a
sovereign in occupied territory, but only those limited military rights
allowed to him under the international law of belligerent occupation .... 3 5 3 If
the most important legal marker distinguishing de jure from de facto
regimes were erased, the status of an occupied state would be irredeem-
ably altered. And if the two were largely indistinguishable, then the act
that de facto status was intended to prevent-annexation-would
effectively be accomplished. Annexation is, of course, profoundly
condemned by contemporary international law.354 What would remain
of that prohibition if occupying powers could assume all the legislative
authority of a de jure sovereign?355
Second, the humanitarian intervention claim improperly conflates
arguments of jus ad bellum with those of jus in bello. Jus ad bellum is law
concerning the initiation of armed conflict, asking when a particular
use of force is permissible. Jus in bello is law addressing conduct in
warfare; for example, the immunity of civilians from direct attack or the
proper treatment of prisoners.356 A fundamental tenet of jus in bello
norms is that they apply to any armed conflict regardless of its motiva-
tion or objective.357 Article 1 of all four Geneva Conventions provides,
"The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure
respect for the present Convention in all circumstances.,3 5 8 Even ajust
war, in other words, legally sanctioned by jus ad belium, cannot legiti-
353. U.S. Department of State, Memorandum of Law on Israel's Right to Develop New Oil Fields in
Sinai and the Gulf of Suez, Oct. 1, 1976, in 16 I.L.M. 733, 734 (1977) (emphasis added); see also
OPPENHEIM, supra note 213, at 296 ("International Law not only gives certain rights to an occupant,
but also imposes certain duties upon him.").
354. When Iraq purported to annex Kuwait in 1990, the Security Council responded that
"annexation of Kuwait by Iraq under any form and whatever pretext has no legal validity, and is
considered null and void." It further called "upon all States, international organizations and
specialized agencies not to recognize that annexation, and to refrain from any action or dealing
that might be interpreted as an indirect recognition of the annexation." S.C. Res. 662, U.N. SCOR,
45th Sess., 2934th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/0662 (1990).
355. As von Glahn states, "If not only de facto but also all dejure authority passes into the
hands of the occupant, then the territory can no longer be considered as part of the domain of the
enemy government but has been annexed to the domain of the occupying power." VON GLAHN,
supra note 12, at 31.
356. See generally INGRID DETTER, THE LAW OF WAR (2d ed. 2000); YORAM DINSTEIN, THE
CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT (2004).
357. GREEN, supra note 228, at 16-17.
358. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 11, art. 1 (emphasis added).
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mize impermissible means of conducting war.35 9 This is a fundamental
principle of humanitarian law. 6 ° It rests on the view that the primary
beneficiaries ofjus in bello norms- civilians and individual combatants-
will have had little role in initiating conflict and so should not be
penalized for the alleged unlawfulness of their side's cause for war.
Occupation law is a species of jus in bello. As a result, claims that the
war preceding an occupation was just should play no role in assessing
the duties of the occupying power. 61 Yet the humanitarian interven-
tion claim argues precisely that because an occupation results from a
legally sanctioned war to oust a repressive regime, that determination
of legality should control the legality of reforms enacted under occupa-
tion. The wall of separation between jus ad bellum and jus in bello renders
this claim a non-sequitur.
There is an additional danger here. Even if one could successfully
bridge the jus ad bellum/jus in bello divide in the Iraq case-perhaps by
saying that unlike other jus in bello rules like targeting civilians, the
conservationist principle presents a unique barrier to the realization of
valid humanitarian war aims-there is no consensus among states or
scholars that a unilateral right of humanitarian intervention exists. 3 6 2
359. See GREEN, supra note 228, at 18. The ICRC commentary on article I of the Fourth
Geneva Convention states: "Whether a war is 'just' or 'unjust', whether it is a war of aggression or
of resistance to aggression, whether the intention is merely to occupy territory or to annex it, in no
way affects the treatment protected persons should receive." PICTET, supra note 243, at 16-17.
360. As Dinstein correctly observes, "If every belligerent were given a licence to deny the
enemy the benefits of the jus in bello on the ground that it is the aggressor State, there is reason for
scepticism whether any country would ever pay heed to international humanitarian law." YoRAM
DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 141 (3d ed. 2001).
361. As the Nuremberg Tribunal held in the Hostage case,
international law makes no distinction between a lawful and an unlawful occupant in
dealing with the respective duties of occupant and population in occupied territory.
There is no reciprocal connection between the manner of the military occupation of
territory and the rights and duties of the occupant and population to each other after
the relationship has in fact been established. Whether the invasion was lawful or
criminal is not an important factor in the consideration of this subject.
United States v. List et al., 11 N.M.T. 1230, 1247 (1948).
362. See FRANacs KOFI ABIEW, THE EVOLUTION OF THE DOCTRINE AND PRACTICE OF HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION 231-35 (1999) (surveying conflicting scholarly opinion). Notably, even during the
Kosovo intervention in 1999-a case sometimes cited as precedent for the Iraq war and an
undoubted human rights emergency-most participating NATO governments declined to base
their actions on a right of humanitarian intervention without Security Council approval. SeeJane
Stromseth, Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention: The Case for Incremental Change, in HUMANITARIAN
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There is even less support for a right of pro-democratic intervention
(the creation of "democratic" institutions being an oft-stated goal of
the CPA) .363 Discarding the conservationist principle, therefore, would
allow an intervener to validate and realize war aims under occupation
law that may well be invalid under law regulating the use of force. If the
international community is unable to prevent an intervention from
occurring, one of the few points of legal leverage it may retain is to
insist that the conservationist principle be respected in a subsequent
occupation. Yet this can only occur if the wall between the two bodies of
law remains impregnable.
Third, principles of state autonomy that largely entered interna-
tional law (or were substantially strengthened) after the Geneva Conven-
tions form an independent foundation for restraining an occupier's
legislative authority. The autonomy principles find various doctrinal
expressions-state equality, internal self-determination, and non-
364intervention being the most common. All were championed by the
newly independent states of the post-colonial era, who insisted on legal
recognition of autonomy in national political processes and fundamen-
tal decisions of domestic political architecture. To be sure, human
rights norms and other standards directed at states' treatment of their
own citizens circumscribe autonomy in policy-making. But these norms
limit specific acts or modes of governance. They do not divest states of all
authority to legislate on matters of political and economic infrastructure.
Yet that would be the consequence of abandoning the conservation-
ist principle. The principle that "[e]very State has an inalienable right
INTERVENTION: ETHIcAL, LEGAL AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS 232, 235-36 (J.L. Holzgrefe & Robert 0.
Keohane eds., 2003).
363. See Michael Byers & Simon Chesterman, "You, the People" Pro-Democratic Intervention in
International Law, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 280, at 259.
Indeed, continued unilateral interventions to enforce an entitlement to democratic governance
could have the effect of undermining the legitimacy of the entitlement itself. As Thomas Franck
warned in a prescient 1992 article, democratization norms "will have to be uncoupled, in the
clearest fashion, from a long history of unilateral enforcement of a tainted, colonialist 'civilizing'
mission." Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM.J. INT'L L. 46, 84
(1992).
364. See Ian Brownlie, The Rights of Peoples in Modern International Law, in THE RIGHTS OF
PEOPLES 1, 5 (James Crawford ed., 1988) (describing the core of the self-determination principle
as "the right of a community which has a distinct character to have this character reflected in the
institutions of government under which it lives").
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to choose its political, economic, social and cultural systems, without
interference in any form by another State," would cease to apply to the
occupied state.365 The conservationist principle thus finds new life as a
concomitant to the view that no conception of political autonomy is
compatible with completely divesting a state of the capacity to make
fundamental policy decisions.
Fourth, an occupier unconstrained by the conservationist principle
would face no barriers to enacting legislation that could incur the
international responsibility of the occupied state. A state incurs "inter-
national responsibility" for its wrongful acts when it breaches an
international obligation and the breach is attributable to the state.366
Legislation enacted in defiance of the conservationist principle could
breach the occupied state's obligations in any number of ways: it could
violate the state's pre-existing treaty obligations; it could repudiate
debts owed by the state; or it could discriminate against aliens in ways
that constitute "denials of justice," thereby creating compensatory
rights in the alien's state of nationality. Attributing an occupying
power's breach to the state is a more complex matter. Because states
rather than governments incur international legal obligations, any
entity properly acting on behalf of the state may incur its responsibil-
ity.367 These agency principles include both actual and apparent author-
ity.36 8 However, they largely focus on an agency created by national
rather than international law. 369 Because the legal status of an occupy-
ing power is determined by the latter rather than the former, the capacity
of an occupier to act on the state's behalf is not entirely clear. 7°
365. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation
Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th
Sess., 1883d mtg., Annex (1970) [hereinafter Friendly Relations Declaration].
366. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, in Report of the
International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, art. 2, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess.,
Supp. 10, Nov. 2001, at 43, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001), available at http://www.un.org/law/ilc/.
367. Id. at 59, 80 (2001) (" [T] he general rule is that the only conduct attributable to the State
at the international level is that of its organs of government, or of others who have acted under the
direction, instigation or control of those organs, i.e., as agents of the State.").
368. Id. at 83.
369. Id. at 82.
370. The U.S. Department of State argued in 1976 that an occupier could not take the similar
action of granting a concession for the exploitation of mineral resources. U.S. Department of
State, supra note 353, at 746-48. The State Department claimed that a concession would be the
type of legislative act prohibited by article 43 of the Hague Regulations. Id. at 747.
[Vol. 36
THE OCCUPATION OF IRAQ
Given this doctrinal uncertainty, prudence dictates that occupiers
should not be given discretion to incur legal obligations for the
post-occupation regime. This is not to suggest that occupiers will always
act rashly and impose such burdens. But if they did, the injured states
could bring claims for compensation against an entirely innocent
post-occupation regime. The conservationist principle creates an impor-
tant barrier to liabilities of this kind.
There are, in addition, more basic doctrinal reasons to preserve the
conservationist principle. Primary among them is that it is set out in
binding treaties whose force cannot be dissipated by unilateral ac-
tion.37 1 Moreover, a common danger highlighted by the objections
above is that of sanctioning self-help on the part of occupiers. Interna-
tional law generally discourages states from taking unilateral enforce-
ment actions, even in response to violations of fundamental rights.372 It
does so by erecting other normative regimes that protect national
decision-making against external intervention. Many of these bulwarks
of state autonomy and sovereign equality are at work here: the prohibi-
tion on annexation, the imposition of jus in bello obligations on states
fighting just wars, and the limitations of instances in which an occupier
may act as an agent for the occupied state. Despite harmony in a variety
of substantive areas, international law still vigorously protects states'
autonomous capacity to make (even illegal) policy choices without
incurring unilateral intervention by self-appointed enforcers.373
371. While a treaty can lose its normative status by falling into "desuetude" through disuse,
the necessary conditions do not exist here. Obsolescence must be manifest in conduct of the
parties. ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREAxY LAw AND PRACTICE 250-51 (2000); LORD McNAIR, THE LAW
OF TREATIEs 516 (1961). But the general validity of the Hague and Geneva instruments has been
reaffirmed not only in recent judicial decisions but by the Security Council during the Iraqi
occupation itself.
372. Certain "counter-measures" are permitted, but their scope is severely limited. Most
notably, they cannot involve armed force in violation of the U.N. Charter or contravene human
rights. See Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 366, art.
50(1) (a), at 57.
373. In the Nicaragua case, the United States argued that the Sandinista regime had refused
to fulfill promises made to the Organization of American States to liberalize its governing
institutions, including the holding of free and fair elections. See Military and Paramilitary Activities
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14,130-31 (June 27). The Court held that even if this claim were true, it
could notjustify the use of force by the United States as a measure of unilateral self-help. Id. More
generally, the court refused to sanction "the creation of a new rule opening up a right of
intervention by one State against another on the ground that the latter has opted for some
particular ideology or political system." Id. at 133.
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D. A Reformist Reading of Occupation Law
1. Looking to International Standards
The fourth argumentjustifying CPA reforms is similar to the third in
that it presents a direct challenge to the conservationist principle. But
this claim stops short of rejecting the principle altogether. It seeks only
to modify the principle in order to account for recent developments in
other areas of international law.
The argument begins with the view that Geneva occupation law "is of
an essentially humanitarian character; its object is to safeguard human
beings and not to protect the political institutions and government
machinery of the State as such."374 The specific prohibitions in articles
27-34 and 47-78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention overwhelmingly
involve the protection of individual rights. Collectively, these provi-
sions have been described as a "bill of rights for the occupied popula-
tion. '3 75 The Geneva drafters, meeting in the shadow of Nazi atrocities
in occupied Europe, substantially expanded upon the rights guaran-
teed in the Hague Regulations. 376 Their work also reflected a slow
demise of the minimalist nineteenth century European state that
intervened little in the lives of its citizens, either to provide social
services or to protect individual rights. If most dejure regimes of that
era were non-interventionist, there was little reason for occupation law
to require that a de facto regime-presumably an extrapolation of
prevailing conceptions of good governance-actively work to better the
lives of persons in occupied territories. In the post-WWII era, however,
human rights became an increasingly central concern of the Western
states that dominated the Geneva drafting process. A number of
commentators point out that their views on occupied populations
reflected this emerging concern. Accordingly, these writers argue that
neither Hague nor Geneva law should protect laws and institutions of
an ousted sovereign that fall below minimally acceptable standards of
374. PICTET, supra note 243, at 274.
375. BENVENISTI, supra note 218, at 105.
376. See Theodor Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 239,
245-47 (2000) (discussing the human rights concerns of the Geneva Convention drafters). Apart
from protection of private property, the only provisions of the Hague Regulations similar to
contemporary human rights principles appear in article 45 ("It is forbidden to compel the
inhabitants of occupied territory to swear allegiance to the hostile Power.") and article 46 ("Family
honour and rights, the lives of persons, and private property, as well as religious convictions and
practice, must be respected."). Hague Regulations, supra note 10, arts. 45-46.
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humanity.377 This is also the view of the U.S. Army.3 78
Unlike a claim that all liberal/democratic reforms can be reconciled
with the treaty's text, this argument relies on external normative
sources. It takes the Convention's text as a means of assimilating recent
developments in international law that appear to support the CPA's
reforms. This resort to external sources is necessary because the rights
enumerated in the Convention are basic and do not reflect the full
range of protections now contained in human rights treaties. Rights
essential to political participation, for example, such as freedoms of
speech, press, and conscience, are omitted. The rights of children and
ethnic minorities are not explicitly protected. In addition, the Conven-
tion does not require an infrastructure of rights protection. There is no
obligation to create institutions that monitor rights compliance, investi-
gate allegations of wrongdoing, and prosecute violators. Like most new
governmental structures introduced by occupiers, such institutions
would likely run afoul of the conservationist principle. All these obliga-
tions, however, can be found in contemporary human rights law.
Linking the Fourth Geneva Convention with trends in customary law
can be justified on two grounds. First, treaty obligations may be
377. See GREEN, supra note 228, at 249 (occupier may "remove from the penal code any
punishments that are 'unreasonable, cruel or inhumane' together with any discriminatory racial
legislation"); PICTET, supra note 243, at 336 (occupier may "abolish courts or tribunals which have
been instructed to apply inhumane or discriminatory laws"); GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, 2 INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS: THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 195
(1968) (An enemy who has "relapsed into a state of barbarism" may "make unavoidable the
exercise of the occupant's legislative powers for the double purpose of destroying the legal
foundations of such a barbarous system and restoring a minimum of civilised life in the occupied
territory."); VON GLAHN, supra note 12, at 115 ("[A]n occupant should be able to set aside the
operation of laws opposed to the humanitarian concepts of the convention .... "); R.Y. Jennings,
Government in Commission, 1946 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 112, 132 n.1 (1946) (Article 43 of Hague
Regulations does not require an occupier "to respect the laws in force in the country to the extent
of respecting laws which are contrary to naturaljustice.").
378. The U.S. Army Field Manual on the Law of Land Warfare, after setting out Hague and
Geneva standards on the inviolability of local laws and institutions, nonetheless provides:
The occupant may alter, repeal, or suspend laws of the following types:
a. Legislation constituting a threat to its security, such as laws relating to recruitment
and the bearing of arms.
b. Legislation dealing with political process, such as laws regarding the rights of suffrage
and of assembly.
c. Legislation the enforcement of which would be inconsistent with the duties of the
occupant, such as laws establishing racial discrimination.
THE LAW OF LAND WARARE, supra note 250, 371.
2005]
GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
understood in their larger normative context in order to assimilate
developments in international law that elucidate and update their
meaning.17 9 Second, the link may rest on an occupier's own human
rights treaty obligations. Those obligations are understood as restrain-
ing every coercive exercise of a state's power over individuals it gov-
erns. 380 They attach not only within an occupier's own territory and in
regard to its own citizens, but, in the words of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, wherever persons are "subject to
their jurisdiction. 38' That is certainly the case in an occupation. 8 2
379. Together with context, a treaty may be interpreted by reference to "any relevant rules of
international law applicable in the relations between the parties." Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 31(3)(c), S. TRtAT. Doc. No. 92-12, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 340. The
International Court ofJustice has said that "an international instrument has to be interpreted and
applied within the framework of the entire legal system prevailing at the time of the interpreta-
tion." Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 I.C.J. 16, 31.
380. See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall, supra note 217, at 107-111
(holding Israel's obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to
apply outside its territory, explaining that "while thejurisdiction of States is primarily territorial, it
may sometimes be exercised outside the national territory").
381. Article 2(1) of the Covenant provides in full:
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the
present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art. 2(1), S. TREATY Doc. No.
95-20, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 173 [hereinafter ICCPR]. SeeTheodor Meron, Extraterritoriality of Human
Rights Treaties, 89 Am. J. INT'L L. 78 (1995). The Human Rights Committee, established by the
Covenant, has interpreted article 2(1) to require a State Party "to respect and ensure the rights
laid down in the Covenant to anyone within the power and effective control of that State Party,
even if not situated within the territory of the State Party." As an example of state "power and
effective control" the Committee cites "forces constituting a national contingent of a State Party
assigned to an international peace-keeping or peace-enforcement operation." Office of the U.N.
High Commissioner for Human Rights, General Comment No. 31 on Article 2 of the Covenant: The
Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/74/
CRP.4/Rev. 6,1 10 (2004).
382. The European Convention on Human Rights has been applied on a number of
occasions to the Turkish occupation of northern Cyprus. See Loukis G. Loucaides, The Protection of
the Right to Property in Occupied Territories, 53 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 677, 683-85 (2004). In the Loizidou
case for example, the European Court of Human Rights held:
[T]he responsibility of a Contracting Party may also arise when as a consequence of military
action-whether lawful or unlawful-it exercises effective control of an area outside its
national territory. The obligation to secure, in such an area, the rights and freedoms set out
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Triggering human rights obligations in this manner is consistent with
applying occupation law whenever a belligerent power exercises "effec-
tive control": both tests turn not on the formal question of whether a
state has acquired de jure authority over a territory but on the factual
question of whether it exercises powers of government on the ground.
If it does, minimum protective standards for the affected population
apply. And if both bodies of law are triggered by the same factual
circumstances, it makes little sense to interpret the scope of occupation
law obligations without taking into account an occupier's human rights
obligations as well.
The CPA itself made frequent reference to international law as a
basis for its reforms. 3 83 Security Council resolutions were mentioned in
virtually every piece of legislation.384 The CPA also made frequent
reference to substantive international standards, suggesting that a
range of norms beyond the goals articulated by the Security Council
had influenced the content of its law-making.
385
in the Convention derives from the fact of such control whether it be exercised directly,
through its armed forces, or through a subordinate local administration.
Loizidou v. Turkey, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 24 (1995) (Preliminary Objections).
383. None of the CPA's orders, regulations, or memoranda made any mention of Iraqi
constitutional law. While the 1970 Iraqi Provisional Constitution-the last of Iraq's six constitu-
tions in force since its independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1920-was not formally
suspended, it was effectively ignored in CPA decrees. See UNITED NATIONS/WORLD BANKJOINT IRAQ
NEEDS ASSESSMENT: GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS, CIL SOCIETY, THE RULE OF LAW AND MEDIA 42 (Oct.
2003) ("The Iraqi Provisional Constitution of 1970, while not repealed or suspended, has been
essentially in abeyance since the beginning of the occupation."), available at http://
lnwebl8.woddbank.org/mna/mena.nsf/Attachments/IQ-GOVERNANCE/$File/GOVERNANCE+
final+sector+report+16+October.pdf; see also Int'l Crisis Group Middle East Rep. No. 27, Iraq's
Cmstitutional Challenge 1-5 (Nov. 13, 2003) (discussing Iraq's previous constitutions, noting that all
constitutions since the monarchy was overthrown in 1958 have been denominated "provisional"),
available at h ttp: / /www.icg.org/ /library/ documen ts/ Iniddle_eastnorth_africa/ I 9 _i raq-s.
constitutional-challenge.pdf.
384. The Administrator began every CPA regulation, order, and memorandum by declaring
that he was acting pursuant to "relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions, including Resolution
1483 (2003), and the laws and usages of war." See, e.g., Coalition Provisional Authority Regulation
No. 1, supra note 28.
385. See, e.g., Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 89, supra note 91 (standards on child
labor needed in light of Iraqi obligations under two ILO conventions); Coalition Provisional
Authority Order No. 87, supra note 172 (order on public procurement needed because "public
contract laws should conform to international standards"); Coalition Provisional Authority Order
No. 80, supra note 147 (amendments to Iraqi Trademarks and Descriptions Law needed because
"several provisions of the current Iraqi trademark legislation do not meet current internationally-
recognized standards of protection"); Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 79, supra note 80
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Must occupying powers, then, apply the full range of their human
rights obligations to territories they administer? Are any shortcomings
in the minimum set of rights contained in the Fourth Geneva Conven-
tion to be filled by (i) an interpretive expansion of Geneva law
obligations and/or (ii) an extra-territorial application of the occupier's
own human rights treaty obligations? If this were the case, the conserva-
tionist principle would cease to apply to human rights reforms. Human
rights and humanitarian law obligations would effectively become
fused: with the exception of actual combat and other exigent circum-
stances of warfare, which may justify the suspension of certain guaran-
tees,3 8 6 governments would be held to one set of human rights obliga-
tions whether they were at war or peace and whether or not the
individual right-holders were their own citizens or aliens over whom
they exercise temporary jurisdiction.
This goes well beyond how national militaries have interpreted
Hague and Geneva law for their own forces' conduct. The U.S. military
manual allows for the repeal of laws "the enforcement of which would
be inconsistent with the duties of the occupant, such as laws establish-
ing racial discrimination."38 7 The New Zealand manual is identical. 88
The German manual gives only the examples of racially discriminatory
laws and those violatingjus cogens norms. 38 9 The British manual refers
(creation of Iraqi Nonproliferation Programs Foundation based in part on TAL provision "calling
on the government to respect and implement Iraq's international obligations regarding" nonpro-
liferation); Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 60, supra note 87 (creation of Ministry of
Human Rights based in part on "the obligations assumed by Iraq under international human
rights treaties to which it is party"); Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 7, supra note 94
(noting that "the former regime used certain provisions of the penal code as a tool of repression in
violation of internationally recognized human rights"); Freedom of Assembly, Coalition Provisional
Authority Order No. 19, CPA/ORD/9 July 2003/19 (July 9, 2003), available at http://www.
iraqcoalition.org/regulations/ 20030710_CPAORD_19_Freedom ofAssembly_.pdf (repealing re-
strictions on freedom of assembly, which were "inconsistent with Iraq's human rights obliga-
tions").
386. Most human rights treaties allow "derogation" from specified rights in extreme circum-
stances. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, for example, permits derogation
from some (but not all) protected rights in a "time of public emergency which threatens the life of the
nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed." ICCPR, supra note 381, art. 4(1).
387. THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, supra note 250, 371.
388. INTERIM LAW OFARMED CONFLICT MANUAL, supra note 251, at 13-7, 2(c).
389. HANDBOOK OF HUMANITAIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 252, at 255.Jus cogens
rules are "of a superior status and cannot be affected by treaty." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES § 331 cmt. e (1987).
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to laws that "shock elementary conceptions ofjustice and of the rule of
law."'3 90 Nazi-era laws are the only example given. The Canadian
manual refers to repealing laws if "the welfare of the population" so
requires. 39 The French and Argentine manuals are silent on any
exceptions to the conservationist principle.
Abandoning the constraints of the conservationist principle in this
fashion also goes further than scholars who seek to "humanize" the role
of an occupier administering a formerly totalitarian state. Their descrip-
tions of the repealable laws seem to emerge directly from the Nazi
experience and are phrased in extreme terms. The authors speak of a
nation having "relapsed into a state of barbarism," "inhumane or
discriminatory laws," and laws "which are contrary to naturaljustice. 39 2
This is a high threshold and does not include every right arguably
protected by human rights instruments.
Three additional factors counsel a restrained application of human
rights obligations to occupiers. First, a reform agenda legitimized solely
on the grounds that it accords with human rights norms would radically
skew the delicate balance of conflicting policies inherent in reconciling
human rights imperatives with the conservationist principle. The CPA
could have gone much further than it did, for example by imposing a
new constitution on Iraq, wholly rewriting its civil and criminal laws,
restructuring thejudicial system or imposing a new federalist structure.
All these actions could be justified by contemporary human rights
standards. But legitimacy based on that outcome would cease to be an
accommodation between humanitarian law and human rights and
become, instead, a full substitution of the latter for the former. This
may well be a result the Security Council accepts after collective
deliberation and exercise of its legislative capacity. But for a single
occupier, it is simply cherry-picking between equally binding treaty
obligations. It is not even clear this result would obtain, as the Interna-
tional Court of Justice has suggested that in the event of a conflict
between certain humanitarian and human rights law, the former ought
to govern as the lex specialis.3 93
390. THE LAw OF WAR ON LAND, supra note 228, at 143 n.1.
391. LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 252, at 12-3, 1209(2).
392. Seesources cited supra note 377.
393. In the Nuclear Weapons case, the Court was faced with the claim that the "right to life"
protected by human rights instruments ought to restrain the use of nuclear weapons, regardless of
how humanitarian law viewed the question. The Court observed:
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Second, there is affirmative value in some domestic norms and
institutions emerging from the politics of a post-occupation society.
While democratic political theory now largely excludes the view that
political majorities may legitimately choose to subordinate "the right"
to collective notions of "the good," this view does not require bypassing
majoritarian politics on all issues arguably affecting human rights.
Some questions of political architecture, legal policy, and social order-
ing are legitimately open to debate and collective national decision-
making. Utilitarian conceptions of democracy in fact regard delibera-
tive politics as essential to the long-term viability of liberal institutions.394
This societal autonomy principle underlies the still-vital doctrine in
international law of internal self-determination, noted above. This is
the view that "[e] ach State has the right freely to choose and develop its
political, social, economic and cultural systems., 395 At its core, the
conservationist principle seeks to preserve this decision-making capac-
ity by preventing, as McDougal and Feliciano put it, "the active transfor-
mation and remodeling of the power and other value processes of the
occupied country., 396 This is not to support the continuation of laws
that clearly violate core human rights. But at a certain point, an
occupier's reforms may become so sweeping and far-reaching that
inhabitants lose the opportunity to make important choices about the
nature of their own society.397 Deferring sweeping reforms until the
[T] he protection of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights does not
cease in times of war, except by operation of Article 4 of the Covenant whereby certain
provisions may be derogated from in a time of national emergency. Respect for the
right to life is not, however, such a provision. In principle, the right not arbitrarily to be
deprived of one's life applies also in hostilities. The test of what is an arbitrary
deprivation of life, however, then falls to be determined by the applicable lex specialis,
namely, the law applicable in armed conflict which is designed to regulate the conduct
of hostilities. Thus whether a particular loss of life, through the use of a certain weapon
in warfare, is to be considered an arbitrary deprivation of life contrary to Article 6 of the
Covenant, can only be decided by reference to the law applicable in armed conflict and
not deduced from the terms of the Covenant itself.
Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 217, 25.
394. This is Mill's argument, for example. See JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON
REPRESENTATIVE GOvERNMENT 48-74 (1861) (Gateway ed. 1962).
395. Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 365.
396. McDouGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 278, at 768.
397. Thus, Christopher Greenwood concludes:
[Vol. 36
THE OCCUPATION OF IRA Q
return of an indigenous government allows both objectives to be
served: core human rights obligations would be respected through
narrowly tailored reforms enacted during occupation, while self-
determination would remain meaningful for the post-occupation soci-
ety by prohibiting overbroad systemic changes.
Third, the commentators who argue for a human rights exception to
the conservationist principle do so in order to allow for the repeal of
offensive laws. None speak of replacement legislation. And none speak
of creating entire bodies of rules or new governmental entities in areas
where none existed before. Finally, none speak of monitoring or
enforcement mechanisms. An unadulterated application of human
rights law might well require all of these affirmative steps. But in
occupation law, they must be balanced against the presumption against
institutional change. Allowing the repeal of clearly offending laws but
not permitting the enactment of new ones, except when necessary to avoid
incoherence or confusion, seems an appropriate accommodation. 98
If, for these reasons, occupiers should be held to a more limited set
of human rights obligations, what are their particulars? The preceding
discussion suggests a series of guideposts. First, by definition, the rights
in question must unquestionably be protected by international law.
Second, any pre-existing laws that require occupiers to violate well-
established human rights may (and probably must) be repealed. This
follows from the widespread reaction against the discriminatory laws of
Nazi Germany, as well as from the affirmative obligations of the Fourth
Existing administrative and legislative structures and the political process may be
suspended for the duration of the occupation but an occupant will exceed its powers if
it attempts, for example, to create a new State, to change a monarchy into a republic or
a federal into a unitary government. An occupant may, therefore, suspend or bypass the
existing administrative structure where there is a legitimate necessary of the kind
discussed... but any attempt at effecting permanent reform or change in that structure
will be unlawful.
Christopher Greenwood, The Administration of Occupied Territory in International Law, in INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES: Two DECADES OF ISRAELI OCCUPA-
TION 241, 247 (Emma Playfair ed., 1988).
398. An area not covered by this resolution would be the violation of rights in the private
sphere. If the existing law did not speak to issues such as family violence, a non-repeal rule would
do nothing to address the problem. See generally ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PRIVATE
SPHERE (1993).
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Geneva Convention. If, on the other hand, the laws in force cannot
plausibly be identified as a cause of human rights violations, then
repeal would not be justified. 399 Third, in the absence of repealable
laws violating human rights, if the very lack of legal protection itself
appears to contribute to rights being denied in practice, an occupier
may enact new laws tailored to the particular violations. This follows
both from the Convention's focus on the condition of rights in the
territory and from a restrained understanding of human rights treaty
obligations. Fourth, if rights violations appear to result from a lack of
supervisory institutions or review mechanisms, those may be created as
well. The degree of permissible legal reform is thus linked to the actual
experience of citizens in the territory. Reforms based on mere efficiency
considerations or projections of potential future violations in the post-
occupation era would remain subject to the conservationist principle.
2. Consistency with International Human Rights Norms
How do the CPA's human rights reforms fare under these guide-
lines? Many appear consistent with human rights now deeply en-
trenched in international law. The following chart shows the major
human rights reforms and the corresponding protected rights in the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the most
widely ratified general human rights treaty4 "0 :
399. Most human rights treaties require state parties both to refrain from violations and to
enshine rights protection in law. The standard set out in the text would only require the latter if
necessary to ensure the former. The distinction between these two obligations is well-captured by
the two sub-parts of article 2 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights:
1. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all
individuals within its territory and subject to itsjurisdiction the ights recognized in the
present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other
status.
2. Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each State
Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance
with its constitutional processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to
adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights
recognized in the present Covenant.
ICCPR, supra note 381, art 2(1-2).
400. The Covenant had 149 state parties as of June 9, 2004. See Office of the U.N. High
Commissioner for Human Rights, Status of Ratifications of the Principal International Human Pghts Treaties
(2004), at http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf. The CPA's prohibition of child labor by Order No.
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CPA Action ICCPR Right Protected
* Torture prohibited 4 0 1  Right against torture (art. 7)
* Capital punishment Heightened procedural protections
suspended 40 2  in capital cases (art. 6(2))
* Discrimination by public officials Discrimination prohibited (art. 2)
prohibited
40 3
* Central Criminal Court Right to fairjudicial hearing (art.
created 40 4  14)
* Due process in criminal Due process guarantees (art. 9)
proceedings enhanced
40 5
* Supervision ofjudiciary Right to fairjudicial hearing (art.
enhanced 40 6  14)
* Tribunal to punish former Victims have right to a remedy
regime members40 7  (art. 3)
* Prison conditions improved 40 8  Humane treatment in detention
(art. 10)
* Human Rights Ministry Measures necessary to ensure
created 40 9  recognition of rights (art. 2)
The only exception to this consonance with international standards
is de Ba'athification. Not only is the wholesale purge of former regime
members not required by human rights law, but some argue it is
89, while not addressed by the Political Covenant, is supported by two widely ratified conventions of
the International Labor Organization. Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 89, supra note 91; see
Convention Concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment,June 26, 1973, 1015 U.N.T.S.
297 (ratified by 135 states); Convention Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the
Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour, June 17, 1999, S. TREATY Doc. No. 106-5, 2133
U.N.T.S. 163 (ratified by 150 states). For ratification information, see the International Labour
Organization's Database of International Labour Standards at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/
convdispl.htm. It is also supported, though in less categorical terms, by the Rights of the Child
Convention. See United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, art. 32, 1577
U.N.T.S. 3, 54-55. The Rights of the Child Convention had 192 States Parties as of November 14, 2003.
See Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Status of Ratiflcation of the Convention on
the Rights of the Child (2003), at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/6/crc/treaties/status-crc.htm.
401. Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 7, supra note 94.
402. Id.
403. Id.
404. Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 13, supra note 99.
405. See Coalition Provisional Authority Memorandum No. 3, supra note 97; Coalition
Provisional Authority Order No. 13, supra note 99; Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 15,
supra note 102.
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affirmatively prohibited, or at least radically circumscribed. 4 10 How-
ever, the CPA largely abandoned its de-Ba'athification initiatives to-
ward the end of the occupation.4 1'
The second and third guidelines ask whether pre-existing Iraqi law
required the occupiers to violate human rights or whether the mere
absence of protections contributed to rights violations. Any definitive
answers to these questions would require almost impossibly precise
estimations of causation. Iraq's constitution of 1970 contained a set of
fundamental rights and duties that, while short on detail, was not
unacceptable by international standards.412 But layered on top of
permanent legal structures were a series of ad hoc mechanisms of
arbitrary authority and repression.413 Since 1991 the Iraqi Revolution-
ary Command Council, headed by Saddam Hussein, had "issued some
1,500 resolutions annually, ranging from amendments to the constitu-
tion and security decrees to changes in laws concerning trade and
taxes." 414 The Ba'ath Party had also largely marginalized the judiciary
as a check on state power.415 One report has described the result as "a
legal jumble., 416 Existing Iraqi law clearly facilitated the Ba'athist
regime's violations of human rights, but whether legal reform was
necessary to abate violations or whether removal of the Ba'athist
leaders would have been sufficient is an unanswerable counter-factual.
Given the intertwining of the two, law reform should not be rejected as
clearly unnecessary to protecting human rights.
Finally, did human rights violations result from a lack of supervisory
mechanisms? This question also calls for disentangling the thicket of
inadequate norms, informal control mechanisms and behavioral pat-
terns in a repressive political culture. Human rights law generally
406. See Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 15, supra note 102.
407. See Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 48, supra note 106.
408. See Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 31, supra note 96; Coalition Provisional
Authority Memorandum No. 2, supra note 110.
409. Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 60, supra note 87.
410. See Roman Boed, An Evaluation of the Legality and Efficacy of Lustration as a Tool of
TransitionalJustice, 37 COLUM.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 357 (1999).
411. See Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 100, supra note 68, § 3.
412. See Iraqi Interim Constitution, ch. III (July 16, 1970) in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF
THE WORLD: IRAQ 21, 25-28 (Fouad Famy Shafik trans., Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flantz eds.,
1990).
413. See MIDDLE EAST WATCH, supra note 279.
414. United States Inst. of Peace, supra note 275, at 7.
415. Id. at 5.
416. Id. at 7.
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regards implementing institutions as essential to effective fights guaran-
tees, but specificity of particular methods is lacking.41 7 Creating impedi-
ments to the effective realization of protected rights, however, is itself a
treaty violation. Two examples are broad amnesties for violators and
sham investigations into known cases of abuse.418 In a state like Iraq,
where the effective guarantee of human rights is largely a new task for
the government, deference to the CPA's judgment that a Human
Rights Ministry and other changes in infrastructure were necessary
seems appropriate.
All reforms save de-Ba'athification, therefore, appear necessary to
ensure that Iraqis actually enjoy internationally sanctioned human
rights in practice.419
3. Military and Security Reforms
Human rights was only one category of CPA reforms. Another was
change in Iraq's military and security infrastructure: the old Iraqi army
was disbanded, a new one was created along with a supporting bureau-
cracy, military laws and codes were abolished, and a new Ministry of
417. This hands-off approach is evident in the Human Rights Committee's General Com-
ment on article 2 of the ICCPR, which requires state parties to take effective steps to guarantee
protected fights:
[A] rticle 2 of the Covenant generally leaves it to the States parties concerned to choose
their method of implementation in their territories within the framework set out in that
article. It recognizes, in particular, that the implementation does not depend solely on
constitutional or legislative enactments, which in themselves are often not per se
sufficient. The Committee considers it necessary to draw the attention of States parties
to the fact that the obligation under the Covenant is not confined to the respect of
human rights, but that States parties have also undertaken to ensure the enjoyment of
these rights to all individuals under their jurisdiction. This aspect calls for specific
activities by the States parties to enable individuals to enjoy their rights.
Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, General Comment No.03: Implementation
at the National Level (Art. 2) CCPR General Comment No. 3., 13th Sess., 1 (1981). This deference to
national methods of implementation is often referred to as the "margin of appreciation." See
generally YUTAKA ARAI-TAKAHASHI, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE AND THE PRINCIPLE OF
PROPORTIONALITY IN THEJURISPRUDENCE OF THE ECHR (2002).
418. See, e.g., Barrios Altos Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 75, 45-49 (2001)
(Inter-American Court of Human Rights finds Peruvian amnesty laws to violate provisions of
American Convention on Human Rights); Vel;Jsquez Rodriguez Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 4, 180-186 (1988) (Honduran government has an affirmative obligation to investigate case
of disappearance in good faith).
419. That is, all the reforms described supra Parts II.B.3-4.
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Defense was established. Reforms were made to the national intelli-
gence service, and two agencies related to non-proliferation were
created.4 2 °
These reforms fail the first prong of the test for a reformist reading of
occupation law- consistency with well-established international norms.
Simply put, there is no international law on the subject. There are no
multilateral treaties setting standards for national militaries, either in
their internal governance or in their relation to other branches of
government. One might argue that an effective transition to democracy
requires civilian control of the military. Or one could make the specific
claim that the Ba'athist-era military had become an instrument of
repression. But both these arguments are overbroad, potentiallyjustify-
ing any reforms, no matter how sweeping, that result in improvements
in human rights protection. Maintaining at least some respect for the
conservationist principle requires that a "least drastic means" test be
applied to reforms that appear to go beyond changes strictly necessary
to give effect to the norm in question. Here, concern for the military's
arbitrary exercises of power could have been addressed directly by
either limiting the military's involvement in civilian affairs or ensuring
that individual rights are protected against infringement by civilian and
military personnel alike. Or one could take the quite reasonable view
that no military reforms were needed to protect human rights during
the occupation, since no indigenous Iraqi institutions, political or
military, exercised independent authority during the CPA's tenure.
Either argument demonstrates the overbreadth of the CPA's approach.
4. Economic Reforms
a. International Legal Context
The CPA remade virtually every aspect of Iraqi economic life. The
laws of banking, taxation, trade, foreign investment, corporations,
bankruptcy, intellectual property, securities regulation, the media,
state-owned enterprises, and even road traffic were extensively over-
hauled. All were intended to transform Iraq's economy from a centrally
planned to a free market model.4 2 1
The two routes by which human rights law may be assimilated into
the obligations of occupying powers are not available for these changes
in economic policy. Multilateral treaties exist in only a few of the areas
420. See supra Part II.B.2.
421. See supra Part II.B.5.
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of economic regulation, principally intellectual property and foreign
investment and trade. But even these do not impose the extra-
territorial obligations contained in human rights instruments. 422 No
multilateral instruments that impose regulatory standards exist for
banking, taxation, corporate law, bankruptcy law, securities regulation,
media regulation, traffic control, and state-owned enterprises.423 Nor
does Hague or Geneva law contain a list of economic infrastructure
422. In the area of intellectual property, the United States is party to the Berne Convention
for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary
and Artistic Works, July 24, 1971, S. TREATY Doc. No. 99-27, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (1986) (originally
signed at Berne Sept. 9, 1886) [hereinafter Berne Convention]. The treaty's protections apply in
all countries that are parties. Id. art. 1. Iraq, however, is not a party to the Berne Convention. See
Status on Dec. 2, 2004, at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/documents/word/e-berne.doc. Ar-
ticle 31 allows a State Party to declare at any time that the Convention "shall be applicable to all or
part of those territories, designated in the declaration or notification, for the external relations of
which it is responsible." Berne Convention, supra, art. 31. The United States has made no such
declaration regarding Iraq. See World Intellectual Property Organization, WIPO Treaties Data-
base, Notifications, Berne Convention, at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.
jsp?searchwhat=N&treatyid=15. The World Trade Organization's Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights simply incorporates the requirements of other
intellectual property treaties, such as the Berne Convention, by reference. See Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO Agreement], Annex IC, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994). In the area of trade,
Article 26(5)(a) of the original GATT agreement states, "Each government accepting this
Agreement does so in respect of its metropolitan territory and of the other territories for which it
has international responsibility." General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art.
26(5) (a), 61 Stat. A-i1, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194. The United States did not notify the GATI?
Secretariat of its intention to apply the treaty outside its metropolitan territory, which it had an
opportunity to do. See WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, 2 GUIDE TO GATT LAW & PRACTICE 917 n.39
(1995). The 1994 Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization provides that members
of the original GATT who accept the substantive agreements also negotiated in 1994 "become
original members of the WTO." WTO Agreement, supra, art. XI(1). Presumably the territorial
scope of the GATT obligations carries for-ward for each such original member.
423. Standards do exist in some of these areas, but they are generally advisory and do not rise
to the level of international legal obligations. An example is banking regulation. The most widely
followed standards are those produced by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, which is
organized under the aegis of the Bank for International Settlements. The Basel Committee itself
notes that it "does not possess any formal supranational supervisory authority, and its conclusions
do not, and were never intended to, have legal force." Bank for International Settlements, Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision, About the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, at http://
www.bis.org/bcbs/aboutbcbs.htm. And whatever effects the Committee's recommendations may
have had in other regions, they have not been widely followed in the Arab world. Several central
elements of the CPA's banking law-diversity of ownership and openness to foreign investment-
are generally absent in banking practices in the Middle East. As the International Monetary Fund
notes of the region:
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obligations that might be deepened or broadened when informed by
the details of cognate legal regimes. Apart from general obligations to
provide for the welfare of inhabitants, as well as provisions concerning
an occupier's use of public and private property, matters of economic
regulation are almost wholly absent from the treaties.4 2 4
In fact, a reference to international legal "context" here would tend
to restrict, not enhance, an occupier's legislative competence in eco-
nomic affairs. Emerging from colonialism, newly developing countries
reacted against Western economic power by introducing a robust
notion of economic sovereignty into international law.4 25 On this view,
426
economic policy is a matter of legitimate diversity among states. This
preservation of domestic competences stands in contrast to the now-
dominant assumption that human rights deviating from global norms
are not proper exercises of sovereign discretion, even for states not
parties to the major treaties. Much of the developing world's "new
international economic order" did not survive the turbulent era of its
[T] he banking sector is dominated by public sector banks, which are characterized by
government intervention in credit allocation, losses and liquidity problems, and wide
interest rate spreads (or spreads in rates of returns). In more than half the countries,
the banking sector is highly concentrated, with assets of the three largest banks
accounting for over 65 percent of total commercial bank assets, and the entry of new
banks is difficult. And in many parts of the region, there is an urgent need for
developing modern banking and financial skills.
Susan Creane et al., International Monetary Fund, Financial Development in the MiddleEast and North
Africa (2003), at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/med/2003/eng/creane/.
424. Articles 46-53 of the Hague Regulations, supra note 10, address public and private
property, requisitions, pillage, and other matters such as levies to support the occupation. Article
53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 11, deals with destruction of personal property.
But "[tihe general rule requiring respect for fundamental institutions would seem to have
important economic and financial implications. It would seem that an occupant has no right to
transform a liberal into a communistic or fascistic economy, except so far as military or
public-order needs should require individual changes." ERNST H. FEILCHENFELD, THE IN1rENATIONAL
ECONOMIC LAW OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION 90 (1942).
425. See generally JERZY MAKARCZYK, PRINCIPLES OF A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER
(1988).
426. The General Assembly's Friendly Relations Declaration, frequently cited by the Interna-
tional Court of Justice as evidence of customary law, provides that "[a]ll States enjoy sovereign
equality. They have equal rights and duties and are equal members of the international
community, notwithstanding differences of an economic, social, political or other nature." Friendly
Relations Declaration, supra note 365. The ICJ has cited the Friendly Relations Declaration as
authoritative. See, e.g., Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall, supra note 217, 87-88,
156.
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birth. And to be sure, when developing states join trade organizations
such as the WTO or accept assistance from international financial
institutions, their range of economic policy choices shrinks dramati-
cally.427 But states choose to operate under these constraints. This is the
essential point for occupation law. The economic sovereignty move-
ment did not prescribe a particular economic model, though many
proponents rejected market mechanisms. Instead, it sought to protect
opportunities for legitimate choice, unconstrained by such burdens as
concession contracts entered into by former colonial powers, to pick a
common example from the 1960s. The principle of autonomy in
choosing economic models has remained integral to international
law.4 28 It is legitimate, for example, for a state to decide that utilities,
media outlets, natural resource extraction, and other strategically
important industries should be government-owned or off-limits to
foreign ownership. In short, there is no normative obligation for a
post-occupation government to choose a market economy (or any
component thereof) over a command and control system. A fortiori,
that choice cannot be made in its stead by an occupying power.
Nonetheless, a clear trend exists in the world away from centrally
planned economies and toward free markets. International organiza-
tions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund are
entirely devoted to implementing market-based reforms in developing
countries. And foreign direct investment grew steadily across the globe
in the 1990s, though it has dipped in recent years. 429 Thus, the CPA
might have argued that even if conventional sources of law did not
427. See Dermot McCann, Small States in Globalizing Markets: The End of National Economic
Sovereignty?, 34 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 281 (2001).
428. This autonomy principle has been described as
one that takes seriously the self-determination of peoples as extending to fundamental
choices of political, economic, social, and cultural systems (as provided for in numerous
authoritative international instruments), notwithstanding the ontological primacy of
the individual and the universality of certain basic principles of human equality. This
standard allows that the collective capacity to make fundamental decisions, and to have
outside actors acknowledge their status as governing law, has a moral value indepen-
dent of thejustice or injustice of the decisions themselves (albeit a moral value that may
be trumped where that capacity is egregiously abused).
Brad R. Roth, Anti-Sovereigntism, Liberal Messianism, and Excesses in the Drive Against Impunity, 2001
FINNISH Y.B. INT'L L. 17, 26-27 (2001) (footnote omitted).
429. U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV., WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT, 2002, U.N. Sales No.
E.02.11.D.4 (2002). It is noteworthy that this report does not even cover foreign direct investment
in the Middle East, though all other regions of the developing world are discussed.
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support liberalizing the Iraqi economy, there is a sufficient consensus
in the world to find little objectionable in the CPA's actions. Have not
recent trends, it might have said, at least put to rest the claim that Iraqis
would be worse off under a liberalized economy?
The trouble with this superficially attractive claim is that it seeks to
elide the distinction between state practice giving rise to legal obliga-
tions and state practice simply expressing policy preferences. The
former arises according to the requirements of customary international
law, which act as an essential filtering mechanism: only practice under-
stood by the states themselves as reflecting legal obligations can be
counted.4 3 0 To interpret the Hague Regulations according to mere
policy preferences, however strongly felt at the moment, risks consign-
ing the Fourth Geneva Convention to an ebb and flow of meaning
according to trends in sub-normative international opinion.
The varying interpretations given the economic clauses in the Hague
Regulations well illustrate this danger. As noted, when the Regulations
were drafted in 1907 there were few centrally planned economies.
Strict protection was therefore afforded to private property, and an
occupier's assumption of economic functions previously in the hands
of private industry was assumed to be prohibited.43' But by the mid-
twentieth century, state socialism had emerged as a competing eco-
nomic model. This led several commentators to question whether the
Regulations might be ignored by states that had come to have far less
regard for the sanctity of private property than the drafters.432 Today,
of course, the pendulum has swung back, and the Hague Regulations
may be criticized for impeding the undoing of state-owned and regu-
430. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 8-9 (6th ed. 2003).
431. Hague Regulations, supra note 10, art. 46 ("Family honors and rights, the lives of
persons, and private property, as well as religious convictions and practice, must be respected.
Private property cannot be confiscated.").
432. See FEILCHENFELD, supra note 424, at 24-25. Stone, for example, criticized the Hague
Regulations at length for their antiquated assumptions of laissez-faire economics. Writing in 1954,
he observed:
Even in capitalist economies there has been a sweeping assertion of State power over
economic ownership and control. This shows itself in the movement from the laissez
faire of the liberal State, to the setting of collectivist goals. New objectives are matched
by new techniques and practices of governmental intervention and manipulation. The
field of private property has been steadily eroded, and even the residual field subjected
to political control.
STONE, supra note 220, at 728.
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lated economic structures. In a future perhaps characterized by the
hyper-mobility of capital, disease pandemics, and environmental crises,
central economic planning may yet make a come-back. But a treaty's
meaning should not shift regularly depending on prevailing policy
preferences. Only when states choose to codify a particular economic
model in law should an argument be made for its recognition by
occupation law.
b. Foreign Investment
A separate comment on the foreign investment reforms is needed,
since they are potentially the most far-reaching enacted by the CPA.
The new Iraqi foreign investment law opened virtually all sectors of the
Iraqi economy to foreign ownership. All utilities (electrical supply,
telephone service, retail gasoline sales, home heating oil, and internet
service) may be owned by non-Iraqis. The same is true for transporta-
tion, media of all kinds, banks, and the entire manufacturing sector. In
competition between foreign and domestic providers, no preference is
given to Iraqi businesses, as all foreign investors are subject to national
treatment. Moreover, all restrictions on the repatriation of profits are
eliminated.
No general multilateral treaty on foreign investment exists, though
many states have entered into webs of bilateral investment treaties.
433
While some Arab states have begun reforming their foreign investment
regimes, many retain the restrictions on foreign investment swept away
by CPA Order No. 39.434 These include restrictions on foreign owner-
ship in certain sectors, local content requirements, requirements for
433. The World Trade Organization does not yet address barriers to foreign investment of
the kind dismantled by the CPA. See SHERIF H. SEID, GLOBAL REGULATION OF FOREIGN DIRECT
INvrSTME.Nr 58 (2002). The WTO's Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) is
narrowly tailored to address investment barriers related to the free flow of goods, such as domestic
content requirements or restrictions on exports by foreign investors. Agreement on Trade-
Related Investment Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex ]A, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125
(1994), available at http://www.wto.org/English/docs e/legal_e/ 18-trims.pdf. An attempt by the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development to negotiate a Multilateral Agree-
ment on Investment foundered in 1998. SEID, supra, at 88-94.
434. SeeJoseph Ghougassian, Iraq, 38 INT'L LAw. 712, 713 (2004) (Order 39 "is the most
liberal law in the Arab world, and the most transparent and most attractive directive to foreign
investment in the Middle East.").
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hiring domestic labor, and capital repatriation limits. 43 5 The nature
and degree of the restrictions vary greatly, but no Arab state has taken
the CPA's approach of eliminating virtually all restrictions on foreign
direct investment. The Arab world as a whole received less than 1% of
the total global flow of foreign direct investment from 1975 to 1998.436
Moreover, the little foreign investment by global multinationals was
generally limited to secondary economic activities and did not establish
bases for industrial production designed to export to world markets.43 7
As the United Nations Development Program concluded in 2002,
"[t] he Arab world remains comparatively cut off from financial global-
ization."438 Neither global nor regional norms, in short, support the
CPA's extreme version of free trade.
5. Good Government Reforms
The CPA's anti-corruption initiatives, including creation of an Iraqi
Commission on Public Integrity, reformation of the Supreme Board of
Audit, and placement of an Auditor General in each government
ministry, follow an increasing global focus on the costs of official
corruption. 439 Because the CPA supervised all the Iraqi ministries and
their staff during the occupation, these reforms were quite clearly
intended primarily for the post-occupation period. This creates a
presumption against their compatibility with occupation law. But prob-
lems also exist under the theory that global anti-corruption norms may
be incorporated into an occupier's legal obligations. Occupation law
contains no prohibitions or even general guidelines on corruption that
might serve as an entry point for incorporating international norms. A
U.N. treaty on corruption exists, but only five parties have ratified it
and it was not yet in force during the occupation.44 ° Regional treaties
435. Florence Eid & Fiona Paua, Foreign Direct Investment in the Arab World: The Changing
Investment Landscape, in THE ARAB WORLD COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2002-2003, at 108,113-16 (Peter
K. Cornelius & Klaus Schwab eds., World Econ. Forum 2003).
436. UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2002, at 87
(2002) [hereinafter AHDR 20021.
437. UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2003, at
136-37 (2003).
438. AHDR 2002, supra note 436, at 87.
439. See generally Symposium, On Combating the Culture of Corruption, 10 Sw. J. L. & TRADE AM.
243 (2004) (containing several articles addressing corruption in Latin America).
440. See United Nations Convention Against Corruption, U.N. GAOR, 58th Sess., Annex,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/4 (2003). The Convention will come into force when thirty states have
ratified. Id. art. 68(1). Information on States Parties is available at http://www.unodc.org/unodc/
en/crimesignaturesscorruption.html.
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exist, but only the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment (OECD) and Latin American conventions are in force.44'
Moreover, each takes a different approach to combating corruption,
with the OECD treaty addressing the "supply" side and the Inter-
American treaty addressing both the "supply" and "demand" sides.442
As for the "portable obligations" theory, none of the anti-corruption
treaties explicitly creates extra-territorial obligations that require States
Parties to address corrupt acts by non-citizens occurring in foreign
territory.
E. The Precedent of Occupied Germany
The final argument justifying CPA actions seeks a precedent in the
Allied occupation of post-World War II Germany. Superficially, the
German and Iraqi cases appear quite similar. In both, the victorious
powers concluded that the ideology and leading members of the
former regime posed irredeemable threats to peace and future stabil-
ity. Accordingly, party structures were abolished and party members
purged from leadership positions. A zero-tolerance policy for the ideas
and symbols of the former regime was instituted.
The details of the German occupation are essential to understanding
the validity of this comparison. On May 9, 1945, the post-Hitler German
Government, led by Admiral D6nitz, signed a Final Act of Uncondi-
tional Surrender.4 43 This was followed on June 5 by the Berlin Declara-
tion, in which the Allies set out principles to govern their control over
Germany. The Berlin Declaration stated that there was "no central
Government or authority in Germany capable of accepting responsibil-
441. See Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions, Dec. 17, 1997, S. TREATY Doe. No. 105-43, 37 I.L.M. 1 (1998), available at
http://www.olis.oecd.org/olis/1997doc.nsf/LinkTo/daffe-ime-br(97)20; Inter-American Conven-
tion Against Corruption, Mar. 29, 1996, S. TREATY Doc. No. 105-39, 35 I.L.M. 727 (1996). The
Organization of African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption has only
four parties and is not yet in force. Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption,July 11,
2003, available at http://www.africa-union.org/Officialdocuments/Treaties_%20Conventions_
%20Protocols/Convention%20on%20Combating%20Corruption.pdf; see also List of Countries
Which Have Signed, Ratified/Acceded to the African Convention on Preventing and Combating
Corruption as of Aug. 27, 2004, available at http://www.africa-union.org/Official-documents/
Treaties-%20Conventions-%20Protocols/List/African%20Convention%20n %20Combating%
20Corruption.pdf.
442. See generally Brian C. Harms, Note, Holding Public Officials Accountable in the International
Realm: A New Multi-Layered Strategy to Combat Corruption, 33 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 159 (2000).
443. Act of Surrender by Germany, Signed at Berlin, May 8, 1945, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON
GERMANY, 1944-1985, at 14 (U.S. Dep't of State ed., 1985).
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ity for the maintenance of order, the administration of the country and
compliance with the requirements of the victorious Powers. ' 444 It
therefore announced:
The Governments of the United States of America, the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom, and the
Provisional Government of the French Republic, hereby as-
sume supreme authority with respect to Germany, including all
the powers possessed by the German Government, the High
Command and any state, municipal, or local government or
authority. The assumption, for the purposes stated above, of
the said authority and powers does not affect the annexation of
Germany.445
Authority was to be exercised by the Allied Control Council, which
would coordinate the actions of individual national authorities in four
separate zones of occupation. The Council's first proclamation, on
August 30, 1945, declared that "supreme authority in matters affecting
Germany as a whole has been conferred upon" it.4 4 6 The four-power
organs operated fitfully until 1948 when, after France blocked the
creation of central German administrative departments and the Soviet
Union left the Council altogether, authority devolved to the individual
zonal authorities.447 Cold War tensions soon dictated the course of
events: the three western zones merged in 1949, and when the occupa-
tions finally terminated in 1955 the occupation lines had hardened
into the state borders of East and West Germany. 44
A wide-ranging program of "de-Nazification" was an early and central
aim of the occupation. 44 9 At Yalta, the Allies had agreed to "destroy
German militarism and Nazism" and to "wipe out the Nazi Party, Nazi
444. Declaration Regarding the Defeat of Germany and the Assumption of Supreme Authority by the
Allied Powers, Signed at Berlin, June 5, 1945, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON GERMANY, supra note 443, at
33.
445. Id.
446. Theodor Schweisfurth, Germany, Occupation After World War II, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 582, 584 (1995).
447. Id. at 584-85.
448. Id. at 586-87.
449. Elmer Plischke, Denazification Law and Procedure, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 807 (1947). At the
Potsdam Conference in August 1945, the Allies declared, "All Nazi laws which provided the basis
of the Hitler regime or established discrimination on grounds of race, creed, or political opinion
shall be abolished. No such discriminations, whether legal, administrative or otherwise, shall be
tolerated." Report on the Tripartite Conference of Berlin, reprinted in 2 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED
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laws, organizations and institutions.,, 4 50 Accordingly, Control Council
Law No.1 repealed a core of Nazi laws and implementing measures and
provided that no other discriminatory legislation would be enforced.45'
Other provisions, such as those related to High Treason, were repealed
by Control Council Law No. 11. 4 5 2 Control Council Law No. 2 abol-
ished the Nazi Party and affiliated organizations and declared them
henceforth illegal. 453 A parallel process was undertaken to identify,
arrest and ban from public life the individuals most closely associated
with Nazi policy and institutions. 454 As Wolfgang Friedmann observes,
the Allies were confronted with "the penetration of Nazism into all
parts of German life, public and private." 4 55 The de-Nazification pro-
gram "was dictated by the desire to reverse the process as far as
humanly possible." 56
What was the legal basis for the Allied actions? In order to claim the
German occupation as precedent for Iraq, one would need to argue
that the Allied reforms were somehow permissible under Hague law.
Yet to reconcile those extensive reforms with the conservationist ethic
of occupation law seems an impossible task. As Friedmann wrote:
[E]ven the most elastic interpretation could not bring the
wholesale abolition of laws, the denazification procedure, the
arrest of thousands of individuals, the introduction of sweeping
social reforms, the expropriation of industries, and above all
the sweeping changes in the territorial and constitutional struc-
ture of Germany within the rights of belligerent occupation.
These are symbols of sovereign government, yet it is of the
essence of belligerent occupation that it does not claim such
powers.
457
STATES: THE CONFERENCE OF BERLIN (THE POTSDAM CONFERENCE) 1945, at 1499, 1503 (U.S. Dep't of
State ed., 1960).
450. Communiqui Issued at the End of the Conference, reprinted in FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE
UNITED STATES: THE CONFERENCES AT MALTA AND YALTA 1945, at 968, 970 (U.S. Dep't of State ed.,
1955).
451. Plischke, supra note 449, at 810-11.
452. Id. at 811.
453. Id. at 810.
454. Id. at 811.
455. W. FRIEDMANN, THE ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF GERMANY 112 (1947).
456. Id.
457. Id. at 65; see also United States v. Tiede, 86 F.R.D. 227, 230 (U.S. Ct. Berlin 1979) ("The
Allies' objectives in occupied Germany went far beyond an ordinary belligerent occupation of
enemy territory.").
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Confronted with this legal obstacle to a central post-war objective,
Allied international lawyers faced a stark choice: concede that the Allies
had violated occupation law, or produce arguments as to why occupa-
tion law did not constrain their actions. Unsurprisingly, virtually all
chose the latter path.458 Some argued that the Allies had effectively
conquered Germany, and the old doctrine of debellatio allowed the
Allies to govern the state.459 But not only was this view inconsistent with
the contemporaneous prosecution of Nazi leaders at Nuremberg for
their annexation of Poland, but the Berlin Declaration itself explicitly
denied that an annexation had been effected.460 Others asserted that
the German state had wholly ceased to exist and that the territory had
become res nullius, which under traditional international law meant
that it was available for acquisition by any power asserting effective
control and claiming title.4 6' But the formality of surrender and the
continued functioning of at least some local governmental units belied
this claim, as did the lack of any mention of state dissolution in the
Potsdam Agreement setting out the Allies' post-war objectives. More-
over, if the Allies had disclaimed taking steps to annex the German
state, they presumably had not taken the much more drastic step of
extinguishing it altogether.
By far the most influential theory was that put forth by Robert
Jennings.462 Jennings recognized that "the whole raison d itre of the law
of belligerent occupation is absent in the circumstances of the Allied
occupation of Germany, and to attempt to apply it would be a manifest
anachronism." 463 The anachronism arose because the Allies had nei-
ther annexed Germany nor terminated the state of warfare through a
peace treaty (which was never in fact concluded).464 The assumption
that occupation would be a temporary event awaiting one of these two
outcomes was therefore absent. But in Jennings' view, the Allies could
458. See Schweisfurth, supra note 446, at 587-88 (summarizing various legal theories).
459. See Hans Kelsen, The Legal Status of Germany According to the Declaration of Berlin, 39 Am. J.
INT'L L. 518, 520 (1945).
460. See Declaration Regarding the Defeat of Germany, supra note 444, at 33.
461. See MICHEL VIRALLY, LADMINISTRATION INTERNATIONALE DE L'ALLEMAGNE 26 (1948).
462. See Roberts, supra note 218, at 269 (describingJennings' article as "authoritative").
463. Jennings, supra note 377, at 136. The British government came to agree with Jennings.
The 1958 edition of its military manual, citingJennings' article, states, "The position in Germany
after the unconditional surrender has given rise to much controversy. It was probably not
governed by the Hague Rules 42-56." THE LAw OF WAR ON LAND, supra note 228, at 140 n.2, 1 499.
464. The Berlin Declaration remained in effect until it was terminated in 1990 by the
agreement on German reunification. SeeTreaty on the Final Settiement with Respect to Germany,
Sept. 12,1990, art. 7, S. TREATy No. 101-20, 1696 U.N.T.S. 123, 128.
[Vol. 36
THE OCCUPATION OF IRAQ
have subjugated and annexed Germany, thereby acquiring title to the
state and, as sovereigns (perhaps in condominium), the right to make
whatever changes they desired to national laws and institutions. That
they chose not to pursue this course did not mean they could not
engage in a lesser form of subjugation, one that would also confer
powers of governance:
[I]f as a result of the Allied victory and the German uncondi-
tional surrender Germany was so completely at the disposal of
the Allies as tojustify them in law in annexing the German state,
it would seem to follow that they are by the same token entitled
to assume the rights of supreme authority unaccompanied by
annexation; for the rights assumed by the Allies are coextensive
with the rights comprised in annexation, the difference being
only in the mode, purpose, and duration of their exercise, the
declared purpose of the occupying Powers being to govern the
territory not as an integral part of their own territories but in
the name of a continuing German state.46 5
InJennings' view, the Allies had annexed the German Government but
not the state, and that annexation was sufficient to avoid their assuming
the status of belligerent occupants.
This was clearly an essential conclusion for Allied international
lawyers. But ifJennings was correct that the right to subjugate a state a
fortiori created a right to subjugate its government, then any occupation
following an unconditional surrender could fall into this "third cat-
egory" at the discretion of the victors. The victors' actions would
thereby fall beyond the reach of the Hague Regulations. Moreover, as
Friedmann pointed out, if the Allies had stepped into the shoes of the
German Government and, in the absence of a peace treaty, the state of
war with Germany continued, the conclusion must be that "the allies
are at war with themselves." 466 This would have required the Control
Council, an Allied institution, "to assert rules of warfare on behalf of
Germany against the allied governments."
4 67
Beyond these incoherencies, two post-war developments have made
Jennings' reasoning virtually impossible to replicate for the Iraqi
occupation. First, the Fourth Geneva Convention applies occupation
465. Jennings, supra note 377, at 137.
466. FRIEDMANN, supra note 455, at 66.
467. Id.
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law to "all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High
Contracting Party., 468 This includes occupations following surren-
der.469 Jennings' "anachronistic" category of territory neither annexed
nor subject to a peace treaty simply does not exist under Geneva law.
Second, the illegality of state annexation under article 2 (4) of the U.N.
Charter, even in a war of self-defense, renders Jennings' a fortiori
argument untenable. The sanctity of existing borders has been one of
the cornerstones of post-Cold War international practice. This is no less
true for Iraq, since the Security Council consistently reaffirmed the
"sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq., 470
A realpolitik conclusion may well be justified that the Allies' actions
in Germany constituted breaches of occupation law perpetrated by
victors upon the vanquished, but given the nature of the war, one could
not imagine them acting otherwise. As a matter of international law,
this might lead one to conclude that the Hague regime had been so
blatantly ignored as to have suffered irreparable damage. But this view
helps little in understanding Iraq. For one thing, the Hague Regula-
tions were emphatically reaffirmed and substantially expanded just a
few years later in the Fourth Geneva Convention. And early in the Iraqi
occupation, both the United States and the Security Council affirmed
that both Hague and Geneva law governed the CPA's actions. Even the
occupiers themselves, evidently, were not willing to claim the German
experience as precedent for wholly ignoring occupation law, including
the conservationist principle.
468. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 11, art. 2 (emphasis added).
469. The ICRC Commentaries focus on the need to apply occupation law in the absence of a
final peace treaty, a circumstance crucial toJennings' analysis. "An armistice suspends hostilities
and a capitulation ends them, but neither ends the state of war, and any occupation carried out in
wartime is covered by paragraph I [of article 2]. It is, for that matter, when a country is defeated
that the need for international protection is most felt." PICrET, supra note 243, at 22. The
formalities of terminating war also play no role in the U.S. Army's view of when an occupation
commences:
Military occupation is a question of fact. It presupposes a hostile invasion, resisted or
unresisted, as a result of which the invader has rendered the invaded government
incapable of publicly exercising its authority, and that the invader has successfully
substituted its own authority for that of the legitimate government in the territory
invaded.
THE LAw OF LAND WARAR, supra note 250, 355.
470. See S.C. Res. 1511, supra note 39, 1; S.C. Res. 1500, supra note 38, pmbl.; S.C. Res. 1483,
supra note 25, pmbl.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
The occupation of Iraq was a remarkable episode in international
law. The first occupation acknowledged as such since the Fourth
Geneva Convention was drafted, Iraq dramatically challenged the
vitality of the conservationist principle, which lies at the doctrinal core
of occupation law. It did so by pursuing social reforms far removed
from the objectionable Nazi practices that led Geneva drafters to
include a catalogue of individual rights in the treaty. Instead, the CPA's
reforms resonate with many widely subscribed trends in contemporary
international society. At the same time, the CPA's actions came immedi-
ately following a conflict deeply unpopular in the Security Council,
which had numerous opportunities to pass judgment on CPA actions.
The Council's response to the reforms, best described as studiously
ambiguous, reflected this ongoing sense of discomfort.
Most of the reforms appear inconsistent with the literal meaning of
Hague and Geneva law. A limited exception exists for some of the
substantive human rights reforms, which can be reconciled (though
uneasily) with many of the affirmative obligations Geneva law imposes
on occupiers. Remedial and supervisory human rights reforms are
more suspect, as they clearly depart from the substantive prohibitions
in the treaty. And virtually none of the de-Ba'athification measures and
military, economic, and good government reforms finds support in the
treaty texts.
Two theories purporting to justify the reforms by asserting the
inapplicability of occupation law-consent by the Iraqi Governing
Council and legislative fiat by the Security Council acting under
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter-do not appear convincing. The
former is refuted both by the Geneva Convention's strong presumption
against sanitizing agreements with pliant local bodies and by the
Governing Council's lack of an independent voice in occupation
governance. If the Council lacked the authority to disapprove CPA
actions, the value of its purported approval of certain reforms is
minimal. Legitimization by the Security Council encounters not only
the lack of clarity in Council resolutions-they both expressed indirect
support for some of the CPA's policy goals and insisted on strict
adherence to occupation law-but a stark contrast with the clear
language used in past resolutions to authorize post-conflict nation-
building missions. Even as the Iraqi occupation was unfolding, Council-
authorized missions in Bosnia and Kosovo continued to operate under
these reformist mandates.
Three more ambitious justifications directly challenge the conserva-
tionist principle, in whole or in part. The first claims that it is an
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anachronism, arguing that the now common approach of condemning
the practices of non-democratic regimes and, occasionally, intervening
to remove them from power, cannot co-exist with a norm that would
object to the central goals of such an intervention. But this claim would
largely eviscerate the important assumption of non-annexation at the
heart of occupation law, as well as impermissibly blend jus in bello and
jus ad bellum principles. The conservationist principle still resonates
with values fundamental to contemporary international law.
A more persuasive claim is that the substantive rights and implemen-
tation responsibilities in human rights treaty law should inform our
understanding of Hague and Geneva law. These external norms may
support CPA reforms either as a matter of treaty interpretation or as
"portable" legal obligations binding on the United States by virtue of its
exercising effective control over Iraqi territory. But as a delicate accom-
modation between two conflicting normative premises- conservation
and reform-an occupier cannot be held to the same human rights
obligations as a state acting within its own territory. Otherwise the
accommodation would become a preemption. A limited support for
the CPA's human rights initiatives emerges from this approach. But
reading occupation law in light of external norms cannot legitimate
the other areas of CPA reform. In most of these areas treaty obligations
simply do not exist. In others, the obligations are not extra-territorial.
And most importantly, the Hague and Geneva treaties contain few if
any obligations in these areas that might serve as entry points for
external norms. While there may be many good policy arguments for
the CPA's economic, military, and good government reforms, there are
few good legal arguments.
A final purported justification based on the Allied occupation of
post-war Germany fails because the contemporary arguments for why
the Hague rules did not bind the Allies cannot be replicated under
current international law.
Resort to all these arguments could have been avoided, of course,
had the United States sought an integral role for the United Nations at
the outset of the occupation. A Security Council mandate would have
superseded the conservationist principle by invoking a superior interna-
tional obligation and could have provided an opportunity to make
clear that a consensus within the United Nations supported reform in
Iraq. Since the CPA seems to have taken past Council-sanctioned
missions as an inspiration for its actions, a multilateral route may not
have changed much of the legislative agenda in Iraq. But it would have
avoided the dispiriting spectacle of the United States justifying worthy
substantive initiatives on specious procedural grounds. Claims that the
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reforms were permitted by occupation law itself at best render a central
portion of that law incoherent. And claims that the reforms were
authorized by the Security Council threaten to marginalize the Council
by reading great depth of meaning into the blandest of its language.
The distinction between multilateral and unilateral actions-particu-
larly in the sensitive area of national governance-is hopelessly blurred
by such overreaching.
But the distinction is important and needs to remain clear. The
lessons of the Iraqi occupation ought to center on this point. In an age
of globalization and human rights, it is easy to discount the value of
national political processes. It is particularly easy where, as in Iraq, the
reasons given for imposing a new politics (and economics) on a state
are ones broadly consistent with human rights and other areas of
evident international consensus. It is easy, in other words, to treat all
opportunities for nation-building alike, whether they are unilateral or
multilateral in origin, staffing, and oversight. But as demonstrated by
the insurgency that persisted throughout the occupation, laudable
substantive goals alone do not legitimize the actions of nation-builders.
Legitimacy emerges from right process, a point generally understood
in domestic legal systems and, one would have thought, by now also
clear for the international legal system. 471 But unless future occupa-
tions receive the legitimating force of a collective mandate, the lesson
of Iraq should be that the conservationist principle retains its authority.
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